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For generations, public services in England have centred on top-down, centralised 
control, which since the 1990s has become increasingly underpinned by national 
performance regimes and increasing accountability mechanisms. Since 2010, there 
has been a political shift towards localised governance and delivery of public services 
of which greater collaboration across services has been seen to be a key enabler. 
However, this change in approach has been slower than some might have expected or 
desired. 
  
This research draws on the theories of historical institutionalism and complexity 
theory to understand how the governance of three public services in the Bristol city 
region – local government, the police and the National Health Service – has evolved 
and changed in recent years. Through a survey and qualitative interviews, the research 
examines the perceptions of a random sample of one per cent of the most senior 
leaders in these services to understand what the incentives and disincentives are in 
adopting a system-wide collaborative approach to cross public sector challenge. 
  
The research finds that leaders in each of the organisations understand the value of 
collaborative working and support its principles. However, historical institutional 
practices and path dependencies in the three different services, overlaid with national 
performance requirements, accountability mechanisms and governance structures, 
together with limited capacity and other determinants, has meant that collaboration is 
not systemised and significant change would need to take place if such an approach 
was to become more commonplace.  
  
The research concludes that employing a bottom-up collective service model would 
be more beneficial in the effective management of cross cutting, complex and 
enduring challenges than the top-down directional approaches that have characterised 




GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
APACS    Assessment of Policing and Community Safety 
 
BDS  Bristol Drugs Project  
 
CAA      Comprehensive Area Assessments  
 
CCG      Clinical Commissioning Group 
 
CPA      Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
 
CQC     Care Quality Commission 
 
DSO     Departmental Strategic Objectives  
 
GCSE   General Certificate of Secondary Education 
 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
 
KPMG  Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
 
KPI   Key Performance Indicators 
 
LAA    Local Area Agreements 
 
LGA    Local Government Association 
 
MAA    Multi Area Agreements 
 
MRSA   Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus 
 
NAO    National Audit Office 
 
NHS    National Health Service 
 
PCT    Primary Care Trust 
 
PPAF    Policing Performance Assessment Framework 
 
PSA    Public Service Agreements 
 
SARI  Stand Against Racism and Inequality 
 
SHA    Strategic Health Authorities 
 
STP    Sustainability and Transformation Partnership 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Setting the Context 
 
For generations, public services in England have centred on top-down, centralised 
control, which in the 1990s became increasingly underpinned by national 
performance regimes and proliferating accountability mechanisms. However, in 
recent times, there has been an increasing political shift towards a more localised 
approach to the delivery of public services, and several factors have contributed to 
this, which include:  
 
• Criticism of existing systems from practitioners, professionals, academics, and 
sections of the media;  
• Changing public demands and expectations about how public services are 
delivered; 
• Growing availability and access to data from advancing technology; 
• Reductions in government spending on public services; 
• Changes to public policy introduced by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
coalition government that came to office into 2010.  
 
These have all led to a drive to do things differently, both nationally and locally. 
 
A Changing Political Landscape 
 
In December 2010 the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government set out 
its commitment to end the era of top-down government by decentralising the delivery 
of local services and giving power back to local people, signalling a significant 
political shift in public administration. This political support, coupled with growing 
demand, decreasing budgets and rising public expectations meant there could never 
have been a better time for more locally agreed priorities and increased collaborative 
work across public services. However, despite the political drive and general 
acceptance amongst many public service practitioners that a more collaborative cross-
sector approach would be more effective and efficient (Milward and Proven, 1998; 
Huxham and Vangen, 2000a; Agranoff, 2005), performance management systems 
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based on traditional internal indicators of competition and internal markets have 
remained a stubborn barrier to progress (Harfield, 1997; Skogan et al.; 1999; 
Neyroud, 2002; Cordner, 2004; Fridell, 2004; Bird et al., 2005; Vito, 2005). 
 
Considerable research has been conducted to try to understand precisely how agencies 
coordinate and integrate collaborative activities (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Bolland 
and Wilson, 1994; Provan and Milward, 1995), however evaluating their effectiveness 
has been extraordinarily complex and consequently somewhat neglected (Proven and 
Milward, 1995). There have been various reasons espoused for why collaboration 
fails, including aspects regarding complexity, ambiguity, and tension (Williams, 
2012) and a lack of clarity on who is accountable for what is another critical factor. 
When many organisations participate it becomes challenging to hold a single one to 
account, running the risk that nobody takes responsibility for success or failure (Van-
Dooren, 2011).  
 
In January 2019, Bristol Council published its ‘One City Plan’ aimed at bringing 
together public services to achieve a set of common goals. In the introduction to the 
plan, the Mayor of Bristol, Marvin Rees, described the complexity and lack of 
interconnectivity across public services stating that: 
 
"When we began work on the City Plan, we found hundreds of unaligned city 
strategies pointing towards over 1,500 city measures with decisions being 
made across tens of disconnected city boards." 
 
However, while the need for change has been clearly stated, not only the requirements 
of existing performance regimes and accountability mechanisms, but the 
organisational history, differing constraints and the variance in path dependence, has 








Outline of the Research Content 
 
Chapter Two firstly outlines the research topic, explains why it was chosen and then 
discusses the significance of the theoretical concepts of historical institutionalism and 
complexity theory and how these inform the research. It then sets out the research 
aims and questions, the role of the Researcher, the ethical considerations, the 
authorisation required, and the mitigation of potential biases. Finally, it concludes 
with a discussion about the contribution the study makes to the field and the lessons it 
offers for public sector reform in England.  
 
Chapter Three seeks out the existing literature relevant to this research topic, in order 
to understand what is already known, who the key contributors are, and what theories 
they have applied to the subject. This was done by way of a sequential historical 
review of the emerging approaches to public administration across the police, local 
government and health and is followed by a discussion on how this has resulted in a 
complex landscape in which a variety of theoretical and practical approaches have 
emerged.  
 
Chapter Four explains the methodology used in the research. In doing so it discusses 
the choice of using a mixed-methods approach, how the relationship between these 
approaches worked, and how these were selected, sequenced and connected. Finally, 
it discusses the conduct of each phase of the empirical data collection and analysis, 
and the mitigation of any potential bias. 
 
Chapter Five analyses the findings of the self-completing online survey sent to a 
random sample of one per cent of the most senior leaders from Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary, Bristol City Council and University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation 
Trust. It examines the four key themes of public administration, performance 
management, accountability and collaborative working that emerged from the 
literature review and considers the historical influence traditional public 
administration and new public management have had on the path dependence of the 
organisations in this research. 
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Chapter Six considers the findings from the qualitative empirical interviews 
conducted with 16 of the most senior leaders from Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 
Bristol City Council and University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, as well 
as national stakeholders in the field.  This chapter tests and builds on the findings of 
the survey under the four key themes and adds three additional themes of joint 
leadership development, the use of data and organisational values that all emerged 
during the interviews. 
 
Chapter Seven draws together the conclusions from the survey and interviews under 
the seven themes. It then returns to the aims, questions and hypotheses and tests these 
against the findings from the empirical research. In doing so, it discusses the 
relevance of the underpinning theoretical concepts of historical institutionalism and 
complexity theory and how, in practical terms, incremental change and critical 
junctures have influenced the path dependence of the respective organisations to the 
detriment of cross-sector collaborative working. The conclusions identify why a 
bottom-up service-led approach to collaboration is likely to gain greater traction, than 
solely attempting to increase collaborative efforts through a directional top-down 
approach.  
 
Chapter Eight draws on the findings from existing literature and empirical research to 
identify several recommendations that might improve the collective delivery of public 
services. Explained through a model of collective public service delivery (figure 1) it 
describes ways in which cross-cutting, complex and enduring issues might be more 
effectively approached within the existing constraints. This model sets out five key 
steps that emerged during this research that demonstrate the value of a bottom-up 
service centred approach to collaboration, rather than top-down organisational 
change. These key stages involve a greater understanding of the overall demand the 
three organisations face, how they agree a clear set of shared priorities, what the 
appropriate intervention(s) might look like, how a process of joint performance 
management might assist this and finally how service provision is reviewed and 
leaders are trained and developed more collectively. This model is explained more 






























CHAPTER TWO: THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the reasons why the research topic was chosen and discusses 
the significance of the theoretical concepts of historical institutionalism and 
complexity theory and how these underpin the research topic. It then sets out the 
research aims and questions, the role of the Researcher, the ethical considerations, and 
the authorisation required to conduct the research. It then considers the potential 
biases that may be present and concludes with a discussion about the contribution the 
research makes to the field and the lessons it offers for public sector reform in 
England.  
 
The Rationale for the Research 
 
There is no single reason why people do social research, but the main reason is that 
there are aspects of our understanding of what goes on in society that is to some 
extent unresolved (Bryman, 2012). Despite many years of political and practitioner 
support for a more collaborative delivery of public services, from the Researcher's 
own professional experience, working at various levels within and across public 
services, it is apparent that existing performance frameworks, accountability 
mechanisms and institutional practices have done little to pull organisations towards a 
common aim. Despite acknowledgement from many that this is the case, and a 
willingness to work more collaboratively, the drivers within the existing system, 
together with an ingrained legacy of differing approaches to public management has 
made change a challenging process. This research acquires and disseminates new 
knowledge in this topical field and adds to the knowledge, understanding, and 
appreciation of the topic.  
 
The review of the literature identifies several gaps in the existing research. This study 
aims to fill some of those gaps and provide an opportunity to shape the ways in which 
policy and practice operate in the delivery of public services. Through critical analysis 
of related work, comparative field analysis across local services, and a broader 
comparison across the UK, the research tests an issue of significant social importance. 
 16 
The outcome is intended to add value in considering the incentives and disincentives 
of a more collective approach to the delivery of public services.  
 
Choosing the Population Group 
 
The population group for the first phase of the research was a random sample of one 
per cent of the most senior leaders in the University Hospitals Bristol NHS 
Foundation Trust, Avon and Somerset Constabulary, and Bristol City Council. These 
are three of the largest public service providers in the Bristol city region, with a 
collective workforce of over 24,000 people. 
 
Those occupying the most senior positions were chosen as they hold a unique position 
between policy makers and frontline delivery in which they are responsible for 
interpreting national policy and embedding this into operational delivery. While much 
research has been conducted on policy formation and frontline delivery, this cohort 
has historically been tested less due to aspects concerning availability and access 
(Thuesen, 2011). This group of one per cent of the most senior leaders amounted to 
256 people across the three organisations and included chief executives, deputy chief 
executives, directors, deputy directors, departmental heads and their equivalent in the 
police. 
 
The second phase of the research involved interviews with the same elite group and 
included chief executives and deputy chief executives, the chief constable and senior 
executives in the police and national and regional commentators. It also included a 
former local government chief executive and civil service permanent secretary, a 
former NHS chief executives, a regional director in health regulation, the chief 
executives of the West of England Combined Authority, the chief executive of the 
Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group 
and the chair of the National Police Chief’s Council. 
 
In addition to the unique perspectives they hold, their interest in the topic, depth and 
detailed grasp of the accountability mechanisms and understanding of the pressures 
impacting on their service were all distinct. The selection of the sample group is 
explained further in Chapter Four. 
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Establishing the Aims of the Research and Understanding the Significance of the 
Underlying Theoretical Concepts of Historical Institutionalism and Complexity 
Theory 
 
This section outlines the overall aims of the research, the specific research questions 
and hypotheses. In doing so, it begins by setting out the theoretical concepts of 
historical institutionalism and complexity theory and discusses their underpinning 
significance to the research topic. 
Historical Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism theories predominately emerged in the 1980s, as studies of 
the State coincided with a renewed interest in institutions, producing an explanation 
of how chronological processes and events influenced the origin and transformation 
of institutions (Fioretos et al., 2016). Historical institutionalism promotes the theory 
that the configuration of institutions created in the past continues to structure the 
present in ways that often run counter to the interests or preferences of individuals. 
This has led to a more precise theoretical understanding of the impact of history and 
how institutions ordered political life through a variety of mechanisms that systemised 
the way people worked and constrained the way they behaved (March and Olsen, 
1983). As these theories have matured, the focus has turned to how institutions as a 
whole are considered as well as the role an individual plays within them (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Thelen, 1999), reinforcing the need to focus on longer 
horizons to understand why specific events happen (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). 
This has heightened interest in what creates or sustains institutions through coalitions, 
how rules or policies reflect particular ideas or beliefs, the influence of macro-
structures and institutional assemblages and how, at a more micro-level, institutions 
solve collective problems (Fioretos et al, 2016).  
 
Consequently, historical institutionalists such as Hall and Taylor (1996) have urged 
researchers to pay greater attention to politics and differences over the structure of 
institutions and contextual conditions, and other commentators reinforce the need to 
study whether, when, and how the same causal mechanisms yield different outcomes 
across time and space (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). 
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While the theoretical concept of historical institutionalism is more commonly applied 
to political science than to public service reform, its significance in this research in 
understanding how each institution’s behaviours and practices have been shaped is 
important, as it helps to explain any variance in path dependence and the incentives or 




Complexity theory is generally seen as a new approach to science that identifies (and 
then explains) systems or processes that lack the order and stability required to 
produce universal rules about behaviour and outcomes (Cairney, 2012). Complexity 
theory presents an opposing ideology to the historically embedded approaches of 
public administration as it supports a shift away from traditional top-down directional 
control to one that expands analysis from individual parts of a system to the whole 
system and promotes bringing the organisation to the ‘edge of chaos’ and then 
trusting workers to self-organise to solve problems (Grobman, 2005). Complexity 
theory has grown in popularity as the traditional approaches to organising public 
services have failed to grasp the complexity of modern-day public services and the 
growing range of complex social problems (Muir, 2014). As a theory, it is 
intrinsically linked to a system thinking approach that focuses on a relational and 
process style of thinking emphasising organisational patterns, networked relationships 
and historical context (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011) as well as the interconnectivity of 
elements within a system, and between a system and its environment (Mitleton-Kelly 
2000). Its association with whole system service-led approaches, rather than top-down 
directional change, is of particular significance in this research.  
 
Understanding how the theoretical concepts of historical institutionalism and 
complexity theory have underpinned the institutionalised behaviours and practices in 
each of the organisations in this study is of particular importance, not only in deciding 
the aims of the research but also in deciding the methodological approach.  
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Aims of the Research 
 
a) To examine the operation of different models and practices of public sector 
performance management and accountability in three vital public services – 
health, local government and the police - in a defined locality of England (the 
Bristol city region); 
 
b) To determine which are the dominant models and practices of management 
and accountability in these services; how they have developed in recent 
decades, and how they operate today;   
 
c) To establish whether collaborative, place-based and systems approaches to 
local public services constitute an emerging paradigm of public sector 
management and accountability in England, and, if so, how far such a 
paradigm is constrained or frustrated by the persistence of New Public 
Management (NPM) governance frameworks. 
 
Research Questions  
 
1. Which models of public sector management have the most significant 
prominence in the discourses and institutional practices of each of the 
organisations? 
 
2. How do senior officials perceive and interpret the models of accountability for 
performance in their respective organisations, and how do these models affect 
the way they manage and lead their respective organisations? 
 
3. How do the organisations' performance management systems and 
accountability mechanisms incentivise or disincentive a system-wide 
collaborative approach to solving complex cross-sector challenges? 
 
4. Is it necessary for legislative and structural change to take place before a 





From the review of the literature and the design of the research aims and questions, 
the following hypotheses were formulated: 
 
1. A place-based, collaborative and system-wide approach to public sector 
management is an emerging paradigm in local services in England and 
commands support from senior managers;  
 
2. Despite an apparent consensus amongst politicians and system leaders, the 
existing performance frameworks and layers of accountability create more 
disincentives, than incentives to change; 
 
3. In the long term a change to legislation, organisational structures and 
accountability frameworks may be necessary to enable a more collaborative 
approach to public service delivery; 
 
4. In the short term, a more collective form of performance management may 
ease the passage towards a more collaborative delivery of services. 
 
The scope of the research was manageable within the Researcher's time frames and 
capacity. In addition, it contained substantial and original dimensions, it was 
unambiguous, compelling, and advances and tests theory, and it satisfies the 














Use of Terminology in Research 
 
Various terms are often used interchangeably to describe how public sector 
organisations work beyond their organisational boundaries, whether that is within 
their own sector or extending further across other public services. These include 
joined-up, multi-agency, networks, partnership, and collaboration. There is no 
standard or accepted definition for any of these. Applied in this research, are the 
following   understandings of the aforementioned terms:  
 
• Joined-up - is used to describe the effective and efficient communication 
between central government departments. 
• Localism - is the transfer of power, authority and resources from central 
government to local government and other local public agencies, which in turn 
devolve to and empower communities (Evans, Marsh and Stoker, 2013);  
• Networks - There have been numerous attempts to define networks in a 
scientific, technological, social and biological setting (Newman, 2018) 
However, in this research the term is used to describe organisations with a 
common interest in solving unachievable problems or hard to achieve 
problems. (Agranoff and Maguire, 2001); 
• Multi-Agency Working - describes the formal cooperation between several 
providers of public services (in public, voluntary and sometimes private 
sectors) over the planning, delivery, and review of those services, especially in 
crime prevention and social welfare programmes; 
• Partnership - is used to describe the relationships built in both statutory and 
non-statutory multidisciplinary and inter-disciplinary settings between 
different organisation working towards common aims; 
• Collaboration – extends beyond information sharing and relationship building 
into access to each other's domains, altering activity and pooling resources. In 
this research, it is used to describe both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
networks or agencies uniting in specific deliverables both formally and 
informally to design and deliver services.  
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Partnership working might claim to be an end in itself in the building of relationships 
across services, whereas collaboration should not be seen as an end in itself, and 
relates to specific deliverables. 
 
The Role of the Researcher 
 
This section considers the positioning of the Researcher in the research process. The 
Researcher served as a police officer from 1984 until 2017, having reached the rank 
of chief constable. Before retirement, he held a prominent national role on the 
National Police Chiefs' Council Performance Management Board and was the 
national policing lead for crime statistics, a role he held from 2012 until 2017.  From 
2015 until his retirement he was chair of the Welsh Government's Effective Services 
Board, a cross-sector board of senior practitioners and government policy leads that 
worked together to identify solutions for effective services for the most vulnerable 
people in Wales.  
 
As the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) lead for crime statistics, he was 
responsible for representing the views of the service in the media and to parliamentary 
committees and was a member of the Home Secretary's Crime Statistics Advisory 
Committee. The Committee was responsible for advising the Home Secretary on 
national policy on crime recording.  He still retains a close personal and professional 
relationship with serving police officers at all levels, and with many police and crime 
commissioners, political leaders and senior officials in local government and health. 
 
In December 2017, he became the chair of the University Hospitals Bristol 
Foundation Trust, an acute trust that provides over 100 specialist medical services in 
and around Bristol, in addition to being a leading teaching and research centre. In this 
role, he has a strong professional relationship with staff across the whole spectrum of 
health care, nationally, and across the Bristol city region. In January 2018, he was 
appointed as non-executive director on the Welsh Government Board and chairs the 
Welsh Government's Senior Civil Service Remunerations and Appointments 
Committee. In September 2019, he was also appointed as the chair of Weston Area 




As a former chief constable and current chair of the University Hospitals Bristol 
Foundation Trust, the Researcher has unique access to politicians, policymakers and 
practitioners at a regional and national level, and is reliant on professional trust to 
operate in such a setting. Therefore any ethnographic approach to the research would 
have been problematic. Some commentators argue that concealment is intrinsic to 
social life (Punch, 1994), or that a researcher needs to be dishonest to get honest data 
(Gans, 1962), However, such an approach in light of the Researcher's position was 
untenable and unethical and a more universalist stance that breaks down ethical 
principles (Erikson, 1966; Dingwall, 1980; Bulmer, 1982) was favoured. Therefore, 
any research conducted had to be strictly overt and based on informed consent in 
which the intentions were explained at the outset and combined with a clear 
understanding from participants that they were not obliged to take part in the study.  
 
While the nature of the Researcher's role and responsibilities inevitably leads to some 
element of ethnography in the form of overt unstructured simple observation (Webb 
et al., 1966) due to the part he plays as a senior stakeholder in the field, this is 
different to deliberately masking oneself (Erikson, 1966). 
 
Authorisation and Consent 
 
Authority to conduct the research involved written agreement from the head of paid 
service in Bristol City Council, the chief executive of the University Hospitals Bristol 
NHS Foundation Trust and the chief constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary. 
This was necessary to enable the Researcher to carry out surveys within their 
organisations and interview key stakeholders. Voluntary participation and the 
University of Bath privacy policy was covered with recipients of the electronic 
survey, and written consent formed part of the semi-structured interviews. However, 
as Erickson (1966) identifies it would be absurd for sociologists to introduce 
themselves as investigators everywhere they go and inform every person who features 
in their thinking precisely what their research is about. The research proposal for the 
survey and the research proposal for the interviews were separately agreed by the 
Ethical Consent Committee of the University of Bath (Reference Numbers S19-014 
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and S19-043). This was in line with the policies and procedures of the Department of 




As a former chief constable, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for crime 
statistics and the current chair of two acute NHS trusts, there was the potential for 
researcher bias and preconception from both an ontological (theory-based) and an 
epistemological (justified belief/knowledge, personal values or professional/practical 
experience) perspective. Durkheim et al., (1938) argue for the eradication of such 
preconceptions, but as Bryman (2012) acknowledges, it is unrealistic to disentangle 
the perspectives of the Researcher from that of the study groups. However, this can 
lead to a more sympathetic (Becker, 1967) or appalled view (Turnbull, 1987) of the 
study group, which is something the Researcher was aware of as it could have 
resulted in asking the wrong questions, surveying the wrong people, using an 
exclusive collection method, misinterpreting data results, or drawing inaccurate 
conclusions (Bryman, 2012). Additionally, due to the position the Researcher holds, 
and has held, there is potential that the relationship with participants, particularly the 
more junior ones, might be skewed due to fear of reprisal, or by relaying a message to 
the Researcher that they think he wants to hear (Bryman, 2012).  These have all been 
critical factors in considering the research methodology as discussed in Chapter Four, 
which identifies how potential biases were avoided or mitigated. 
 
Opportunities, Risks, and Limitations 
Opportunities and Risks 
The Researcher's access to participants’ at the most senior level of the organisations 
in the study, while not unique is relatively rare. However, while this creates 
opportunities, it also brings with it the potential for unintended ethnographic research 
as part of his daily professional role. This presents the risk of researcher bias, with the 
ability to manipulate minor events such as meetings (Yin, 1994). The Researcher's 
access to senior political figures, senior officials, national and local experts, statistical 
analysts and practitioners in the field is extensive, which has led to considerable 
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subject matter knowledge and professional interests in the topic, all of which provided 
an opportunity for greater access to participants and to make recommendations that 
shape national policy on the delivery of public services.   
Limitations of the Research 
This research is a cross-sectional study of three of the largest public sector 
organisations in Bristol. The study does not extend more broadly across statutory 
services, private business or third sector employees and the results are therefore not 
representative of all services in the city, or indeed the same services provided in other 
cities or localities.  
 
The identification of potential respondents to the survey was reliant on each of the 
organisations providing email addresses for a random sample of one per cent of their 
most senior leaders. The survey was structured; however it was self-completed, thus 
limiting the reliability of the findings. Additionally, the findings may also be affected 
by the particular time or environment in which the respondent completed the survey.  
 
The sample group of one per cent of senior leaders were randomly sampled from 
senior leaders in each of the three organisations. A 95 per cent confidence level was 
applied together with a confidence interval level of five and a percentage level of 50 
per cent. A more in-depth discussion on confidence levels is presented in Chapter 
Four. 
 
The interview phase was limited to 16 national and local elite interviews, all of whom 
were selected by the Researcher based on position and potential contribution to the 
subject matter. Participants were asked the same questions in a semi-structured 
manner, they were audio recorded, and a fully unedited tape transcript was prepared. 
The data were analysed and coded through digital coding software (NVivo) all of 
which increased the reliability and accuracy, however, there remains an element of 
interpretation and potential bias based on what the Researcher has read, seen, 
understood, and heard, and the themes he identified from the interview process, which 
all potentially limit the validity of the findings. However, overall, the research can 
claim to add to the knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the topic. 
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Training and Development of the Researcher 
 
In preparation for the research and in order to minimise any potential bias, the 
Researcher attended two residential weeks at the University of Bath, and a further 
training week at University College London in which a variety of taught sessions 
were conducted that developed the Researcher's understanding, skills and techniques 
necessary to conduct a doctoral research project. This was in addition to specific 
specialist workshops at the University of Bath, such as compiling a data management 
plan (DMP) and attending a number of national conferences surrounding the subject 
matter, including providing evidence to the National Commission on Governance in 
the public sector. Assessment of these skills, knowledge, and techniques formed part 
of the module assignments in the first two years of the professional doctorate. 
 
The next chapter provides a sequential review of existing research literature relevant 


















CHAPTER THREE:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the existing literature relevant to the scope of this research in 
order to understand what is already known, who the key contributors are, what 
theories they have applied, and whether there are any substantial disagreements 
therein. It conducts a sequential review of existing research and its significance to this 
study to help narrow down the emerging themes and frame the research questions 
appropriately.  
 
The literature review was carried out by conducting a chronological examination of 
the theory and practice of public administration in the NHS, the police, and local 
government in England since the 1940s, a time span chosen to provide sufficient 
context and background for the critical analysis and understanding of the research 
topic. It begins by exploring the transition from a model of traditional public 
administration to new public management, and the influence public choice theory and 
neoliberalism had on this. It then examines the pros and cons of new public 
management, before discussing the by-products thereof, the emerging model of public 
value, and the impact this has had on the increase in accountability mechanisms. An 
analysis of the accountability mechanisms and the correlation and confusion between 
these and performance management regimes takes place before investigating how 
alternative approaches to system redesign have impacted on the delivery of services, 
and how the financial crisis in 2008/9 accelerated many of these changes. It then 
explores whether the change in political direction with the shift to a Conservative–
Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, made any significant difference in 
how public services are delivered. Finally, it examines the theoretical concept of 
complexity theory and the historical evolution of the three organisations, and 
discusses these in the context of the incremental change, varying critical junctures and 







The Search for the Literature 
 
The initial search for the literature involved using the key terms 'public 
administration', 'performance measurement', 'performance management', 
'collaboration', and 'accountability' using the University of Bath databases, libraries 
and broader Internet searches. Additionally, a citation search on the Institute for 
Scientific Information (ISI) database and contact with key practitioners in the field, 
took place to unearth relevant findings. 
 
The initial online and database searches led to a vast quantity of results. For ‘public 
administration’, this produced 1,310,000,000 hits, ‘performance management’ 
produced 786,000,000 hits, ‘performance measurement’ produced 280,000,000 hits, 
‘collaboration’ produced 1,230,000,000 hits, ‘accountability’ produced 220,000,000 
hits, ‘historical institutionalism’ produced 1,140,000 hits, ‘path dependence’ produced 
127,000,000 hits and ‘complexity theory’ produced 193,000,000 hits. A search of 
available databases through the University of Bath library journals, articles and 
databases produced 1,549,902, 2,632,018, 2,532,217, 289,448, 474,286,16,064, 
417,897 and 1,023,366 hits, respectively. Narrowing this down further by confining 
the searches to 'public services' produced 711,451 hits on 'performance 
administration', 550,796 hits on 'performance management', 213,239 hits on 
'performance measurement', 103,146 hits on 'collaboration', 176,113 hits on 
'accountability',  ‘historical institutionalism’ produced 7,256 hits, ‘path dependence’ 
produced 57,064 hits and ‘complexity theory’ produced 200,927 hits. 
 
The weight of academic and grey literature (including government reports) on these 
topics was still considerable even after narrowing down the search parameters, so 
these were narrowed down even further by shortening the timespan to post-1940 and 
adding in a specific reference to the NHS, police and local government. Finally, the 
research relied on 407 books, peer-reviewed articles, reviews and grey literature, all 
of which are referenced herein. A range of online alerts identifying research 
developments in the field was also established to ensure the literature review 
remained current throughout the research phase. A manual search was conducted of 
academic journals from 2004 to 2019 that cover the research topic. While all the 
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existing literature may not have been considered, it is apparent from the re-emerging 
themes, that the main arguments have been critically reviewed and considered. 
 
Traditional Approaches to Public Administration  
 
Public administration was mainly a task carried out by loyal amateurs until the 18th 
century when administering public organisations became a professional occupation 
and serving the public became a high calling. This required the best people available 
to form an administrative elite who were required to act according to the law and 
established precedent (Hughes, 1998). While politicians have come and gone, the 
apparatus of public administration, managed by permanent officials, has been 
consistent and has aided the transition between political regimes. The origins of this 
professionalised approach to public administration, often referred to as the 
'bureaucratic paradigm', the 'orthodoxy', ‘old institutionalism’ or  'traditional public 
administration' can largely be traced back to Europe, and to the work of the German 
sociologist Max Weber in particular, whose bureaucratic management theory divided 
work on the basis of specialisation. Managers were organised within these 
specialisms, in hierarchical layers, with all employees being selected based on 
technical skills and competences. Formal rules and requirements were necessary to 
ensure uniformity, and these created a 'necessary' distance between managers and 
employees.  
 
The principles of traditional public administration in England, centred on top-down 
accountability, bureaucracy and rationality by politicians, together with control, 
professionalism and direct delivery through permanently neutral officials (Wilson, 
1887; Fayol and Coubrough, 1930, Taylor, 1939; Weber, 1948,), or as Salamon 
(2002) puts it, politicians were defining public servants priorities who in turn 
identified the best means of meeting them.  
 
Traditional public administration became ingrained in the structures and working 
practices of the public sector in England for most of the 20th century and remained 
relatively unchanged for over 60 years. Under this model, elected officials were 
assumed to be accountable for all that went on under their jurisdiction (Dubnick, 
2005). Weber (1978) described this progress towards bureaucratic officialdom as the 
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unambiguous yardstick of the modernisation of the state. The adoption of traditional 
public administration principles meant that from the early 1900s decision making at 
all levels across public services was and to a certain extent still is, dominated by 
hierarchies and committee structures.  
 
On the establishment of the NHS in 1948, this approach was evident in the formation 
of regional health boards, and individual hospital management committees and sub-
committees. These committees dictated how business was conducted, with even 
minor items of expenditure and the appointment of staff requiring committee approval 
(Edwards et al., 1993). This was replicated in the structures and working practices of 
local government and the police.  
 
The origins of local government in England date back to medieval times. However, 
the structure established in 1972 of a two-tier system of county borders with lower-
level districts and six new metropolitan counties for the most extensive urban 
conglomerations, remains mostly intact today. This consisted of 418 principal 
(unitary, upper and second-tier) councils in England, 27 county councils, 201 district 
councils, and 125 unitary councils, all constructed under a well-established structure 
of committees and sub-committees and bureaucratic reporting processes.    
 
Throughout the 19th century, and well into the 20th, police accountability and 
management was primarily seen as a responsibility of local government. For instance, 
the Municipal Corporations Act (1835) required each borough to establish a watch 
committee to oversee policing. These were made up of councillors or aldermen and 
magistrates. However, in 1964 this changed with the introduction of the Police Act 
(1964) that brought into law the tripartite accountability of the chief constable, the 
police authority, made up of two-thirds locally-elected members and one-third 
magistrates, and Home Office nominees. The police authority had less power than its 
predecessors, especially in boroughs, and the Act gave the Home Secretary more 
supervisory powers than before, which all laid the platform for national performance 





Emerging Models of Public Administration 
 
By the mid 1960s there was already growing criticism of the bureaucracy and delays 
created by traditional public administration approaches (Morgan et al., 2012). From 
the late 1970s traditional public administration began to fall out of favour with 
political thinking across England and Wales, as it paid limited attention to public 
views (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000), with citizens seen primarily as voters, clients, 
or constituents (Bryson et al., 2014). This meant central and local government became 
increasingly distant from the expectations of citizens (Parry, 1992), which contributed 
towards its demise. Traditional public administration was blamed for a legacy of 
inflexibility based on complex hierarchical rule-based systems and top-down 
decision-making processes, it paved the way for more localised accountability where 
the shift towards alternative approaches became increasingly supported. By the early 
1980s, traditional public administration had arguably had its time, and both the public 
and politicians became more demanding of public services and their accountability 
and performance management mechanisms, with a more business-like private sector 
approach gathering favour. 
 
Public Choice Theory 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new approach to public administration commonly 
referred to as public choice theory had begun to emerge. Taking the form of a drive 
toward market-driven solutions to economic problems (Thompson, 2008), it 
transplanted the general analytical framework of economics into political science 
(Tulloch et al., 2000), igniting political and academic discussions about the virtues of 
self-interest demonstrated in the private sector over the more current view of the 
selflessness of public servants in traditional public administration. Public choice 
theory continued to gain prominence on both sides of the political divide, as antipathy 
towards traditional approaches to public administration grew. The 'left' were looking 
for effective democratization of public services away from bureaucratic control and 
policy inertia by civil servants, while the 'right' placed greater emphasis on 
marketization and consumer choice. Public choice theory not only provided this by 
questioning the motivation of the public bureaucracy, but also the integrity of the 
political process, which it argued favoured concentrated voters who were well-
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informed on issues relevant to them, rather than dispersed voters who were ill-
informed on issues that were less directly relevant (Tulloch, 1993).  
 
The Impact of the Conservative Government (1979 – 1997) on Public 
Administration 
 
The influence of public choice theory was evident in the political speeches of Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher as she formed her government in 1979 (Young, 1989; 
Thatcher, 1995). This led to a shift in political thinking, supporting the principles of 
both public choice theory and neoliberalism that engendered more 'business-like' 
ideologies of economy, effectiveness and efficiency (Carter, 1991). Increasingly seen 
as 'old-fashioned' and less effective in the modern world, traditional public 
administration did not produce competition between suppliers and internal markets, 
evident in both public choice theory and neoliberalism (Hayek, 2014). While a public 
choice approach had its critics, mainly due to a lack of social conscience (Hilgers, 
2013), the competition it introduced enabled public service activity to be rationalised 
and quantified. However, it also produced economic, political and cultural 
inequalities, and conflict that replaced political judgement with economic evaluation 
(Davies, 2016). The growing political support for both public choice theory and 
neoliberalism opened the door for the emergence of new public management as an 
alternative model to traditional public administration.  
 
New Public Management 
 
New public management had its greatest impact in Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom and was an attempt to lessen or remove differences between the 
public and private sector, shifting the emphasis from process accountability towards a 
more significant element of accountability in terms of key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) and results (Hood, 1995). New public management’s growing ascendency 
across public services in the late 1980s brought a more reactive control approach to 
performance management in the public sector (Fielding, 1996), laying the platform 
for an era of new managerialism (Peters and Waterman, 1982) with greater centralised 
control and easily measurable performance indicators (Klikauer, 2013). Examples of 
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this were evident in the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) launched in 1982 and 
the Next Steps programme of 1988, that strengthened the association between funding 
and outputs and the formation of the Audit Commission in 1983 that placed the 
performance of local authorities under increased scrutiny through the local authority 
and school league tables introduced after the Education Reform Act in 1988. 
 
By the mid-1990s, new public management had become the central approach to 
public administration in the UK (Hood, 1995), gaining significant political and 
practitioner support (Leishman et al., 1995). Evident in the Local Government Act 
1999 that introduced the principles of open markets, and supported the doctrine of 
challenge, comparison, consultation and competition, is an increased drive towards 
value for money and tighter performance measurement (Leishman et al., 1995). New 
public management was built on accountability through performance information and 
targets with national and localised league tables (Hood, 1995; Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 
1991; Pollitt, 2003). It also introduced a shift of the lines of accountability from 
elected officials to those directly responsible for the delivery of services (Dubnick, 
2005; Kettl, 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). As Grube (2012) identifies this 
created some tension, as senior officials began to exercise their 'public rhetorical 
leadership' by publicly presenting strong policy disagreements with their political 
masters, creating administrative voices that rivalled political ones. 
 
The introduction of market mechanisms in public services generated pressure to 
monitor and publish the performance of a diverse range of organisations, either to 
facilitate user choice or to demonstrate their accountability. It introduced performance 
targets and agreed systems of performance measurement, which represented a 
significant departure from traditional public administration that had centred on 
management style theories. This also The introduction of new public management 
also led to increasing inspection, audit, evaluation, and other means of testing 
performance against defined criteria (Pollitt, 2003), including specific performance 
targets. However, targets were not only used as a disciplinary function in an attempt 
to improve public sector performance, they also took on political significance in 
signalling a commitment to, and underscoring the achievement of, a range of political 
goals (Boswell, 2015).  
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However, despite the increasing focus on top-down control with greater local 
accountability, the political drive towards greater citizen involvement continued. This 
broadened the accountability framework making it more multifaceted, and shifting it 
from a solely top-down model under traditional public administration principles to 
one in which top-down, bottom-up, and other external pressures were incorporated.  
 
The Impact of the Labour Government (1997- 2010) on Public Administration 
 
Despite 18 years of Conservative-government political control, and rising criticism of 
new public management and the target culture (Hood, 1995), many of the well-
established new public management principles were not only maintained, but 
reinforced. The Home Secretary at the time, Jack Straw, set out his crime reduction 
targets, league tables, rankings and performance measures linked to national policing 
plans  (Eterno and Silverman, 2012; McLaughlin, 2007) underpinned by a rigorous 
performance processes in each of the police forces in England and Wales.  
 
In health, a new performance assessment framework was established in 1997 that 
published performance charts of individual health authorities and acute trusts across 
six themes: health improvement, fair access, the effective delivery of appropriate 
health care, efficiency, patient/carer experience, and health outcomes. This led to the 
production of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) for health and local government, 
underpinned by a range of performance targets, and league tables similar to those in 
place for the police. This also led to a central monitoring unit being formed answering 
directly to the Prime Minister, accompanied by an annual system of publishing star 
ratings for public health care organisations. The results of which were made public 
through a process of naming and shaming which led to senior health executives facing 







The Praise and Criticisms of New Public Management 
 
New public management arguably brought with it a more focused and business-like 
approach that held senior leaders to account for performance improvement, however 
crude the mechanisms used might have been. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 
approach continued to be highly acclaimed and politically supported as virtually all 
the government's targets were being achieved, leading to several commentators 
arguing that governance by targets was a necessary form of control for the governance 
of any complex system (Beer, 1966). 
 
However, despite its popularity, new public management also had its critics who cited 
categorisation errors, gaming and counter-intuitive policies as negative consequences 
of this approach (McLean et al., 2007), which led to the House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts (1994) describing the culture of entrepreneurial values 
associated with new public management having eroded the principles of guaranteed 
probity that had been offered by traditional public administration (Ferlie et al., 1996).  
  
A review of integrity in the police service conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (1999), found that 'an aggressive and demonstrable performance 
culture had emerged' which had led to reprioritising things that could be measured 
rather than addressing localised demands and emerging threats. They also indicated 
that this was due to the sanctions and incentives created in pursuit of nationally set 
targets. These concerns were replicated across public services in both empirical 
research (Skogan et al., 1999; Bird et al., 2005; Vito, 2005), and theoretical agreement 
(Harfield, 1997; Cordner, 2004; Neyroud, 2002; Fridell, 2004; Matthews, 2016). 
 
However, despite these growing concerns judgement of the performance of public 
services through numerical targets remained intact. This led to damaging and 
unintended consequences such as distortions in priorities, undermining professional 
autonomy and local leadership, encouraging silo-based rather than integrated 
approaches, and promoting a focus on process rather than outcomes (Gubb, 2009). By 
the early 2000s, the requirement to achieve individual, organisational performance 
targets was now firmly embedded across the police, health and local authorities, with 
highly prescriptive targets to be achieved in a set period. For the police, this meant the 
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reduction of specific types of crime (Loveday, 2000) and for health this meant a 
single summary score, a set of key targets, and a more extensive set of indicators in a 
balanced scorecard were to be maintained (Secretary of State for Health, 2001; 
Secretary of State for Health, 2002; Commission for Health Improvement, 2003). 
Bevan and Hood (2006) describe the environment at this time in health, as a climate 
of terror in which English health care managers were at increased risk of being 
dismissed as a result of poor performance (Shifrin, 2001).  
 
In March 2003, the first set of star ratings data was published by the Commission for 
Health Improvement and in English local authorities, the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessments (CPA’s) and local PSA’s introduced in 2002 set 600 
centrally prescribed targets and reported on how well a local authority was 
performing overall compared to other local authorities in England. In the police, the 
Police Reform Act (2002) required the central government to lay before parliament a 
national policing plan for the following three years. The plan was intended to set the 
strategic direction and to establish a performance framework, which extended to over 
350 quantitative national performance indicators.  
 
 
However, concerns surrounding new public management approaches to public service 
continued and in July 2003, the Public Administration Select Committee, a cross-
party group of Members of Parliament with a remit to consider matters relating to the 
quality and standards of administration within the civil service, produced a report 
entitled, On Target? Government by Measurement, which questioned the legitimacy 
of the target-driven culture across public services and highlighted the incentives for 
individuals to inaccurately record information, knowing judgement, would be made 
by targets and numbers, and not by the quality of the service they provided to the 
public. The report cited examples of education, accident and emergency, the 
ambulance service and the police cheating on tests, manipulating waiting times or 
massaging response times in an attempt to meet targets.  The report advocated a move 
away from a simplistic hit-or-miss approach towards measures of progress supporting 




Localism and the Emergence of Public Value 
 
From the mid-1990s alternative models of public administration began to emerge. 
Often referred to as ‘public value’ (Moore, 1997); ‘new public service’ (Denhardt and 
Denhardt, 2000), and ‘new localism’ (MacLaughlin, 2007), they not only 
incorporated top-down accountability from legal requirements, regulation and 
inspection but also bottom-up accountability from the public. The expectation was 
that public service leaders would be increasingly accountable to a broader range of 
commentators, external and internal governance, staff expectations and media 
pressure (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). As Moore (1997) points out, traditional 
forms of public administration assumed the answers to questions of purpose and 
public value, but these traditional approaches to organising public services failed to 
grasp the complexity of modern-day public services and the growing range of 
complex social problems (Muir, 2014).  
 
In table 1, Kelly, Mulgan and Meurs (2002) compare the difference between 
traditional public administration, new public management and public value 
identifying how accountability and performance objectives under a public value 
model are more in tune with public demand. What is also apparent from these 
comparisons is how the methods used to assess performance under the public value 
approach, particularly on performance objectives and accountability, significantly 














Table 1: Models of Public Administration 
 Traditional Public 
Administration 
New Public Management Public Value 
Public Interest Defined by 
politicians/experts 
Aggregation of individual 
preferences, demonstrated by 
customer choice 
Individual and public 
preferences (resulting from 
public deliberation) 
Performance Objective Managing inputs Managing inputs and outputs Multiple objectives 
• Service outputs 
• Satisfaction 
• Outcomes 
• Maintaining trust 
and legitimacy 
The dominant model of 
accountability 
Upwards through 
departments to politicians 




sometimes outwards to 
customers through market 
mechanisms 
Multiple 
• Citizens as 
overseers of 
government 
• Customers as 
users 
• Taxpayers as 
funders 
Preferred system of 
delivery 
Hierarchical department or 
self-regulating profession 
Private sector or tightly 
defined arms-length public 
agency 
Menu of alternatives selected 
pragmatically (public sector 
agencies, private companies, 
JVCs, community interest 
companies, community 
groups as well as the  
increasing role for user 
choice) 
Approach to public service 
ethos 
The public sector has a 
monopoly on service ethos  
Sceptical of public sector 
ethos (leads to inefficiency 
and empire building) favours 
customer service 
No one sector has a 
monopoly on ethos and no 
one ethos is always 
appropriate. As a valuable 
resource, it needs to be 
carefully managed 
The role of public 
participation 
Limited voting in elections 
and pressure on elected 
representatives 
Limited apart from the use of 
customer satisfaction surveys 
Crucial- and multifaceted  
involving customers, citizens, 
and key stakeholders) 
Goal of Managers Respond to political direction Meet agreed upon 
performance targets 
Respond to citizen/user 
preferences, renew mandate 
and trust through 
guaranteeing quality services 
 
Adapted from: Kelly, G., Mulgan, G. and Muers, S., 2002. Creating Public Value: An analytical framework for public service 
reform. London: Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office. 
 
The move towards a public value approach to public services was initially politically 
attractive. The Modernising Government White Paper (1999) had a recurring theme 
of making public services more joined-up in addition to a drive towards a holistic 
approach to policy development in which the budgets and resources are shared by 
different departments, and even agencies would be expected to deliver related 
services. 
 
The move towards a more collective approach to service delivery and performance 
management faced challenges in that the frameworks used to measure performance 
retained the hallmarks of neoliberalism and new public management. This 
increasingly posed a dilemma for public service leaders, in choosing between doing 
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what they believed was right for the citizen and doing those things for which they are 
accountable under their organisation's performance frameworks.  
 
In the Cabinet Office paper Creating Public Value (Kelly, and Meurs, 2002), the 
political commitment to public service reform was further strengthened by the then 
Minister of State, Douglas Alexander, who in the document's foreword set out how 
public value could help to avoid narrow and over-simplified approaches. While the 
political support appeared clear from the range of service quality initiatives and 
definitions of service standards, such as rebranding the Citizen's Charter as Service 
First, and the adoption of cross-sector PSA’s, new public management regimes 
remained in place with nationally set targets for all central government departments, 
and their arms-length bodies. Meaning that  ‘public value’ was arguably incompatible 
with the hierarchical structures of Westminster governance, exposing entrepreneurial 
bureaucrats to dangerous risks (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007; 2009).  
 
Public Value and the Growth of Accountability Mechanisms 
 
The growth of public value approaches brought with it various additional 
accountability mechanisms. This growth has largely been an uncontested concept in 
that it has generally been seen as a good thing (Gallie, 1956). For instance, 
accountability was often regarded as a characteristic of liberal democracy and part of 
the broader system of checks and balances, acting as a bulwark against tyranny 
(Barberis, 1998).  For that reason, anyone who dared to question the introduction of 
yet another monitoring agency, board or commission was immediately labelled as 
either irrational, corrupt, or, at the very least, having something to hide (Flinders and 
Moon, 2011). This has led to a crowded, complex and varied landscape as table 2, 3 
and 4 demonstrate, which has led many commentators to believe that public servants 
face too many constraints (Kaufman, 1977). 
 
However, it is a commonly held view that public service organisations are still 
essentially public, and as such, should rightfully expect to face strict accountability 
tests (Ferlie et al., 1996).  
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What Constitutes Accountability 
 
Cairncross and Ashburner (1992) found, in their survey of NHS board members that 
there was a lack of clarity on what constituted accountability, with participants 
providing contradictory accounts of what they thought it meant, which the authors 
claim presented a concern for corporate governance. This inconsistency and confusion 
is unsurprising given that there are now over 70 different lines of upwards, 
downwards, sideways and personal forms of accountability in place in health alone, 
with fewer than 30 of these being in existence at the beginning of the millennium, and 
less than 20 before 1990.  
 
With such considerable layers of accountability and the associated personal risk 
involved, it is again unsurprising that the tenure of chief executives in health and local 
authorities and chief constables in the police have reduced significantly in the past 20 
years. In health, the average tenure of a chief executive is now three years, extending 
to seven years for a chief executive in a CQC outstanding rated trust, but only 11 
months for a chief executive for a trust in CQC special measures (Anandaciva et al., 
2018). This has often led to calls for a move away from a blame culture of direct 
accountability to a learning culture (Syed, 2015).  
 
The Hierarchy of Accountability Mechanisms 
 
Many commentators have attempted to create a framework of the accountability 
mechanisms public services face (Oliver, 1991; Lawton and Rose, 1991; Stone, 1995; 
Pyper, 1996; Flinders, 2001; Hood et al., 2004, Talbot, 2008) but, in more recent 
times, the landscape has become more cluttered than ever before. Gallo and 
Thompson (2000) attempted to place these various layers of accountability into 
distinct hierarchies but, while on the face of it this may appear relatively easy, in 
practice, it is somewhat more complex. The analogy of spinning plates is used as a 
narrative in this regard. Where a chief executive has over 70 plates spinning (those 
they are accountable to, to a greater or lesser degree), some may need less frequent 
and sustained effort to keep aloft, while others may require more constant and time-




The parallels can be seen here where one high profile event attracts media attention, 
and other regulators, professional bodies, politicians, the public and governance 
processes take on a simultaneous heightened interest, often referred to as the 
‘Bandwagon effect’ (Cairney, 2012). While many layers of organisational 
accountability overlap, some do not, and it is therefore understandable that chief 
executives or chief constables are drawn to act independently, rather than acting 
collaboratively, and expecting senior leaders to prioritise non-statutory cross-sector 
working above other organisational requirements and constraints is questionable. 
 
Table 2: NHS Accountability Framework 
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Table 3: Police Accountability Framework 
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Table 4: Local Government Accountability Framework 
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The multiplicity of formal accountability through legal requirements, regulators, 
professional bodies, internal and external governance, inspectorates, arms-length 
bodies, pressure groups, media scrutiny, service users and the wider public, together 
with the informal accountability of an individual's conscience, have the potential to 
accelerate or impede cross-sector working on the ground between public services due 
to opposing views on what the priorities are.  
 
In theory, it is hard to challenge the assumption that the accountability of public 
services should be irksome to those agents at whom it is directed (Barberis, 1998) but, 
in practice, it potentially limits the incentive for chief executives and chief constables 
to work collaboratively on the delivery of services. Additionally, what became 
apparent after the 1990s is that performance management and accountability began to 
be used interchangeably which led to confusion.  
 
A Systems Thinking Approach and its Association with Complexity Theory 
 
While the political popularity surrounding a public value approach to the delivery of 
services continued, its application in practice has been challenging, amidst a complex 
landscape of firmly embedded structures, legislation and processes. This led to a 
search for alternative ways of reducing costs and improving services and a growing 
plethora of management models and techniques. These included business process re-
engineering, a business management strategy, focusing on the analysis and design of 
workflows, and business processes within an organisation that used a set of 
techniques and tools for the improvement of service.  
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These were accompanied by continuous improvement processes, commonly badged 
as lean and systems thinking the origins of which date back to the 1930s in both the 
work of Taiichi Ohno in Toyota car manufacturing (Seddon, 2003) and Walter 
Shewart, whose total quality management model was popularised in the 1960s by 
engineer and academic W. Edwards Deming, who had been one of one of Shewart's 
students (Zangwill and Kantor, 1998). This attempted to move traditional thinking 
away from the top-down micro-management of staff improvement to one in which the 
flow of production, unnecessary waste and duplication of effort were, wherever 
possible, eliminated from the system. Deming's 14-point model encouraged new ways 
of working that focus on identifying a clear sense of purpose, reducing constant 
inspection, removing blame and barriers between staff, removing numerical goals, 
targets and quotas, and enhancing staff development and training, with an overall 
intent of continuous improvement. Other similar techniques evolved from this such as 
ISO9000, with its seven quality management principles (Buttle, 1997) and the 
European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) (1999) that provided a 
framework for organisations to determine their current level of excellence. These 
were used in conjunction with tools such as the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1998), one element of which measured performance against internal business 
processes. These all gained a growing prominence in both academic circles, and 
practical application and trials began to increase significantly in the mid-1990s. 
However, it was not until the early 2000s that these approaches became more 
regularly considered and operationalized across public services. 
 
In the police, the Flanagan Report (2008) championed lean systems in the form of the 
'Quest programme', which aimed to manage cost, provide value for money, and 
deliver economies of scale by systematically bringing together front-line practitioners, 
senior officers and specialist consultants to work as a team. This had the financial 
backing of the Home Office supported by external consultants Klynveld Peat 
Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). A continuous improvement approach became 
widespread across the police service in England and Wales (Barton, 2013). This 
triggered several initiatives to improve services such as incident management, 
briefing, investigation and custody processes. Continuous improvement even attracted 
its own national subgroup, chaired by a chief constable, within the Police National 
Performance Management Committee. 
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In health, there were many and varied examples cited of lean applications across the 
English healthcare landscape (Jones and Mitchell, 2006; Radnor et al., 2008; 
Provonost and Vohr, 2010). Likewise, across local government, the adoption and 
spread of its application were similar. The local government association website 
contains numerous examples of the application of lean, six-sigma, total quality 
management and system thinking approaches being applied across local government 
in England, accompanied by various claims of reduced costs and service 
improvement. System thinking had a strong correlation with the hallmarks of 
complexity theory, which supported a more bottom-up and citizen-centred approach 




Cairney (2012) describes how complexity theory underpins systems thinking 
approaches, demonstrating this through six themes of how complex systems behave: 
 
1. A complex system cannot be explained merely by breaking it down into its 
component parts because those parts are interdependent: elements interact 
with each other, share information and combine to produce systemic 
behaviour;  
2. The behaviour of complex systems is difficult (or impossible) to predict in 
which small actions can have large effects and large actions can have small 
effects;  
3. Complex systems are particularly sensitive to initial conditions that produce a 
long-term momentum or ‘path dependence’; 
4. They exhibit emergence or behaviour that evolves from the interaction 
between elements at a local level rather than central direction. This makes the 
system difficult to control (and focuses our attention on the rules of interaction 
and the extent to which they are adhered to); 
5. They may contain strange attractors or demonstrate extended regularities of 
behaviour, which are ‘liable to change radically’ (Bovaird, 2008; Geyer and 
Rihani, 2010). They may, therefore, exhibit periods of ‘punctuated equilibria’ 
– in which long periods of stability are interrupted by short bursts of change; 
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6. The various problems that complexity theory seeks to address can only be 
solved by interdisciplinary scientific groups (Mitchell, 2009). 
 
Complexity theory and its association with systems thinking, fitted neatly with the 
shift in political thinking towards a more localised and public value approach that had 
its primary focus on the citizen's journey through services and identifying waste along 
the way. However, Seddon (2003), one of the leading commentators in systems 
thinking in public services, contends that often these approaches have been treated as 
separate quality initiatives rather than a whole system approach that breaks through 
existing functions, structures, measures and traditional operations. He further 
contends that, despite the value of systems thinking, managers remain the problem as 
they cling to old ways of working underpinned by new public management, seeing 
systems thinking as just another fad, rather than driving system change and altering 
conventional thinking. This approach challenged the institutionally ingrained 
practices and path dependence on new public management and its cultural 
incompatibility with existing political administrative traditions, and as such it has 
been difficult to implement (Christensen and Lægrid, 2008). As Talbot (2008) argues 
this went some way towards explaining why performance regimes did not always 
match the political rhetoric and as identified by Matthews (2016) 13 years of the 
Labour government’s centralised control had stymied institutional capacity for 
responsiveness.  Complexity theory provides a theoretical grounding in this research, 
outlining the tension between competing ideologies that challenge the necessary 
conditions for collaborative approaches to become common-place.  
 
Localism and Citizen-Centred Services 
 
In Wales, the Beecham Review Making the Connections - Delivering Beyond 
Boundaries (2006) was published with the intention of transforming public services. 
While not adopted in England, many of the areas under consideration were 
transferable and relevant. The review had all the hallmarks of systems thinking and 
public value with much of it focused on putting citizens first and involving them in 
the design of services. It also encouraged public service partners to work more closely 
together to achieve a more effective network of public services through a shared 
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vision, shared resources, and pooled budgets, which mirrored the commitment in the 
Modernising Government White Paper (1999) in England. However, despite the 
Welsh government’s move towards the establishment of Local Service Boards and 
local service agreements to facilitate progress, there was limited evidence that this 
ground-breaking and ambitious approach delivered significant change. Martin and 
Webb's (2009) critical evaluation of citizen-centred public services in Wales 
concluded that the lack of success was not because service providers lacked vision or 
goodwill, but apportioned the reluctance to adopt its recommendations as a natural 
outcome of the existence of sector-specific funding and performance regimes. They 
found that the accepted model of a good leader in Wales was one who focused their 
achievement on their own organisational goals first and foremost and that the broader 
picture came a distant second. They also identified that unless the government co-
ordinated the priorities, targets and incentives that flow down to the organisations 
with which it wanted to work, then success would be minimal. In summary, they 
indicated that even when there is support for a collaborative model, there needs to be 
adequate supporting data about what the public wants, or thinks it wants, from public 
services and a coherent strategy for promoting informed public debate about policy 
options. 
 
This thinking was evident in October 2006, when the government published its White 
Paper for public service reform in England (and non-devolved services in Wales) 
entitled Strong and Prosperous Communities. The purpose of the Paper was to 
revitalise local government to work with their partners and to reshape public services 
around the citizen and communities that use them. The stated intent was that these 
reforms would empower citizens and communities, create stronger and more visible 
leadership, and put in place a new framework within which local government and 
their partners could work. It created a new role for local government as strategic 
leaders of their area to manage performance between central and local government 
and its partners, giving local government and their partners the freedom and powers to 
meet the needs of their communities and tackle complex cross-cutting issues. It also 
introduced a performance framework tailored to local needs, which was supported by 
local area agreements (LAA’s) introduced in 2007. These were three-year agreements 
negotiated between central and local government, which set a series of service 
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improvements that local government were committed to achieving, along with a 
detailed delivery plan.  
 
However, while this appeared intended to reduce burdens on local government, it also 
introduced a single set of indicators used to assess the performance of local 
government and local partnerships. In England, this involved 198 national indicators 
and targets which local government and local partnerships were required to deliver 
through the LAA’s with 185 national indicators in 2008/09, together with another 13 
online indicators delayed until 2009/10. The new performance framework was 
intended to reform the delivery of public services in health, welfare, housing, 
employment, education, communities, economic development, policing and 
community safety, and the environment. National indicators taken from PSA’s and 
the Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) were agreed across government 
through the Comprehensive Spending Review (2007). The intention was that by 
reducing the number of indicators required by the central government, priorities 
would be identified in the LAA’s.  While this purported to give greater freedoms, it 
still retained elements of a high level of centralised control. Related information was 
still used by central government and regulators to make judgements as to where 
performance was better or worse and to focus attention accordingly. This was 
supported by an annual comparison by the Audit Commission, as part of the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA’s), which replaced Comprehensive 
Performance Assessments (CPA) that had been in place between 2002 and 2007. 
These replaced the previous central government indicators for local government, 
including best value and were intended to measure success in the local delivery of the 
central government's priority outcomes expressed through the PSA’s. They were set 
out in the Comprehensive Spending Review, and government departments’ strategic 
objectives, and were seen as key to ensuring that the central government achieved its 
aspirations outlined in the three-year Comprehensive Spending Review period.  
 
In policing, the National Policing Performance Assessment Framework (June 2007) 
was replaced to reflect this approach and a new system of performance assessment 
was implemented with the Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) 
(Home Office, 2008a). This change was recognition in that, as policing had become 
more intrinsically delivered in partnership with local government and other partners, a 
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new system was needed. The APACS took an evidenced-based approach (Neyroud, 
2008) and attempted to hold not only the police but other public service providers to 
account. This linked into the LAA’s and set specific targets that measured numerical 
performance improvements through crime and disorder reduction partnerships 
supported by data provided to the Home Office.  
 
In June 2007, the government outlined its vision for the future of the NHS in its White 
Paper NHS autonomy and accountability: Proposals for legislation. The Paper 
reinforced the need for the NHS to be freed from the day-to-day interference of 
politicians and pledged to end the top-down, centralised, and target-driven culture, 
which had frustrated the work of frontline clinicians.  
 
In June 2008, the Department of Health published ‘Developing the NHS Performance 
Regime’ which was intended to afford greater transparency and consistency across the 
NHS in identifying underperformance and interventions to address turnaround and 
management failures. In the following year, the Department of Health introduced the 
NHS performance framework to provide a dynamic assessment of the performance of 
NHS providers (that were not NHS foundation trusts) against minimum standards 
(April 2009). This performance framework was intended to create a clear definition of 
success and to generate relevant annual assessments. It contained an existing set of 
national indicators and mandatory data collection and a requirement for NHS SHA’s 
and PCT’s to take swift and decisive action with a prescriptive list of interventions for 
when a trust was underperforming, challenged or when its performance was under 
review. Classification of an organisation as 'performance under review' meant it 
would have a maximum of three consecutive quarters to recover before it would be 
moved to the category 'underperforming'. However, this approach continued to be 
underpinned by a range of nationally set targets with sanctions and rewards for 
achieving them. While there was still political support for a more localised, whole 
system approach as set out in the vision I the Strong and Prosperous Communities 
White Paper (October 2006), historically ingrained regulatory and performance 
management frameworks still appeared to be inconsistent and counter-intuitive with 
this commitment and continued to reinforce and reward a path dependence based on 
old ways of working. 
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The Dawn of the Age of Austerity 
 
While there was already a steady drive towards new and improved ways of working, 
the financial crisis brought with it an added impetus for more immediate responses 
and a recognition that the centralised state could no longer afford the choices it had 
been able to make in the past.  Many public service leaders were required to lead in a 
different way due to significant budget cuts, which was a new concept for most 
having progressed their leadership journey through a period of sustained economic 
growth since the early 1990s. While the old performance and accountability regimes 
remained, a new leadership requirement emerged that relied on leaders giving up 
some control to facilitate more integration and collaborative approaches to public 
service delivery.  
 
The introduction of CAA’s in 2009, replacing the CPA’s that had been in place since 
2002, signified a further move towards place-based performance management and 
was intended to bring together the separate monitoring of local services by the CQC, 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, Prisons and Probation, and Ofsted under one 
umbrella and to introduce practical place-based approaches. 
 
In the same year, there was a replacement of APACS targets with a single national 
public confidence target. This target of 60 per cent had to be achieved by all police 
forces by 2012.  The national average at the time was 45 per cent. This would be 
measured through the national British Crime Survey and was accompanied by a 
national 10-point policing pledge aimed at setting national minimum standards for 
policing (Home Office, 2008b). This proved to be a challenge for many forces as, 
after years of targets and league tables, the move to one single indicator, meant a 
complete rethink of the way senior leaders had worked for many years. However, 
despite a consistent political commitment to change and the explicit removal of 
targets for the police, and to some extent local government, the target culture had 
become so ingrained in operating practices throughout public services that many 
found this hard to change (Curtis, 2015), and mechanisms such as performance-
related pay, continued to reward a target-driven approach (Bajorek and Bevan, 2015).  
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A further softening of the centralised control and performance targets was signalled in 
the White Paper, Putting the Frontline First: smarter government (2009). This 
acknowledged the impact of technological advancements and how these would enable 
the central government to give citizens public services that responded to their needs 
and were driven by them, improving both quality and reduce costs. It set out three 
clear commitments to: 
 
1. Strengthen the role of citizens and civil society;  
2. Recast the relationships between the centre and the frontline and between the 
citizen and the state and;  
3. Streamline government. 
 
In the foreword, the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, applauded the contribution 
of the past of the rigorous performance targets and central control, but signalled a new 
approach to public service delivery stating that: 
 
"Historic underinvestment has been corrected, and once-ambitious goals are 
increasingly seen as the norm thanks to a rigorous regime of targets and 
central direction. It is precisely because of the success of this approach that 
we can now embark on a radical dispersal of power, where people will have 
enforceable guarantees over the services they receive, and frontline staff will 
have greater freedom over the services they give". 
 
There was an apparent acceptance that the central control and national targets made 
popular under the new public management principles had become too large and that 









Whole System Working 
 
The increasing calls for greater system-wide working through collaborative networks 
was nothing new, having been discussed for more than 20 years (Bryson et al., 2006). 
However, it was gaining more and more political support and inspection oversight, 
and was seen as one of the solutions for improving services and responding to the 
rising financial challenges that public services were facing.  The talk was now less 
about multi-agency working or even partnership, and more about joined-up services 
and collaboration.  
 
Collaborations have attracted many definitions, but in the broadest sense, these are 
defined as working with someone to achieve something, or agencies uniting to design 
and deliver services (Williams, 2012). Similarly, ‘networks’ typically refers to multi-
organisational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or 
achieved easily, by single organisations (Angranoff and Maguire, 2001). However, as 
Bolden, Petrov and Gosling (2009) point out there is little evidence, beyond the 
confines of academia, that such approaches are common practice, or easy to initiate, 
as each partner organisation in a collaboration (or network) is likely to have distinct, 
multiple and conflicting overseers, mandates and reporting requirements (Waterman 
and Meier, 1998; Willems and van Dooren, 2011). This reinforced the challenges and 
constraints of the historical make-up of the organisations and their dependence on 
individual pathways, fostered by traditional public administration and new public 
management approaches. Where collaboration occurs, it crosses organisational lines 
and policy fields, and confounds the traditional institutional relationships between 
overseers and the bureaucracies that implement policy (Page et al., 2015). However, 
the breadth and complexity of most collaborative work make upholding conventional 
accountability relationships difficult (Sørensen, 2012). Collaboration requires new 
infrastructure and management behaviours, leaving managers to choose between 
performance measurement goals and collaboration goals (Lee Baker, 2004).  
 
Yet, despite a worldwide movement towards collaborative governance and public 
service provision (Huxham and Vangen, 2000a), these are rarely successful in 
practice (Denhardt and Aristigueta, 2008), which Bardach (1998) argues leads to a 
substantial loss of value in the public sector. However, the time it takes and the 
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resources required for organisations to effectively work together suggests that there is 
an optimal level of value in collaboration (Park, et al., 2018). Many commentators 
have attempted to describe the critical factors in successful collaborations. These have 
included:   
 
• Capacity, principles and shared motivation (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balog, 
2012);  
• Trust, norms, and operations of the network (Fountain, 1994; Getha-
Taylor, et al., 2019)  
• A learning culture (Innes and Booher, 1999);   
• Moving beyond the rhetoric of collaboration (Clegg and Hardy, 1996);  
• Shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking (Senge, 1990);  
• A culture of joint problem solving that includes an ethos that values 
equality, adaptability, discretion and results (Bardach, 1998);  
• Dual loyalty to both their present organisation and the problem (Weiner, 
1990); and  
• Greater understanding of each other's challenges, local autonomy and 
aligned performance management/reward systems (Balogun, Gleadle, 
Hailey, and Willmottz, 2005).  
 
Additionally, as Huxham and Vangen indicate (2000a), barriers often emerge in 
negotiating joint purposes due to the diversity of organisations, varying internal 
procedures, operational constraints, professional language, differences in cultures, 
structures, and procedures, imbalances inequity and power (real or perceived) from 
participants.   
 
In March 2010, the Labour government launched its Total Place initiative, with 13 
pilot sites across England.  At the time of its launch Liam Byrne, Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury, and John Denham, Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government described it as a new direction for local public services and local 
government, with a range of freedoms that defined a new relationship with central 
government putting the citizen at the heart of service redesign. This was intended to 
enable local partnerships to improve systems and introduce innovative ideas and 
solutions to change the way services are delivered. However, despite this optimism 
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similar to the Beecham Review in Wales in 2006, the success of the initiative was 
limited. Writing on the Guardian's public service network site (13 December 2012), 
Lord Michael Bichard, a former senior civil servant, highlighted the inability of 
public services to share information. He concluded that while effective collaboration 
can grow from redesigning services, the process was exposed to flaws in the current 
arrangements, and that collaboration locally is greatly helped by central government 
departments creating a framework that facilitates, rather than impedes, the sharing of 
resources and outcomes, something he felt that Whitehall and Westminster were still 
unwilling to grasp.   
 
The Success of Whole System Working 
 
The National Audit Office’s (NAO) evaluation of Whole Place community budgets 
(2013a) was similarly critical of the level of collective working across public services, 
but also questioned the effectiveness of this approach. They concluded that the 
initiatives (including reviews of LAA’s and Total Place) did not lead to widespread or 
fundamental changes in local public services, or in the relationship between central 
and local government and that there was limited evidence of the joint working and 
resource alignment improving the impact of public services. They reviewed 181 
publications pre-dating Whole Place community budgets (including reviews of LAA’s 
and Total Place) and found that only 10 past evaluations had assessed the impact on 
service-user outcomes. Seven of the 10 reported a lack of robust evidence that joint or 
collaborative working improved outcomes. This strengthens the argument that there is 
little research on the productive outcomes of networks regarding whether solutions 
would be different if carried out by a single organisation. Without this, the perceived 
benefits of a more collaborative approach remain open to challenge and as such an 
approach still has to demonstrate performance measurement and outcomes that make 
it accountable to its stakeholders and for its stated goals (Angranoff and Maguire, 
2001; Millward and Provan, 1998). 
 
Also, the NAO’s report Early action: landscape review (2014), identified that there 
was a lack of robust evidence to support wider preventive action and early 
interventions. The NAO also identified that, while central government recognised the 
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principle that early action is important in providing public services, they did not plan 
a significant shift in resources due to pressure to preserve high-profile spending, such 
as on hospitals and the police, much of which is acute or reactive. In addition to this, 
the NAO (2014) evaluation of early intervention initiatives found that success factors 
were more dependent on a focus on what works, overcoming short-term bias due to 
electoral cycles and increasing the capacity to deliver, which reinforced the need for 
improved coordination and accountability. They found little evidence of effective 
cross-government coordination of measurement or adequate support structures.  
 
Likewise, the evaluation report on Birmingham’s Total Place pilot site (2010) 
identified several success factors: 
 
• Collective leadership;  
• Governance; 
• Financial planning;  
• Connection with citizens; 
• Alignment of staff skills and; 
• Energy and motivation.  
 
This report also singled out the need for an overall performance management 
framework that fostered current and long-term cooperation between public sector 
partners, rather than marching them to different tunes.  
 
In describing the obstacles to successful system working, this report highlighted the 
following: 
 
• The requirement to report upwards (nationally), frequently and in detail on 
what is happening at the local level meant that partners were distracted from 
doing their job and discouraged innovation; 
• The different interpretations of the legislation about data protection by 
organisations, and even within organisations, meant they often failed to reach 
an agreement on how to proceed; 
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• Contradictory and inconsistent indicators and the very existence of multiple 
(performance) frameworks forced partners to focus their energies in different 
directions.  
Birmingham’s Total Place pilot site (2010)  
 
The findings of these reports and evaluations demonstrate a clear political intent to 
collaborate across services, but with insufficient consideration of the complexities, 
inter-dependencies and system changes that are required.  Sabel and Simon (2011) 
contend that the right form of governance is essential in any successful place-based 
approach and that framework goals, broad local discretion, regular local reporting and 
peer review are all necessary ingredients.  
 
Additionally, as Timmins (2015) identifies in the Kings Fund's review of the practice 
of system leadership in health, the move towards greater localised autonomy through 
the disbanding of SHA’s and the formation of foundation trusts, has been 
counterproductive as it has driven organisations to focus internally thus creating a 
reluctance to claim the role of system leadership. He contends that the pressures of 
regulation, financial balance and targets are still leading people to draw their horns 
and hunker down in order to survive, rather than seeing ways forward in term of 
changes that in some cases, downsize what their organisation do 
 
The Leadership Requirement  
 
Bichard (2012) argues that the most critical factor is inspirational leadership from 
those who can see how local collaboration is the only route to providing decent 
services and support to all citizens. He reinforced that this type of leadership is not 
driven by corporate, or indeed personal, ambition, but by a determination to add value 







As Linden (2002) observed: 
 
"Today's enlightened leaders in both public and private sectors understand 
that most of their pressing problems can be solved by collaborative actions 
with others." 
 
Collier (2018) supports this view pointing towards the importance of individual 
leadership in effective collaborative working and argues that much of compliance 
depends on moral persuasion through peer pressure in which leaders strategically 
construct specific packages of speech, acts or narratives albeit this study focuses on 
individual organisations in which the leader has an element of control.   
 
However, as Williams (2012) suggests, this is less likely to extend across boundaries, 
if organisational priorities are not aligned, creating a perceived loss of control and 
accountability in networked governance. There is also a fear that with no single 
authority, everyone is somewhat in charge and everyone is somewhat responsible, but 
where all participants appear to be accountable, none are accountable (Agranoff and 
Maguire, 2001).  
 
Additionally, the capacities required to operate successfully in a collaborative setting 
are different from those needed to succeed in managing a single organisation and that 
the approaches employed in public administration for more than a century are now 
ineffective in a multi-agency setting (Anganoff and Maguire, 2001). Senge, Hamilton 
and Kania (2015) describe these leadership competencies as: 
 
1. The ability to see the more extensive system beyond one's immediate 
organisation, which is essential to building a shared understanding of complex 
problems; 
2. The ability to foster deeper and more reflective conversations about problems 
that enable the understanding of different perspectives; 
3. Moving the focus from reactive problem solving to co-creating a new future 




Additionally, issues such as the gender of senior leaders (AbouAssi et al., 2018), the 
ability to persuade but not coerce (Ingraham, 2005) and the development of leadership 
orientated towards social capital, rather than leaders orientated towards developing 
human capital (Day, 2000) are all significant factors in supporting successful 
collaboration. 
 
However, it is worthy of note, that the depth of academic literature describing the 
attributes and behaviours required in managing collaborations is still limited 
compared to the understanding of traditional management processes (Hanf and 
O'Toole, 1992) and despite a strong belief that greater cross-sector collaboration is the 
answer to reducing costs and improving services, evidence in support of this is still in 
its infancy. 
 
The Impact of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government  
(2010- 2017) on Public Administration 
 
The formation of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 
2010, reinforced a direction of travel towards less centralized control and more local 
responsibility. While the terminology of Total Place became politically unpalatable 
due its association with the previous government, the introduction of the Big Society 
in July 2010 was not dissimilar. This was launched by the then Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, who declared that current top-down governing was sapping responsibility, 
local innovation and civic action. He set out the three key strands of social action, 
public service reform and community empowerment in which the call for 
decentralized leadership and stronger networks was clear. This produced an 
associated drive across local government, the police and health towards collaborative 
public management, collaborative governance and networks (Amsler and O'Leary, 
2017) in which there was an expectation that a new type of leader that operates 
through influence rather than power across the bandwidth of public services was 
required. Competition introduced under new public management was becoming 
increasingly out of favour and integration, collaboration, and planning were now the 
order of the day (Walshe, 2017).  
 
 61 
Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAA) for local government were abolished in 
May 2010 and in that August, the Secretary of State for Local Government, Eric 
Pickles, announced that the Audit Commission was to be disbanded and many of the 
nationally prescribed targets for local government were removed. There were some 
exceptions in education and environmental health, as well as some local authorities 
choosing to maintain their local targets.  
 
On 13 October 2010, he went a step further in announcing changes to the LAA’s 
reward grant and the national indicators, in what he described as the end of the old, 
top-down local performance framework. In the announcement, he stated that: 
 
“From today, the Government are putting local areas entirely in control of 
their local area agreements, and this enables local authorities and their 
partners to amend or drop any of the current 4,700 Local Area Agreement 
targets without needing ministerial agreement”.  
 
He stressed in the announcement that emphasis needed to be on local government 
being democratically accountable to local people rather than to central bureaucratic 
systems. Nevertheless, despite the change of direction in ministerial policy, some 
local authorities chose to continue with a number of these targets. It was unclear if 
this was just a case of being wedded to an ingrained way of working, or whether there 
was a genuine belief that this remained the best way to improve performance.  
 
However, the heavy reliance on centrally prescribed targets in the NHS remained 
embedded, and this continued to attract criticism and challenges. In June 2010, 
Andrew Lansley, the Secretary of State for Health, announced a public inquiry into 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. Led by Robert Francis QC, this examined 
the conditions of care and high mortality rates between 2005 and 2009 in the Trust. In 
his first report published in 2010, he found that that the hospital had put 'targets 
before care' and that the hospital's priorities were its finances and foundation status 
application rather than its patients. While this signalled an opportunity for change, in 
practice, any attempt to move away from targets in health still attracted significant 
opposition (Foster, 2018) not only from politicians, but medical practitioners 
themselves (Gammie, 2016), with targets still capturing significant media attention 
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(Matthews-King, 2018). Even after this inquiry, and despite the central government's 
commitments, the NHS still maintained top-down constitutional targets linked to 
personal and organisational rewards or sanctions. 
 
Attached to these were considerable financial rewards for reaching or exceeding the 
targets and financial sanctions, or fines, for failing to do so (Propper et al., 2008). 
Research by NHS Providers (2016) found that in 2016 there was over £600m imposed 
in fines by clinical commissioning groups in England on trusts failing to achieve their 
targets for patients waiting for accident and emergency and cancer treatments, and 
non-urgent care. A trust is fined £120 every time it fails to treat an accident and 
emergency patient within four hours and £300 every time a patient exceeds 18 weeks 
on the referral-to-treatment list.  
 
In addition to this, further financial sanctions and rewards are available to NHS trusts 
for achieving their financial control total set by their clinical commissioning group 
and agreed upon with NHS England. This has continued to produce conflicting 
tensions between the drive for devolution and localism and political accountability 
and public expectation (Flinders and Moon, 2011; Matthews, 2016) and, despite 
various promises to let go, in practice successive governments have held on to the 
detail of delivery, with surprising continuity existing between the Labour government 
(1997-2010) and the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010-
2015), despite divergent political approaches (Matthews, 2016).  
 
Following the comprehensive spending review announcement in October 2010 the 
coalition government manifesto 'The Coalition: Our programme for government' was 
published. This reinforced a commitment through its reform agenda to end the era of 
top-down government by decentralising the delivery of local services and giving 
power back to local people across all public services. Specific reference was made in 
the foreword to bureaucracy, top-down control and centralisation having diminished 
the NHS. This approach was reinforced in the foreword of the Department of Health's 
equity and excellence strategy document (2010) that set out requirements to make the 
NHS more accountable to patients, free staff from excessive bureaucracy and top-
down control and increase real-terms spending on the health service every year. This 
was not dissimilar to the commitments of the Labour government in 2006 in its White 
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Paper on public service reform ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’, albeit this had 
been more about pulling services together, whereas the coalition manifesto was more 
focused on citizen need and on loosening state control. The coalition's manifesto 
expressed a belief that for local government, there was a need for a fundamental shift 
of power from Westminster to the people.  This provided a commitment to promote 
decentralisation and democratic engagement and end top-down government by giving 
new powers to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and individuals. The 
White Paper also focused on the police advocating greater freedom from ministerial 
control and making it much more accountable to the public.  
 
The Continuation of the Age of Austerity  
 
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the United Kingdom's economy 
experienced an unprecedented period of sustained economic growth and increased 
funding for public services. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth had risen at three 
per cent a year between the Labour government tenure (1997 – 2010), while per-
person growth averaged two point five per cent (Emerson and Tatlow, 2015). 
However, in 2007, global financial problems began to emerge, initially as a credit 
crisis that resulted in the collapse of major banking institutions in the United States 
and subsequently the United Kingdom. By 2008-2009 this had developed into a major 
international crisis, which in the United Kingdom led to the government bailing out 
British banks at an estimated cost of £141bn, with exposure to liabilities of over £1 
trillion (NAO, 2013b), doubling the nation's debt (NAO, 2009). This triggered both a 
political and practitioner re-assessment of its priorities and how services could be 
delivered, as demand increased, scrutiny grew, and budgets were set to reduce 
finances significantly. 
 
In October 2010, the coalition government published its comprehensive spending 
review (2010) setting out how it would respond to Britain's deficit reduction plan. 
While budget cuts were already beginning to bite, this introduced the government's 
commitment to a prolonged period of austerity, which involved substantially reducing 
public expenditure and increases in tax amounting to £110 billion by 2015/16. This 
was intended to give confidence to the markets stimulating growth in the economy. 
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While austerity measures have had some impact on reducing the deficit, they have 
delivered little growth. According to the Office for National Statistics (2009; 2013), 
public debt had risen from 56.6 per cent of GDP in July 2009, and this continued to 
rise to 90 per cent of GDP (£1.39 trillion) by 2013. 
 
The consequences of this prolonged period of austerity brought about significant cuts 
to public services, particularly the police and local government, which extended 
beyond incremental change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) and created a critical 
juncture (Cappocia, 2016) in the approach they took to the delivery of services. 
Haynes (2012) describes this period as the greatest challenge to public policy in the 
developed world since the Second World War, as the use of public monies to support 
banks and declining tax revenues, resulted in rising government borrowing and 
national debt. In local government and the police, this led to dramatic cuts to their 
budgets. The period of growth under the Labour government between 1997 and 2010 
was followed by eight years of sharp retrenchment, which by 2012 had already taken 
expenditure back to levels last seen in 2005 (Smith et al., 2018).  
 
The Local Government Association (2019) claim that central government funding for 
local government in England would decrease by almost 60 per cent between 2010 and 
2020, with the revenue support grant for local government in England dropping from 
£9,927 million in 2015–16 to £2,284 million for 2019–20, leaving 168 authorities 
with no grants for 2019–20. It is estimated that more than 500,000 council workers 
have lost their jobs since 2010. 
 
Likewise, the police budget in England and Wales was reduced by 20 per cent over a 
four-year period, which resulted in workforce reductions of over 40,000 officers and 
staff from 243,900 in 2010 to 200,600 in 2016 (HMIC, 2016). This created a critical 
juncture for the police and local government, but arguably less so in health. 
 
Health did not face the same critical juncture that the police and local government had 
experienced, albeit since the financial crisis health services have been required to live 
more within their means. Spending on the NHS makes up around a third of all public 
service spending, and since its inception in 1948, health expenditure has increased by 
3.8 per cent in real terms per annum (Crawford and Emerson, 2012). The political 
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commitment to protecting this budget meant that much more extensive cuts were 
required everywhere. However, despite not experiencing the same demand for cuts, 
expectation and capability all continued to grow significantly, and the increased life 
expectancy of the population created an additional strain. Despite year-on-year 
increases in funding for the NHS, by 2017/18 NHS providers were in a deficit of just 
under £1 billion by the end of 2018 (Murray, 2019). The Department of Health's 
response was to provide a further £1.8 billion sustainability and transformation fund, 
which awarded bonuses for hitting centrally prescribed targets and also maintained 
fines where these targets were not achieved and, on June 2018, the government 
announced a commitment to a further £20.5 billion for the NHS by 2023/24.  
 
These enduring financial challenges created, to varying degrees, an imperative for 
change focusing the attention of public service leaders on a variety of alternative ways 
to reduce costs and improve services, of which more significant collaborative 
approaches should have been provided.  
 
Localism and the New Political Imperatives  
 
In the foreword of the Plain English Guide to the Localism Bill the Minister of State 
for Decentralisation and Planning Policy Greg Clark stated:  
 
“For too long, central government has hoarded and concentrated power. 
Trying to improve people's lives by imposing decisions, setting targets, and 
demanding inspections from Whitehall simply does not work. It creates 
bureaucracy. It leaves no room for adaptation to reflect local circumstances 
or innovation to deliver services more effectively and at a lower cost. And it 
leaves people feeling 'done to' and imposed upon the very opposite of the 
sense of participation and involvement on which a healthy democracy 
thrives”. 
 
When the Act was passed in 2011 it introduced new freedoms and flexibilities for 
local government to cut red tape by enabling councillors to play a full and active part 
in the local life without fear of legal challenge and encouraged a new generation of 
influential leaders with the potential to raise the profile of English cities, strengthen 
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local democracy and boost economic growth. The Act also introduced the concept of 
directly elected mayors to provide democratically accountable leadership, intended to 
instigate real change for the benefit of the largest cities, with a focus on long-term 
strategic decisions, such as bringing together different agencies to make public 
services work better and attracting jobs and investment. However, this was dependant 
on a successful local referendum in each city region supporting the introduction of 
combined authorities and regional mayors. The first to take a step in this direction was 
the Greater Manchester Partnership pulling together the police, health and social care 
but, despite several claims of success (Jeffrey, 2017), these have yet to be evaluated. 
This approach appears to have had a galvanising effect on the health and care system 
in Greater Manchester but, as Walshe, et al., (2016) identified there remains a fierce 
debate about the benefits and dis-benefits of this devolution deal. In an examination 
by Checkland et al., (2016) of the inclusion of health and social care as part of Greater 
Manchester devolution, they identified the challenges of the sheer complexity of the 
organisational relationships involved and highlighted the difficulties associated with 
meaningful citizen engagement. They also contended that complexity, alongside the 
retention of statutory powers and responsibilities, meant that success or failure hinges 
on the strength of the partnership relationships that are developing. They also 
contended that representatives of organisations within Greater Manchester would 
need to be prepared to act outside the narrow confines of their organisational self-
interests, ceding a degree of sovereignty to the more comprehensive Greater 
Manchester project.  
 
The Localism Act also abolished regional spatial strategies, along with their 
intermediate tier of regional targets, in order to afford this greater local control. 
During the same period, the police also saw further relaxation of centrally prescribed 
targets and league tables.  
 
In March 2011, in a speech on police reform, Teresa May, the then Home Secretary 
said: 
“I've scrapped the last remaining national police targets, and replaced them 
with a single objective: to cut crime.” 
 
Teresa May, Home Secretary March 2011 
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Following this in September 2011 a report from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government entitled Accountability: Adapting to Decentralisation encouraged 
local communities and institutions to explore new ways of working together to tackle 
shared priorities, citing a practical application of this as local agencies sharing assets 
or pooling their resources. However, it also reinforced the need for competition and 
choice outlining the requirement for policymakers to create incentives for providers to 
compete, stressing the benefit of competitive markets and advocating the expansion of 
financial incentives to drive innovation. Public services were being asked to work 
more collaboratively, but still legislated and governed under the new public 
management principles of competition and markets. While this document committed 
to a reduction in central targets and inspection, it also reinforced the notion that a 
substantial and growing amount of performance data and information would be 
generated for other purposes, such as the national NHS outcomes framework and a 
single data list for local government.  
 
Despite a policy shift away from the management of performance through centrally 
directed targets in the police and local government, this has been inconsistent with 
health.  The Health and Social Care Act (2012) introduced significant reforms to 
increase the influence of general practitioners on commissioning, and abolished 
SHA’s and PCT’s, reinforcing the drive for greater localised accountability. However, 
many of the old regimes of centrally established and monitored targets and 
competition amongst providers have remained. The tension between the 'N' in NHS 
and local decision making continued to pose significant challenges. By the time the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012) had been established, 144 health trusts had been 
accredited with foundation trust status, increasing localised autonomy albeit, by April 
2013, 99 had not achieved foundation trust status of which 47 were not expected to. 
 
In the police, the localism agenda drove the introduction of police and crime 
commissioners in 2012. Introduced in legislation by the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act (2011), police and crime commissioners were locally elected in 41 
police force areas in England and Wales, creating new constitutional arrangements for 
governing the police. Police and crime commissioners were responsible for holding 
chief constables to account for the performance of the local police force.   
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What is clear is that there have been several mechanisms introduced to increase 
localism, and that for local government and the police, there was a political 
commitment made to remove top-down control and central targets. However, this did 
not involve changes to the accountability mechanisms. As a result, there is little 
evidence of incentives created to encourage and facilitate public service to work 
together rather than working in their existing silos. The removal of LAA’s for local 
government and APACS for the police did little to encourage public services to focus 
on anything other than their organisational requirements. Additionally, while the 
central government commitment to the removal of top-down control and 
decentralization is clear, the supporting accountability processes have not been 
aligned, causing many practitioners in local government and the police to continue to 
cling to the former centrally prescribed targets.  
 
This was emphasised by Irene Curtis, the president of the Police Superintendents 
Association, commenting in an article for the police federation magazine in 2011, in 
which she said: 
 
"Despite assurances from the current government about the removal of central 
targets, there is still a really strong performance management culture in the 
service. [This] has created a generation of people who are great at counting 
beans, but don't always recognise that doing the right thing is the best thing 
for the public." 
 
Her claim proved to be right.  Three years on from the removal of national targets, the 
House of Commons Parliamentary Administration Select Committee report (2014) 
Caught Red-Handed: Why we can't count on police recorded crime statistics, found 
that, despite the removal of nationally set targets, many police forces continued to 
measure success by crime targets, which drove perverse incentives to record crime 
inaccurately.  They concluded that the attitudes and behaviour that lead to the 
misrecording of crime had become ingrained amongst senior leaders and had led the 
subordination of data integrity to target-chasing, and presented officers with a conflict 
between the achievement of targets and core policing values. The Committee 
deprecated the use of targets in the strongest possible terms and following on from 
this a report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in November 2014 
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Crime Recording: Making the victim count found little evidence of deliberate 
improper practice, but that victims of crime were being let down by the police as it 
was failing to record a large proportion of the crimes reported. This attracted further 
widespread media criticisms and comment (Townsend, 2015), which reflected the 
findings of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust public enquiry, in its final 
report in February that criticised the targets and numbers culture of performance 
management and had concluded that it should be patients, not numbers, which 
counted.  
 
What is apparent is that, despite the restructuring aimed at strengthening localism and 
removing top-down targets, many of the same behaviours associated with new public 
management were still present, which Matthews (2016) attributes to successive 
governments still holding onto the detail of delivery despite various promises to let 
go. Despite the removal of centrally prescribed police targets in 2011, it took the 
Select Committee report, the consequent HMIC inspection on crime recording and 
considerable media attention on the unethical use of police targets before any 
significant change took place.  There was then a shift towards more outcome-based 
performance management on the threat, harm and risk rather than numerical targets. 
As data from the Office of National Statistics show between 2014 and 2019 the Crime 
Survey of England and Wales data and police recorded crime data have never been 
more consistently aligned. In June 2019 the Crime Survey of England and Wales 
recorded 11.1 million offences in comparison to 5.27 million offences recorded by the 
police. However, this has been inconsistently applied across the service and has been 
reliant on interpretation by each police force, rather than any national requirements or 
standards. 
 
In 2016, the NHS Shared Planning Guidance produced by NHS England asked every 
local health and care system and local council in England to come together to create 
an ambitious local plan for accelerating the implementation of the NHS Five Year 
Forward View (October 2014). These were established in 44 areas, and introduced 
new partnerships known as Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STP) to 
run services in a more coordinated way, agree to system-wide priorities and plan on 
how to improve day-to-day health. The intention was to ensure that decisions were 
made at the most appropriate level, empowering local leaders to plan around the long-
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term needs of those they serve and that health and care systems could make simple, 
practical improvements for local communities (NHS England Guidance, 2016) 
working towards a more integrated care system. However, in September 2018, the 
Kings Fund's report A Year of Integrated Care Systems (Charles et al., 2018) 
identified, amongst other key findings, that there was a continuing tension between 
the statutory framework, which focuses on organisations and their roles and 
accountabilities, and the growing emphasis being placed on systems and the working 
of partnerships. In its conclusions, it was identified that governance within integrated 
care systems should ensure that its work does not conflict with the accountabilities of 
local government and NHS organisations and that national bodies should do much 
more to align regulation and funding with emphasis now being placed on integrated 
care systems. 
 
Additionally, the NHS Providers Regulation Survey Report 2017, indicated that 
locally based collaboration did not incorporate a change to the legislative framework 
and that competition between organisations remained underpinned legislatively by the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012). While this legal framework does not prevent 
collaborative working, it makes it complex to navigate. Sir Ron Kerr's report 
Empowering NHS leaders to Lead (2018) captured the views of 140 responses from 
NHS chief executives and clinical commissioners and demonstrated that tension 
remained between balancing organisational goals with system goals and that in the 
absence of formal legal, governance and system leadership arrangements, effective 
system working was reliant on collaboration grounded in pre-existing working 
relationships and goodwill. While the commitment is clear from the stated intent in 
the NHS Ten Year Plan published in January 2019 to establish an integrated care 
system by 2021, the evidence appears to indicate that the existing climate needs to 
substantially change if this is to be realised and successfully implemented.  
 
The review of the literature suggests that, despite health, the police and local 
government all being publicly funded services, with many similarities, they are 
complex organisations that have evolved differently over time, having been subjected 
to varying challenges, constraints, accountabilities and organisational norms, making 
comparisons more difficult.  
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As the former American Political Science Association President Elinor Ostrom 
remarked in her Nobel Prize lecture: 
 
"When the world we are trying to explain … is not well described by a simple 
model, we must continue to improve our frameworks and theories to be able to 
understand the complexity and not simply reject it" (Ostrom, 2010). 
 
This reinforces how public services, despite their similarities, cannot be levered into a 
simple model or explanation, and their requirements and constraints need to be 
explored and understood. Understanding the historical context and evolution of the 
organisations in this research is an important consideration in understanding these 
constraints and challenges. 
 
The Historical Origins of Health, The Police and Local Government 
 
The origins of local government emerged in a localised geographic setting and, 
despite national reform in 1972 with the introduction of a two-tier structure of unitary 
and district councils, and the introduction in the 1990s of centralised control 
measures, national targets and centralised inspection regimes, they are still primarily 
governed and accountable in a localised way. The primary accountability of the chief 
executive and his/her staff is to local and democratically elected councillors and 
Mayors, albeit with some prescribed legal duties. 
 
However, while the police were initially established in the same geographic and 
localised setting, being primarily accountable to local councils through Borough 
Watch Committees, the introduction of the Police Act in 1964 shifted these lines of 
accountability and introduced police authorities, constituted from local council 
appointees and nationally appointed representatives by the Home Office, in addition 
to some independent members. This led to a greater balance between both local and 
national accountability. These lines of accountability shifted again in 2012 with the 
introduction of local and democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners, 
emphasising the accountability of the chief constable to their local and democratically 
elected police and crime commissioners, but retained national accountability through 
the requirements of Home Office departments. However, chief constables still 
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retained a degree of ‘operationally independence’ from political control through acts 
of parliament and supporting case law. 
 
Conversely, the historical origins in health are distinctly different. The NHS was 
established in 1948 in a national structure and predominantly staffed by medical 
professionals who held a high degree of accountability to their profession as a 
national service rather than being answerable to local governance structures. The 
NHS has never been locally accountable to democratically elected members. Even in 
NHS foundation trusts, that are afforded a greater degree of autonomy, the Board is 
assembled by interview and national appointment rather than local election. This 
leaves the NHS primarily accountable to national mechanisms driven by Ministers 
and Parliament. How the organisations in this study were formed and have evolved, 
and the way in which this has led to varying approaches of governance, accountability 
performance regimes and path dependence, has made a shift to whole system working 
a considerable challenge.  
Path Dependence and the Influence of Critical Junctures and Incremental 
Change 
Path Dependence  
 
The concept of path dependence originated in economics (David, 1985; Arthur, 1994) 
and has been incorporated extensively into theories such as historical institutionalism 
and complexity theory, ever since the question of why institutions continue in the 
same way, even after they are no longer efficient has been asked. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) describe how path dependence is built on decisions and developments located 
in the distant past that still have a long-lasting effect on institutional arrangements 
and, as David (2007) indicates, this has become an important concept for social 
scientists engaged in studying processes of change, suggesting that where the 
evolution of an institution is governed or influenced by its legacies, it is path-
dependent. Thereby reinforcing the notion that history matters, not just because it 
provides different contexts in which rational actors make choices, but also because 
history affects actors beliefs, values, and preferences (Steinmo, 2016). It is commonly 
articulated that path dependence begins from events that are followed by closely 
linked reaction and counter-reaction that can transform and even reverse the direction 
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of the early steps (Mahoney, 2000), either from critical junctures (Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007) or gradual change (Mahoney et al., 2016) and that such events and 
the reaction to them led to a self-reinforcing process through associated positive 
feedback (Pierson, 2004). The basic understanding of this theory is that reversing a 
trend (or path) is more difficult over time. It would suggest from the description of the 
historical origins of the organisations in this study that they face distinctly different 
path dependence. 
 
Critical Junctures  
 
In the analysis of path-dependent institutions, the concept of critical juncture refers to 
situations of uncertainty in which decisions of important actors are causally decisive 
for the selection of one path of institutional development over other possible paths 
(Cappocia, 2016). Proponents of critical junctures such as Capoccia and Kelemen 
(2007) contend that these are an essential part of the analysis of institutions, 
highlighting the relevance of these shorter forks in the road. They provide a well-
accepted definition of critical junctures as relatively short periods during which there 
is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome 
of interests and that the duration of the juncture must be brief compared to the 
duration of the path-dependent process that follows.   However, as Berins Collier and 
Collier (1991) indicate, these choices vary by organisation and what constitutes a 
critical juncture and the subsequent freedom of discretion to respond for one 
organisation, may be different to the deeply embedded antecedent conditions for 
another. Theorists have also debated the extent to which critical junctures themselves 
can be situated in institutions or to other antecedent causes (Pierson and Scocpol, 
2002; Slater and Simmons, 2010), and the degree of organisational change that 
emanates from these critical moments (Capoccia, 2012).  Capoccia and Kelemen 
(2007) argue that if critical juncture periods are conceived of as very long periods, 




However, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) support the view that change is more gradual 
in which existing organisational rules are:  
• Displaced - through the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new 
ones;  
• Layered - through the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing 
ones; 
• Drift - through the changing impact of existing rules due to shifts in the 
environment or; 
• Converted - through the changed enactment of existing rules due to their 
strategic redeployment. 
They argue that critical junctures are just choice points when a particular option is 
adopted among two or more alternatives driven by antecedent historical conditions. 
Proponents of incremental change (Thelen, 2004; Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and 
Thelen; 2010) contend that change and stability are ‘two sides of the same coin’ in 
that stability assumes and requires change but even during periods of massive social 
and political upheaval, certain institutions may well remain unaffected. Thelen (2004) 
builds on this arguing that organisations are not in an equilibrium position but 
continue to change and evolve in directions, or paths, that are dependent on the nature 
of initial and subsequent shocks, but that change will take place whether crucial 
junctures are present or not. 
In the examination of the path dependence of the organisations in this study, it is 
apparent that the way they were established and governed, their organisational 
requirements, their financial challenges, lines of accountability and political focus 
differ considerably and an exploration of their path dependence and the varying 
impact of critical junctures or gradual change that led to this is an important 
consideration in understanding the research findings. The review of the literature 
suggests that while different models of public administration have been displaced, 
drifted, converted or layered in the fabric of public services, the impact of the 
financial cuts produced a particular critical juncture for local government and the 
police, in which the adherence to historically ingrained approaches has been 
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significantly challenged and new approaches such as systems thinking, underpinned 




The review of both the academic literature and practical application indicates that 
while new models of public administration have emerged, despite the political intent 
to move towards a more localised, collaborative approach to the delivery of public 
services there has been limited evidence of this in practice, and in many cases 
performance measurements by numbers still appear to be more convincing than 
anecdotal reports about performance (Andersen and Hjorortshov, 2016; Olsen, 2017).  
 
While the dialogue amongst senior leaders appears to support a different approach, 
not only because it is perceived to be the right thing to do, but because it is necessary 
for the effective delivery of services, localised collaborative working, supported by 
systems thinking, and underpinned by complexity theory have inevitably clashed with 
the historically ingrained approaches of new public management, accountability 
frameworks and the associated path dependence. However, austerity has created a 
critical juncture for the police and local government, which prompted the necessity to 
consider alternative approaches.  
 
For public services leaders in an already cluttered, complex and multifaceted 
landscape with ingrained lines of path dependence, it is legitimate to ask what the 
personal incentives are to embark on a more collective approach.  As Verbeeten and 
Speklé (2015) indicate, effective management control still rests on a results-oriented 
culture and where collaboration conflicts with internal performance targets, then 
withdrawing or failing to engage might be a reasonable choice (Denhardt and 
Aristigueta, 2008).  
 
Those delivering public services are increasingly being asked not only to deliver 
results against those things they are directly accountable for but, to double their 
efforts to deliver broader system outcomes by appealing to their moral obligations and 
leadership responsibilities. This flexibility to respond to emerging local demands 
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remains a challenge within the existing performance frameworks and the existing 
historical norms of the organisations involved it is also arguably too reliant on the 
individual leadership of independent actors who decide to demonstrate a broader and 
more collective social conscience, amongst significant personal risks and 
abandonment of institutional norms.  
 
Those in charge of public organisations have always faced a dilemma. Customarily, 
they are organised to accomplish a given task, or deliver a particular service, and are 
expected to be stable, ordered, predictable and anchored to a permanent funding 
source and to occupy a particular niche in the public sector (Frederickson, 1976) and 
as the literature suggests such approaches have separate layers of accountability and 
performance management.   While a single organisational approach may be suitable in 
tackling complicated, but solvable problems, it is less effective in tackling those 
cross-cutting problems that are uncertain and complex with no apparent solution. 
These are characterised by Ritter and Webber (1973) and Grint (2005) as 'wicked' 
issues that require a collaborative response to make any kind of progress. 
  
So, while the requisite for local leadership would appear to be a compelling one, it 
remains unclear whether this leadership should be focused on the leader's own 
organisation, in which they have more direct control and direct accountability, or by 
taking a more collaborative and system-wide approach to public services.  There can 
be little doubt that the requirements for public services have changed. The need to 
deliver reactive services such as answering calls for crimes, treating broken bones and 
providing day-to-day services such as rubbish collection are all still necessary. There 
is a heightened awareness and growing demand for preventative intervention and a 
more collaborative response. However, Atkinson and Maxwell's (2007) findings on 
the challenges in establishing a multi-agency outcome framework, act as a sharp 
reminder of the practicalities in achieving this.  
 
While policy documents continue to set out commitments towards a collaborative 
approach to the delivery of public services, there is insufficient evidence to indicate 
how individual organisations are to be held to account for crucial cross-sector success 
factors, and it fails to describe how this deals with the tension or conflict with 
different organisations’ historical ways of working, their accountability frameworks, 
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and subsequent path dependence. As O'Leary and Bingham (2009) identify the 
literature on collaboration is often celebratory and only rarely cautious which begs the 
question whether this approach has achieved any long-term success.  
 
The next chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct both quantitative and 
qualitative empirical research to answer the questions and hypotheses set out in the 

































This chapter discusses the choice, design and conduct of the methodology used in this 
research and explains aspects regarding the positioning, relationships, sequencing and 
potential bias. 
  
The first phase of the research involved a systematic and critical analysis of the 
existing literature on the research topic. This was followed by quantitative empirical 
research by way of a self-completing online survey with senior leaders in each of the 
three largest public service organisations in Bristol. These were the University 
Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, Avon and Somerset Constabulary (the 
police force that covers the Bristol city region), and Bristol City Council, the local 
government that covers the Bristol city region.  
 
Finally, through semi-structured interviews, qualitative research was conducted with 
senior leaders from each of the three organisations that took part in the survey, and 
key stakeholders responsible for national policy, regulation and inspection in health, 
the police and local government. The materials used, techniques applied, samples 
studied, and management of the data are also discussed further in this chapter.  
 
An Outline of the Research Design and Chosen Methodology  
 
The research design acts as a guide to the collection, analysis, and interpretation of 
the observations in the study (Frankfor-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992), enabling an 
assessment of the impact and relationship of different variables, and rigour applied to 
the research design. These all contribute to the legitimacy and validity of the findings 
(Yin, 1994). Yin describes this as an action plan for getting from 'here to there', where 
'here' may be described as the initial set of questions to be answered, and 'there' is a 





The methodology is explained more fully in the following sections, but an outline of 
the approaches used is as follows: 
 
• Phase 1 - Secondary non-empirical qualitative research conducted through the 
collection of existing research findings, theoretical literature, professional 
subject matter articles, journals, relevant legislation, and official policy 
documents. 
• Phase 2 - Secondary research, by systematic review and content analysis of 
existing literature. 
• Phase 3 - Primary empirical research, through an online survey completed by 
senior leaders across the three public services of health, the police and local 
government. 
• Phase 4 - Primary empirical research, by analysis of the self-completing 
survey responses. 
• Phase 5 - Primary empirical qualitative research, through semi-structured 
interviews with senior leaders and key national stakeholders  
• Phase 6 - Primary empirical qualitative research, through the analysis and 
interpretation of the semi-structured interviews. 
 
Phase 1: The Literature Review  
 
Chapter Three of this research provided a systematic review and analysis of existing 
research findings, theoretical literature, professional subject matter articles, journals, 
relevant legislation and governmental policy documents surrounding the research 
topic. This, in turn, led to the refining and redefining of the research questions as the 
study progressed. The review of the relevant literature assisted in determining 
whether the topic was worth studying (Creswell, 2009), and it also helped in 
narrowing down the area of inquiry and creating an understanding of the more 







The Positioning of the Literature Review in the Research 
 
The literature review is set out as a separate chapter at the start of the research 
providing an introduction to the topic. The review identified the key themes and 
assisted in framing the problem and areas that required further interrogation. 
Reviewing the existing literature was an essential part of understanding how models 
of public administration have evolved in England, and how they have impacted on the 
way public services in local government, health, and the police are delivered. 
 
The Collection of the Secondary Data  
 
There are distinct advantages in examining official data and reports in preparation for 
this research.  Apart from being an unobtrusive method (Webb et al., 1966), it had the 
advantage of having been collected over an extended period, which enabled both 
longitudinal study and comparative analysis. The breadth and depth of the existing 
literature had the added advantage of minimising any positive or negative bias that 
might have been held by the Researcher.  
 
Phase 2: The Analysis and Interpretation of the Secondary Data in the   
Literature Review 
 
By conducting a literature review, an analytic induction (Znaniecki, 1934; Hicks, 
1994) was carried out from a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Straus, 1971, 
Charmaz et al., 2009). This entailed an objective, systematic and quantitative content 
analysis of the literature (Berelson, 1952), which was critically reviewed and analysed 
so that theory and hypotheses could be derived. This also provided confidence that the 
research questions were pertinent and valid (Straus and Corbin, 1998). The literature 
was mapped into key themes to ensure the breadth of the topic was covered (Creswell, 
2009). The structured and methodical approach to the assignment of information to 
defined categories and coding the data means that anyone would come up with the 
same results by following the same process (Bryman, 2012). However, there is always 
the chance that the authenticity and credibility of the documents may have some 
limitations.  
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The Empirical Research – The Rationale for Adopting a Mixed-Methods Approach 
 
In the empirical phase of this research, a mixed-methods approach was adopted as this 
offered a variety of perspectives, produced greater richness and did not make the 
Researcher a prisoner to one particular method or technique (Robson, 1993). 
Quantitative and qualitative data were necessary to corroborate the findings, increase 
the validity of the results (Mele and Belardinekki, 2018) and triangulate the findings 
(Ricucci, 2010).  
 
Creswell's (2009) comparison of research methods (table 5) was used to consider the 
design of the methodology in this study. 
 
Table 5: A Comparison of Quantitative, Mixed, and Qualitative Methods 
 
A Comparison of Quantitative, Mixed, and Qualitative Methods reproduced from Creswell (2009) Research Design  
 
Quantitative Mixed Qualitative 
 
• Predetermined  
• Instrumental based questions 
• Performance data 
•  observational data, attitude 
data and census data 
• Statistical analysis 
• Statistical interpretation 
• Both predetermined and 
emerging methods  
• Both open-ended and close-
ended questions 
• Multiple forms of data 
drawing on all possibilities 
• Statistical and text analysis  
• Across databases 
interpretation 
 
• Emerging methods, open-
ended questions  
• Interview data, observation 
data, document data and 
audio visual data 
• Text and image analysis  
• Themes patterns 
interpretation 
 
There are generally two main approaches to quantitative research. These take the form 
of experimental research that determines if a specific treatment influences an 
outcome, or survey research that provides a quantitative numeric description of 
trends, attitudes or opinions of a sample of the population.  The latter was chosen for 
this research as it added objectivity and enabled variables and key themes to emerge 
at the commencement of the empirical research phase. This avoided interviewer bias, 
from the Researcher's interpretation of the existing literature and his personal 
experiences in the field (MacDonald et al., 2009). It also mitigated the risk of 
interviewer variability by having standardised questions (Drummond, 1990; Bryman, 
2012), and prevented narrowing down the line of questioning too quickly (Shuman 
and Converse, 1971) enabling the research hypotheses to be tested more objectively.  
 
 82 
However, this disadvantage of this research method was that it did not enable the 
depth, understanding and meaning of responses to be measured in sufficient detail, 
which was necessary for this research. Therefore an additional qualitative phase was 
necessary to provide greater understanding and interpretation of the opinions of 
participants, and to help explain the results from the quantitative survey (Tashakkori 
and Creswell, 2007) through inferential questions and hypotheses, that incorporated 
both independent and dependent variables. The qualitative element had the advantage 
of providing not only answers to the research questions, but participants' feelings, 
perceptions, experiences, and thoughts about the questions (Ivey, 2012).  
 
There are numerous descriptions of how to conduct qualitative research. Wolcott 
(2009) identifies 22 separate approaches to conducting qualitative research, however, 
the most frequently applied approaches are ethnography (Creswell, 2009; Wolcott, 
2009); grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Straus, 1971); case 
studies (Yin, 2018; Stake, 1995); phenomenological research (Moustakas, 1994); and 
narrative research (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). 
 
As in the literature review, the quantitative empirical research (self-completing 
surveys) and qualitative empirical research (semi-structured interviews) both used a 
grounded theory approach. Responses were coded into categories and cross-
referenced and compared with the concepts identified in all phases of the research 
The Sequencing of Mixed-Method Research  
 
After the initial collection and analysis of the secondary research in the literature 
review, there were several issues considered in deciding the sequencing of the further 
mixed-methods approach. This involved deciding whether to conduct a sequential 
exploratory approach in which qualitative data collection and analysis would be 
conducted to raise hypotheses, which would then be tested with quantitative data, or 
conversely, through a sequential explanatory approach in which quantitative 




In this study, it was decided to do the latter as it was the most effective way of testing 
the research questions. The initial quantitative empirical research was employed to 
identify any consistent themes with a larger and more diverse cohort of respondents. 
The results from the quantitative research were used to explore emerging themes 
through further interrogation in the qualitative phase (Tashakkori and Teddie, 1998). 
This approach also identified specific issues emerging from the different 
organisations and different roles within each of these organisations. Using a 
sequential explanatory approach enabled these themes to be triangulated across both 
the quantitative and qualitative methods (Jick, 1979; Bryman, 2012) providing an 
opportunity for interpretation across both phases of the analysis, leading to greater 
integrity and credibility of the findings. 
 
Phase 3: The Collection of the Empirical Quantitative Data (Self-Completing 
Survey) 
The purpose of the survey was not to act as a census but to capture a sample of a 
diverse range of views from senior leaders across three of the largest public service 
organisations in the Bristol city region. It was also cheaper and quicker to administer 
and reached a much larger and more representative cohort. The survey elicited views 
on the predominant approaches to public administration used by each of the 
organisations providing a broad understanding of the incentives and disincentives in 
adopting a system-wide approach to solving complex cross-sector challenges in the 
city.  
 
Sampling - Establishing the Population and Sample Group 
 
While Bristol City Council is the sole provider of council services, and Avon and 
Somerset is the sole provider of policing services, there are several health care 
providers in the city. These include two acute hospitals (University Hospitals Bristol 
NHS Foundation Trust and North Bristol Trust), and a range of primary care 
providers such as general practitioners, and community health providers. In this 
research, the cohort from health was confined to University Hospitals Bristol NHS 
Foundation. Collectively the University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary, and Bristol City Council employ over 24,000 
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people. The University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust employs 11,899 
people, Avon and Somerset Constabulary employees 5,939 people and Bristol City 
Council employs 6,217 people.  
 
This research captured a population group of a random sample of one per cent of the 
most senior leaders in each organisation. This amounted to 256 people across the 
three organisations involved in the study. The cohorts consisted of all the executive 
and senior manager grades, and this produced a split of 124 in the University 
Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, 61 in Avon and Somerset Constabulary and 
71 in Bristol City Council. As Bryman (2012) identifies, the size of the sample and 
the type of data collected has significant implications for the analysis. A direct 
approach was made to the chief executives and chief constable to gain their support 
for the participation of senior leaders in their organisation before the research 
commenced, as this has been shown to improve response rates (Baumgartner and 
Heberlein, 1984).  
 
The three organisations were approached and asked to provide a random sample of 
one per cent of their most senior leaders, detailing the approximate number required 
in their respective organisation and then asked to provide their email addresses to the 
Researcher. These were then sampled through direct email using an online tool. From 
this population, a formula was applied to ensure the confidence interval and margins 
of error were accurate. In this study, a 95 per cent confidence level was used together 
with a confidence interval level of five and a percentage level of 50 per cent. The 
design of the sample group was a key consideration, as the validity of this group, if 
not well designed, might have resulted in concerns over the statistical confidence in 
the returns.   
Survey Design  
 
There have been many academic and non-academic articles advocating guidelines for 
survey design (Creswell, 2009; Bryman, 2012; Dilman et al., 2014). Many of these 
guidelines were incorporated into a checklist and utilised in the design of this survey. 
The survey consisted of 15 questions, nine of which were multiple-choice that were 
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designed using the Likert scale. Likert scales are one of the most reliable ways to 
measure attitudes and opinions with a high degree of nuance.  
 
The only questions that did not use the Likert scale were questions three, three (b) and 
questions 10 to 15 (inclusive), as these required a specific answer. There was a 
facility to offer a written response in the ‘other’ category for question seven as there 
may be other lines of accountability specific to the respondent that were not apparent 
in the list provided. Nine respondents placed an entry in the ‘other’ category. This 
approach allowed responses to be more efficiently coded and analysed, with more in-
depth questioning taking place in the next phase of the research process. Included at 
the end of the survey was an ‘additional comments box’ for participants who felt they 
needed to comment or elaborate further on something in the survey.  
 
The design of the Likert scale questions meant that they were presented in a vertical 
format, as this was likely to improve the accuracy of the responses (Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1982), but the online tool allowed respondents to change this to a 
horizontal format if they chose to. A progress bar, the ability to access the survey 
from a range of devices, and the ability to skip questions that were not applicable to 
them, were all included to help increase the response rate.  
 
Establishing the Content of the Survey  
 
The survey was designed to capture a broad range of responses in order to answer the 
research aims and questions. However, it was recognised from the outset that the 
survey would be insufficient to answer all the research questions in depth, and where 
gaps were evident in the analysis these were dealt with in the next phase of the 
research through one-on-one, semi-structured interviews. 
 
Questions one to seven (inclusive) and questions ten to 11 were designed to test 
research aims A and B.  Questions eight, and nine tested research aim C. Questions 
one to five (inclusive) were designed to test research question one. Questions six and 
seven (inclusive) were designed to test research question two, Questions eight and 
nine were designed to test research questions three and four. However, research 
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questions two, three and four, needed further in-depth testing in the research 
interviews. 
 
Questions 10 to 14 were designed to provide comparative data by gender, age, sector, 
role and responsibilities, and the amount of time the respondent had been working in 
his or her respective organisation. 
 
The Choice of an Online Survey 
 
One advantage of using a self-completing survey, either online or postal, is that it 
removes the potential bias and variability that might be present when the researcher 
asks the questions. Other additional advantages in using online surveys include the 
reduced costs of paper, printing and postage, and a reduction in time in the collection, 
analysis and accessibility to participants. Such an approach also enables automated 
reminders to be sent to participants who have not responded, increasing the reach and 
scale of the survey as it can be sent simultaneously to hundreds of people over a 
broader geographical area. This also reduces the time-lapse between receiving the 
survey and responding, which is an essential consideration in the quality of the returns 
(Drummond, 1990). The use of an online survey also provides greater anonymity and 
is more accurate than manual data inputting. It also avoids the risk of participants 
reading all the questions before they answer the first one, reducing the inclination not 
to complete the survey.  
 
However, the online survey utilised used a verification tool that confirmed if the 
person providing answers was the right person and prevented one person submitting 
multiple responses. While some people can be challenging to reach if they do not 
have Internet access, this was not relevant for the participant group in this study. 
While a higher response rate may occur where surveys are handed out, supervised and 
collected, online approaches are more convenient, are likely to capture a full cohort, 
and response rates can be monitored.  The three organisations agreed on this 
approach, and the target audience were personally contacted through their 
organisational email addresses.  
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However, the disadvantages that can be attributed to both online and postal surveys, 
are that if participants are not clearly identified and engaged this can lead to low 
response rates, unintended bias and problems in creating an appropriate sample from 
which to draw reliable conclusions  (Andrews et al., 2003; Howard, Rainie, and 
Jones, 2001). Other shortcomings include not enough being known about the 
characteristics of the participants and that the completion of the survey is not 
supervised (Smith and McVie, 2003). In this study the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages and therefore an online approach was chosen. 
 
The Length of the Survey 
 
Several studies have shown that participants are less likely to stay fully engaged with 
a survey for more than eight to ten minutes unless they have a particular interest in the 
subject (Bryman, 2012).  In 2018, Survey Monkey, an online survey company 
examined a random sample of 100,000 surveys that were 1-30 questions in length and 
analysed the median amount of time that respondents took to complete the surveys. 
They found that the more questions asked, the less time respondents spend on 
answering each question. They also found that, on average, respondents take just over 
a minute to answer the first question in a survey (including the time spent reading any 
survey introductions) and about five minutes, answering a ten-question survey. 
However, they also found that respondents take more time per question when 
responding to shorter surveys than longer ones.  
 
In table six, Chudoba (2018) set out a comparison of the time spent on questions 
dependent on the length of the survey. This identified that the longer a survey is, the 
less time respondents spend on answering each question and for surveys longer than 
30 questions, the average amount of time respondents spend on each question is 
nearly half of that of surveys with less than 30 questions. Abandon rates increased for 
surveys that took more than seven to eight minutes to complete, with completion rates 





Table 6: The average time people are willing to spend on a survey 
 




1 75 1 min, 15 secs 
 
2 40 2 mins 
 
3 to 10 30 2-5 mins 
 
11 to 15 25 5- 7 mins 
 
16 - 25 21 7- 9 mins 
 
26 to 30 19 9-10 mins 
 
 





However, Chudoba (2018) concluded that you cannot always assume that longer 
surveys contain less thorough answers as this depends on the type of survey, the 
audience, and the relationship of respondents to the researcher, among other factors. 
Inferred from this study is that the questions the researcher wants participants to think 
through carefully should be at the start of the survey, and the survey should ideally 
take no longer than seven to eight minutes to complete. Therefore the design of the 
survey incorporated nine Likert scale questions with a further four multiple-choice 
personal characteristic questions, one closed multiple-choice question and a 
comments box for any written comments that participants would like to add. 
 
Testing and Piloting the Survey  
 
There was an initial pre-test of the survey questions with three participants, one from 
each of the organisations observed. This refined the questions before a pilot of the 
survey was conducted. The pilot survey was done with ten participants from each of 
the three organisations and tested the survey steps from start to finish. The pilot was 
distributed and collected in the same manner as the final research process. This also 
enabled a check to be made that the emails sent avoided any spam filter. However, 
rather than sending the survey link out electronically with an email request for 
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feedback, the Researcher was present to watch the reception and application in 
person. The testers were asked to complete the survey online in his presence and were 
asked to think out loud. Each time they read and answered a question, notes were 
made on everything they said. This enabled the observation of thoughts, concerns, 
pauses and body language and participants could articulate what went well and what 
did not ‘in action' rather than having to provide written feedback. The Researcher 
looked for hesitation and mistakes to ensure the survey questions, the layout and the 
online process were clear, and identified areas for improvement. A set of specific 
prompts was prepared to ensure all the key issues were covered. Based on the pilots 
conducted, and the feedback received the final version of the survey was prepared. 
 
Creating Incentives to Complete the Survey  
 
Church (1993) identifies that when there are incentives, there is an average increase in 
the response rates of 19.1 per cent for monetary and 7.9 per cent, for non-monetary 
rewards. Church also highlights that giving too big an incentive can encourage the 
participant to return more positive answers and that some people find that an incentive 
produces a negative effect. It was decided not to offer any monetary incentive, as the 
Researcher's support from the chief executive and chief constable of each of the 
organisation, was anticipated to be a sufficient incentive to encourage people to 
respond.  
 
Administering the Survey 
 
The survey was administered simultaneously across the whole sample group and was 
open for over a period of one month (24 April 2019 to 24 May 2019). Utilising the 
recommendations of Dilman et al., (2014) on successful survey completion, the 
following process was tailored and designed for administering the survey: 
 
Day 1: On 24 April 2019, an invitation was sent via the online survey to the 
organisational email of the potential participants. The letter introduced the Researcher 
and outlined the purpose of the survey. It reassured the potential participant that 
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information would be anonymous and described its use and included a link to the 
survey. This resulted in 78 completed surveys within the first 24 hours. 
 
Day 5: By 29 April 2019, 84 surveys (32 per cent) had been completed, which 
consisted of 50 from the University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, 21 from 
the Avon and Somerset Constabulary and 13 from Bristol City Council. 
Consequently, the Researcher made personal contact with the chief executive and 
chief constable of the respective organisations, alerting them to the response rate and 
asking them to encourage the completion of the survey, which they all agreed to do. 
 
Day 6: On 30 April 2019, a reminder email to complete the survey went to those that 
had not completed the survey, setting out the collective response rates for each 
organisation. This resulted in a further 39 responses within the following six hours 
and prompted a further 13 responses in the next 18 hours, bringing the overall 
response rate to 142 (55 per cent) by 8 May 2019. 
 
Day 15:  On 9 May 2019, a second reminder email to complete the survey was sent to 
those who had not completed the survey, again setting out the collective response 
rates for each organisation. This resulted in a further 21 responses in the next 18 
hours, bringing the overall response rate to 163 (63 per cent) by 11 May 2019. 
 
Day 22: On 16 May 2019, a final email was sent to all the participants thanking them 
for taking part, advising them about how the data would be used and making a final 
appeal to those who had not completed the survey to complete it. It also advised them 
that the survey would close on 24 May. This revealed that four of the potential 
respondents had left their respective organisation since the start of the survey, and a 
further four had incorrect email addresses. Those who had left the organisation were 
removed which reduced the target group to 252 people, and the incorrect email 
addresses were rectified and resent using the correct email address. This resulted in a 




Variables  - Internal and External Validity, Replicability and Reliability 
 
The survey design allowed it to be replicated and repeatable, increasing its reliability. 
Additionally, the spread and characteristics of the sample group were representative 
of the views of senior leaders in each of the organisations. However, the research is 
spread across three separate organisations, which is a key variable in the study, which 
limits the generalisation of the findings. This is discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
The personal data characteristics in the survey were grouped in ordinal variables, and 
rank-ordered, but the distance between the categories were not equal across the range. 
While asking someone to provide their exact age might have increased the accuracy, 
it may also have presented a negative impact on the likelihood of completion if the 
respondent suspects that this may affect their privacy or anonymity. Therefore these 
were not included. Question five offered, a simple yes, no, or don't know response, 
which were treated as ordinal variables so that the same frequency tables could be 
applied to each of the categories.  
 
Finally, questions one to four and six to 11 involve the use of Likert scales which 
some argue should be treated as interval/ratio variables (Bryman and Cramer, 2012), 
as distances between the categories are identical across the range, but it is appropriate 
in this research to treat them as ordinal data. Mean, standard deviation, upper and 
lower quartile and variance analysis was conducted on the survey responses to 
establish the statistical significance of the research findings and to establish the 
degree of confidence between the variables in the population group.  
Acceptable Response Rates 
 
Mangione’s (1995) scale was used to assess the response rate to the survey and this 
provided the following classification of bands of response rate to surveys: 
• Over 85 per cent - Excellent 
• 70-85 per cent - Very Good 
• 60-69 per cent - Acceptable 
• 50-59 per cent - Barely Acceptable 
• Below 50 per cent - Not Acceptable 
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Albeit, a great deal of published research achieves lower than 50 per cent response 
rates (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Phase 4: Analysis of the Empirical Quantitative Data  
This section discusses the individual steps in the data analysis, and reliability, of the 
inferential and descriptive data. The quantitative data analysis was considered at this 
stage before the survey was designed and administered.  
Coding the Data 
 
Question five was a closed question and was pre-coded as it did not require an 
observation schedule or coding frame. However, questions one to four and six to 11 
utilised a Likert scale and had a coding frame applied. The Likert scale used a five-
point scale. While this may have provided respondents with a ‘middle ground’ to 
avoid answering the question, a six-point scale would have had the disadvantage of 
forcing respondents to lean to one side or the other. Therefore on balance a five-point 
scale was chosen. 
 
The scale was pre-coded as:  
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4.  Agree  
5. Strongly Agree. 
Analysing the Data  
 
The use of descriptive data analysis was applied to summarise and describe the 
patterns in the data. While this does not enable a conclusion to be drawn about the 
hypotheses in the research, it helps in making sense of the raw data in a more 
meaningful way, enabling a more straightforward interpretation. The techniques 
applied in this research are firstly measures of central tendency, which describe the 
central position and the frequency of distribution through the mean (average) of the 
responses; secondly, measures of spread using variance and standard deviation 
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(amount of variance through the mean) and presented through tables, graphs, charts 
and commentary; and thirdly, analysis of the upper and lower quartile responses. 
 
Interpreting the Data (Inferential Statistics) 
 
There was a random sample of one most  of the senior leadership cohort across the 
three organisations. This inferential statistic enabled generalisations about the larger 
population from which the samples came. However, despite the rigour applied in 
choosing the sample group, it is accepted that some sampling errors may occur and 
therefore, the sample cannot claim to be a perfect representation of the population. 
However, the use of inferential data in estimating parameters and testing statistical 
hypotheses was helpful. 
 
Phase 5: Collection of the Empirical Qualitative Data (Semi-Structured 
Interviews)  
 
Selecting the Right Interview Approach 
 
The second phase of this research involved more focused and in-depth interviews 
with nine of the most senior leaders in each of the three organisations participating in 
this research and a further seven interviews with key stakeholders responsible for 
national policy, regulation and inspection in health, the police and local government. 
This phase tested and refined the findings of the survey revealing and exploring the 
data beyond a simple linear understanding (Wang, 2016). This enabled the research to 
extend beyond establishing 'what' was occurring to 'how' and 'why' this was the case. 
In deciding whether structured, unstructured or semi-structured interviews were the 
most appropriate approach to take, the amount of control the Researcher wanted to 
exercise was considered (Harrell and Bradley, 2009). It is more common in policy 
research, such as this, to have a semi-structured approach in which the interviewer has 
some discretion about the order of the questions, but the questions were standardised, 
and probes were used to ensure that the Researcher covered the correct material. 
While this type of interview was able to collect detailed information, it involved a 
conversational style, which was most appropriate for this research. For that reason, a 
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semi-structured approach was used to test the themes emerging from the quantitative 
research phase. 
 
Face-to-Face Interviews versus Telephone Interviews 
 
There are advantages in a semi-structured interview being conducted via the 
telephone as it reduces cost, is quicker to administer and supervise, and reduces 
interviewer bias through remoteness. However, it would have masked body language, 
which prompted further questions, and such an approach was less likely to relax the 
participant and develop a productive environment. Evidence also suggests that the 
quality of interviews conducted via the telephone is inferior to face-to-face interviews 
(Shuy, 2003), and sustaining engagement beyond 20 minutes on the telephone is 
challenging (Frey, 2004). Limiting the duration to 20 minutes in this research would 
have been insufficient to test the research questions. Therefore, face-to-face 
interviews were preferable. However, telephone interviews were considered as an 
alternative if face-to-face interviewing were problematic or challenging to arrange, 
which proved to be the case in one interview. 
 
A structured interview would have provided the opportunity for closed questions with 
fixed choices for interviewees in which the responses could have been easily coded 
and aggregated (Oppenheim, 2000). This also enhances the standardisation of 
questions, reducing the risk of the Researcher embellishing, misinterpreting or 
influencing what was said, and consequently reducing variability (Shuman and 
Converse, 1971), albeit this notion is not conclusive (Bryman, 2012). However, in this 
research, the interviews required greater exploration of the information provided in 
the initial survey, and for that reason, they were more suited to a looser semi-
structured approach. While this ran the risk of participants providing responses that 
might be seen to have social desirability (Dohrenwhend, 1966), their seniority 
reduced the risk them just ‘saying the right thing’.  
 
Participants in the semi-structured interviews were what Mikecz (2012) refers to as 
elite officials. The ability to gain access to elite participants or to get them to talk and 
open up is particularly challenging for most researchers (Thuesen, 2011). 
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Interviewing of 'elites' brings with it different methodological and ethical challenges 
from researching non-elite groups (Cormode and Hughes, 1999).  However, in this 
research, the Researcher had already established varying degrees of rapport with most 
of the participants. While this presented an alternative risk in blurring the critical 
distance (Mikecz, 2012), with the exception of one participant, the Researcher had no 
direct influence over them. The Researcher also had a considerable professional 
interest in the topic, which also had the potential to bring with it preconceived ideas 
and bias. These were considered in deciding the approach and discussed with each of 
the participants and the Researcher's supervisor. On balance it was decided that semi-
structured interviews on a one-to-one basis had more advantages than disadvantages. 
 
Conducting the Interviews 
 
Participants were advised of the objectives of the study, signed a written consent form 
and were given and had explained to them a participant information form. This 
covered how the data would be dealt with, in line with the university's ethical consent 
requirements and the associated data management plan. The interviews were all 
digitally recorded and time-stamped before being fully transcribed and coded. 
 
There were 16 interviews conducted in total.  The identities of the participants have 
all been concealed, as anonymity and confidentiality of participants was crucial in 
creating a frank and open conversation, and were also essential to prevent any 
potential or perceived criticism of participants (Crow and Wiles, 2008). Choosing a 
small cohort of participants at such a senior level created a challenge in creating 
absolute anonymity, but none of the participants were mentioned by name, with 
comments attributed solely to their organisation. However, one specific quote was 
used in Chapter Eight that identified the participant, albeit consent for this was 
obtained.  
 
Participants were not asked to review the completed transcripts and verify that they 
was correct, but they did have access to the final report in which they were asked to 
comment on the accuracy of any quotes attributed to them and whether they felt their 
anonymity was sufficiently protected. This data were then summarised, where 
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applicable, and compared to research findings in the literature and the survey, 
critically comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences. 
 
Interviews were conducted in the participants’ place of work, except for one that was 
done over the telephone due to the participant’s unavailability to do so in person. 
However, there was a spread by gender (three females and 13 males). The data 
elicited were considered through the theoretical lens of historical trends in the four 
key themes of public administration, performance management, accountability and 
collaborative working and whilst every attempt was made to holistically analyse the 
data, through multiple perspectives and multiple factors, there remains an element of 
interpretation and potential bias based on what the Researcher had read, seen, 
understood and heard. 
 
Phase 6: The Coding and Analysis of the Empirical Qualitative Data (Semi-
Structured Interviews) 
 
After transcriptions of the interviews, a grounded theory approach was then adopted 
to code and analyse the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Straus, 1971). 
This involved validating the data, by reading through them and coding them into 
themes. The codes were a combination of predefined codes based on the research 
aims and questions, the themes that emerged from the responses to the survey and the 
themes that emerged during the semi-structured interviews. This was completed using 
a computer software program (NVivo) and identified through triangulation of 
different data sources.  
 
The categories of information (open coding) were selected and placed within a 
theoretical model (axial coding), and then the interconnection of these categories was 
established (selective coding). This was done by systematically marking similar 
categories and meanings of the text, making it easier to identify any patterns and 
themes for analysis and interpretation. While initial codes were established from 
previous research, previous theory and the research questions, some additional theory 




The findings were presented in a narrative discussion. This involved a detailed 
critique of several themes, which included sub-themes, specific illustrations, multiple 
perspectives from individuals, and quotations. 
 
The final stage involved interpreting the meaning of the themes and descriptions by 
comparing the findings with the information gleaned from the literature and survey 



































CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the findings of the self-completing online survey sent to one per 
cent of the most senior leaders from Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Bristol City 
Council and University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust. The four key themes 
that emerged from the literature review were constructed to answer the research aims, 
questions and hypotheses. These were models of public administration, performance 
management, accountability and collaborative working. Each theme was examined to 
test whether the historical context, incremental change, critical junctures and path 
dependence of the respective organisations had a significant impact on the incentives 
or disincentives to work collaboratively. 
 
• Models of Public Administration - examined the accountability to national 
departments, performance targets and service users and the emphasis that was 
put on input; output; outcomes; and changing public demand. These were 
compared across the three organisations to establish the influence that 
traditional administration, new public management and public values 
approaches had on their respective organisations. 
 
• Performance Management - examined the way in which performance was 
managed in each of the organisations with a specific focus on the influence of 
new public management and the use of performance targets. In doing so it 
established whether their organisation sets performance targets, if they were 
helpful in improving the performance of their organisation and whether they 
set them with other organisations. 
 
• Accountability - examined the layers of accountability each organisation faced 
and whom respondents felt most accountable to, and for what, from both an 
organisational and individual perspective. 
 
• Collaborative Working - established whether respondents perceived that a 
more collaborative approach would improve services or reduce costs. It then 
considered what conditions respondents felt were needed to be in place to 
incentivise this, and what disincentives they felt were in the current system.  
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Response Rate to the Survey 
 
There was a 73 per cent response rate (186 responses) to the survey, which was 
broken down as: 
• Police  - 87 per cent response (52 out of 60 requests) 
• Local Government - 57 per cent response (40 out of 70 requests) 
• Health - 74 per cent response (92 out of 122 requests) 
• Other – 0.8 per cent (two respondents did not identify their organisation) 
Analysing the Data  
 
The techniques applied to the analysis of the data were measures of central tendency, 
which describe the central position and the frequency of distribution through the mean 
(average) of the responses, and measures of variance and standard deviation through 
tables, graphs, and commentary. The use of descriptive data analysis was also applied 
to summarise and describe the patterns in the data and make sense of the raw data in a 
more meaningful way. 
 
The survey consisted of nine multiple-choice questions that were designed using the 
Likert scale. These were pre-coded with a five-point scale of strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither agree, nor disagree, agree, or strongly disagree, and there was one 
closed question that required a yes/no or don't know response.  Question seven 
provided a suggested list of people and organisations the respondents might be 
accountable to, and in this question, there was an 'other' category added offering a 
written response to ensure the capture of any additional layers of accountability. Nine 
people made an additional comment in this section. Positioned at the end of the 
survey was a final additional comments box, for participants who felt they needed to 
comment, or elaborate further on something in the survey. This allowed responses to 
be easily coded and analysed before more in-depth questioning took place in the next 
phase of the research process.  
 
Forty-six per cent (85) of respondents were female, 51 per cent (95) were male, and 
the other three per cent (6) classified themselves as 'other'. There was no significant 
variance in the responses based on gender. 
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Models of Public Administration 
 
Questions one, two and six were designed to test research aim B and used the Likert 
scale. This examined the different models and practices of public sector performance 
management and accountability and these questions also tested research question one 
which examined which models of public sector management had the most 
considerable prominence in the discourse and practices of each of the organisations in 
the study. 
 
As table 7 indicates the majority of respondents in all three organisations felt the most 
significant amount of accountability to national departments reporting to politicians 
and parliament. However, this was only marginally more for health respondents than 
the accountability they felt to performance targets, completion and league tables. The 
accountability they felt to service users through comments and feedback was 
significantly less. The spread was more even for local government respondents, but in 
the police the accountability to performance targets, competition, and league tables 
was significantly less than the other categories and significantly lower than the other 
organisations.  
 
Table 7: Respondents’ perception of organisational accountability (by 
percentage) 
 
 National departments, 





Service users from 
their comments 
and feedback 
Health 98.9 90.2 67.3 
Police 90.4 61.6 73 
Local Government  87.5 77.5 82.5 
 
Respondents were also asked if there was a strong emphasis in their organisation on 
the cost of resources and activity (inputs), measuring the amount of work that gets 
done (outputs) and measuring things that make a difference to the public (outcomes) 
and how responsive their organisation was to changing public demands. As 52 shows, 
there was strong agreement across all three organisations that inputs and outputs were 
heavily emphasised with a mean of 4.02 and 4.13 respectively, the standard deviation 
on these responses was consistent at 0.92 and 0.91 respectively, and the variance was 
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also not significant at 0.84 and 0.83 respectively. However, there was a perception 
that the emphasis on measuring the things that make a difference to the public 
(outcomes), and the organisation's responsiveness to changing public demand had less 
emphasis across all three organisations with a mean ranking of 3.89 and 3.47 and a 
standard deviation of 0.93 and 0.87, and a variance of 0.86 and 0.77 respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Combined responses to the emphasis on inputs, outputs, outcomes and 




When separated by individual organisation, figure 2 demonstrates a noticeable 
variance in responses across the three organisations. 
 
Local government responses showed the least variance across all four questions, but 
suggested that the greatest emphasis was on outcomes with a mean of 4.1. The police 
demonstrated slightly wider variance and ranked the emphasis on outputs as the 
highest with a mean of 3.98, but only marginally more than outcomes with a mean of 
3.9. Meanwhile, health responses demonstrated the widest variance with the greatest 
emphasis being on outputs with a mean of 4.4, compared to a mean on inputs of 4.35, 
outcomes with a mean of 3.78 and responsiveness to changing public demand with a 
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Figure 3: A comparison of responses to the emphasis on input, output, outcomes 




While no conclusive interpretations can be drawn from this, the responses suggest that 
the historical influence of traditional public administration and new public 
management still retain significant influence on the path dependence, in varying 
degrees, across each of the organisations in the study, but that this dependence was 




This section examines the way in which performance is measured and managed in 
each of the organisations, with a particular focus on the use of targets, and their 
association with new public management approaches. 
 
The Use of Targets 
Question three was designed to establish if performance targets were set, and if so, 
how this was done. This tested research aim B and research questions one and three.  
 
Eighty-four per cent (153) of respondents indicated that their organisation set 
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of 0.13 across the total number of respondents. Nearly all this standard deviation was 
from police respondents (0.50), but as figure 4 demonstrates, there was a considerable 
difference in knowledge, understanding, clarity and opinion on this from police 
respondents. 
 
Figure 4: A comparison of responses to whether the organisation sets 





In 2010 and 2011, nationally prescribed targets for local government and the police 
were removed, but nationally prescribed targets remained unchanged for the health 
service. Therefore it is unsurprising that health respondents almost unanimously 
indicated that their organisations set performance targets.  
 
However, despite the removal of nationally prescribed targets for local government, in 
Bristol, a policy decision was made to retain many of them locally. While Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary has predominantly removed performance targets, the survey 
showed that there was a divided opinion from respondents to the survey as to whether 
targets had been retained or removed. The responses to the survey tend to suggest that 
either the police leaders who completed the survey were unaware of the changes, or at 
a more localised level the practice of target setting remained intact. It was unclear 












government, or sporadically and locally in the police was due to a belief of their 
value, or whether they were ingrained in the individual or organisational history and 
dependence anchoring them in the fabric of the organisation.  
 
One police respondent gave an explanation as to why this confusion might exist: 
 
"We've got a strong performance management structure (and a good data 
visualisation system), but I don't think of that as creating targets - I think 
we're now much better at thinking of improvement rather than arbitrary 
numerical targets". 
 
This opened up a line of inquiry for the interview phase of the research in 
understanding the reasons for supporting a target driven approach and whether this 
was due to continuing national requirements driving organisational path dependence, 
institutional traditions, or a belief that this was a positive way to improve 
performance. 
 
Targets Improve Performance 
 
The majority of respondents believed that targets helped improve the performance of 
their organisation. Seventy five per cent (139) indicated they were helpful, 11 per cent 
indicated that they were not, and 13.5 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
statement. The standard deviation on this question was 0.85 and the variance 0.73. 
However, as figure 5 suggests, police respondents were generally less sympathetic to 
the use of targets being helpful in improving performance. Only one per cent (2) of all 









Figure 5: A comparison of responses on whether targets are helpful in improving 




The response to the question of whether targets helped in improving performance 
varied depending on how long an individual had been working in the organisation. 
Seventy eight per cent (46) of those that had been working in their organisation for 
under five years either agreed, 56.4 per cent (31), or strongly agreed 23.3 (15), that 
targets were helpful in improving the performance of their organisation. 
 
However, 82 per cent of those under twenty years, either agreed, 72.6 per cent (45), or 
strongly agreed 9.6 per cent (6), but this dropped considerably to 62 per cent (42), of 
which 55.4 per cent agreed, and 6.2 per cent strongly agreed, when they had been in 
their organisations for over 20 years.  
 
It is conceivable that this may be due to those with under 20 years of service never 
having worked in public services before the introduction of new public management 
that they had little or no means of comparison. However, this was not conclusive from 










Targets are helpful in improving the performance of my organisation (by 
mean) 
 106 
The Setting of Targets  
 
In cases where organisations set performance targets, respondents were asked whether 
these were set internally and externally and whether these were discussed and set with 
other public services.  
 
Ninety-five per cent (148) of the total respondents believed that their targets were set 
internally and 86 per cent (128) believed they were set externally. Of those who 
responded from the police (48 per cent of the total respondents) 88 per cent  (22) 
indicated that they were internally set, and 56 per cent (14) indicated these were 
externally set. This suggested that there was a lack of clarity amongst senior leaders, 
particularly in the police, on what targets were in place, how they were set, and how 
they were performance managed. This was explored further in the interviews. 
 
As figure 6 demonstrates, there was significant confusion, or uncertainty, across all 
three organisations about whether their targets were set with other public services. Of 
the 154 people that responded to this question, 37 per cent (57 respondents) indicated 
they had set their targets with other public services, whereas, 38 per cent (59 
respondents) indicated they did not, with a further 25 per cent (38 respondents) not 
knowing. 
 
Figure 6: A comparison of responses on whether their organisation sets its 


















The lack of clarity on who set performance targets and how this was done was 
surprising at such a senior level. This reinforced the assumption that targets have 
become so ingrained in the fabric of the organisation, with such a high degree of 
historical path dependence, that even when they were removed nationally, they were 
still preserved by some senior leaders who relied on them to manage performance. 
This informed further in-depth discussion in the interviews. 
 
The Use of Joint Performance Management 
 
Respondents were then asked whether their organisation's priorities reflected a 
commitment to working with other public services and whether their organisation had 
a process that jointly monitored performance with other public services. Overall, 69 
per cent (128) of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that there was a clear 
commitment in this regard, however as figure 7 shows there was a significant 
variance of opinion about how joint performance management took place across the 
three organisations. This suggested that senior leaders thought joint performance 
management was in place and valued this, regardless of the reality of the situation, 
therefore this was incorporated as a key stage in the collective service model 














Figure 7: A comparison of responses on whether their organisation jointly 







Question six tested research aim B. This was intended to examine the operation of 
different models and practices of public sector performance management and 
accountability in the three public services, and to test research question one that 
examined which models of public sector management had the most prominence in the 
discourse and institutional practices of each of the organisations. Respondents were 
asked three questions designed to ascertain how their organisation was held to 
account, and then to consider where they felt the most significant overall 
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Figure 8: Combined responses on who respondents felt their organisation was 




Figure 8 suggests that overall the majority of respondents felt that national 
departments present the highest level of organisational accountability with a mean of 
4.41, a standard deviation of 0.71 and a variance of 0.50. There was a perception that 
there was less emphasis on the organisational accountability to performance targets, 
competition and league tables, which produced a mean of 3.98 with a standard 
deviation of 0.89 and a variance of 0.79 and a perception that the least of all was 
accountability to service users, which produced a mean of 3.75, a standard deviation 
of 0.92 and a variance of 0.85.  
 
Table 8 breaks this down further into individual, organisational responses, that 
demonstrated a consistent response across local government and the police 
respondents who ordered the most significant accountability as national departments, 
service users, and then targets, competition and league tables, whereas health 
respondents reordered this as national departments, targets, competition and league 
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Table 8: A comparison of responses on the highest levels of organisational 
accountability (by mean, standard deviation and variance) 
 
Organisation National Departments who in 
turn answer to politicians and 
parliament 
Targets, competition and league 
tables with other similar 
organisations 
Service users from their 
comments and feedback 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Police 4.27 0.74 0.54 3.58 0.97 0.94 3.75 0.81 0.65 
Health 4.66 0.5 0.25 4.30 0.70 0.49 3.67 1.0 0.99 
Local 
Government 




Table 9 demonstrates that from the responses received the highest accountability 
respondents felt was firstly to their values and belief and secondly, to their closest 
layers of management. The further away the layer of accountability was perceived to 
be from them, the lesser the degree of accountability they felt. This included areas 


















Table 9: Combined responses on who respondents felt most accountable to (by 
percentage, in descending order) 
 















Own Values & Beliefs  60 40    4.67 0.56 0.32 
Reportees 48 50  2  4.48 0.59 0.35 
Chief Officers/Directors  43 50 6 1  4.34 0.64 0.41 
Management Team 33 56 10 1  4.29 0.49 0.49 
Inspectorates 35 53 10  2 4.14 0.86 0.73 
Line Manager 25 65    4.51 0.35 0.35 
Service Users  42 42 13 2 1 4.22 0.83 0.68 
The Wider Public 28 56 14 1 1 4.09 0.74 0.55 
Peers  19 61 12 8  4.11 0.48 0.48 
The Law  31 45 20 4  4.12 0.92 0.85 
Government Departments  18 54 16 10 2 3.65 0.98 0.96 
Local politicians   23 41 19 17  3.38 1.13 1.27 
Regulators  26 35 27 8 4 3.94 0.98 0.96 
The Board 14 42 34 6 4 4.02 0.86 0.73 
Staff Networks 6 48 25 21  3.32 1.0 1.01 
Statutory Partnerships 13 40 37 8 2 3.48 0.93 0.87 
The Media  10 40 33 13 4 3.01 0.98 0.97 
National politicians  2 41 28 29  3.09 0.91 0.82 
Commissioners 16 29 39 16  3.41 0.97 0.94 
Unions 2 42 21 29 6 3.13 0.97 0.97 
Sub Committees  8 32 46 6 8 3.75 0.98 0.95 
Professional Bodies  8 31 31 22 8 3.54 1.11 1.23 
Social Media  10 28 35 23 4 2.81 0.99 0.97 
Ombudsman  2 22 45 21 10 3.13 0.95 0.90 
Non-Statutory Partnerships  4 17 61 16 2 3.10 0.91 0.84 
Auditors  4 10 53 25 8 3.18 1.03 1.05 
Pressure Groups 4 4 45 43 4 2.64 0.81 0.66 
 
The Variation in Organisational Responses 
 
The responses from each of the three organisations were remarkably consistent and 
there were only four categories that marginally ranged outside a standard deviation of 
one. These were accountability to locally elected politicians, professional bodies, staff 
networks and external audit. Views on the accountability to locally elected politicians 
produced a wide variance in responses across the three organisations, with local 
government respondents recording a mean of 4.55 indicating a strong sense of 
accountability towards this group. In contrast, the police recorded a mean of 3.69 and 
health a mean of 2.72 with the police recording the broadest standard deviation of 
1.02. Again, this appears to support the findings that the closer the proximity, the 
higher the accountability respondents perceived, but also demonstrates how a more 
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centralised path dependence is accentuated in health, whereas the reverse appears to 
be the case for local government.  
 
On accountability to professional bodies, there was again a significant variance with 
health reporting a strong sense of accountability with a mean of 4.0, whereas the 
police recorded a mean of 3.1 and local government respondents recorded a mean on 
3.69.  Again the police recorded the broadest standard deviation on this of 1.15. This 
reinforced the historical importance in health of accountability to national 
professional bodies. This was again tested in the interview phase of the research. 
 
All three organisations felt a degree of accountability to staff networks.  For instance, 
there was minimal variance or standard deviation from the local government (standard 
deviation 0.89, variance 0.80) or the police (standard deviation 0.88, variance 0.78). 
However, respondents from health recorded a standard deviation of 1.18 and a 
variance of 1.09. This suggests that there was a full span of opinion amongst health 
respondents, and consequently conclusions drawn from this are less reliable. 
However, the mean responses from the police (3.38), local government (3.55), and 
health (3.16) were not significantly different.  
 
Finally, accountability to external auditors identified a variance albeit slightly less 
exaggerated with health and local government respondents recording a neutral 
response with a mean of 3.35 and 3.27, respectively. In contrast, the police recorded a 
mean of 2.76, which suggests that police respondents that they felt less accountable to 
external audit. However, health showed the broadest standard deviation recording of 
1.15, which again suggests that there was a wider span of opinion amongst health 
respondents and consequently conclusions drawn from this are less reliable. 
 
Respondents were provided with several statements and asked to indicate on the 
Likert scale the degree of accountability they felt towards each. Nine respondents 
offered additional categories such as users of the city, as opposed to service users, 
other cities around the world, the West of England Combined Authority, neighbouring 
local authorities, friends and family, and the National Institute for Health Research. 
While these did not materially alter the findings of the survey, they extended the 
layers of accountability described.  
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Collaborative Working 
The Perceived Benefits and Challenges 
 
Questions eight and nine tested, in part, research aim B. This was designed to 
establish whether collaborative, place-based and system-wide approaches to local 
public services constitute an emerging paradigm of public sector management and 
accountability in England, and, if so, how far such a paradigm is constrained or 
frustrated by the persistence of new public management governance frameworks. It 
was also intended, in-part, to answer research question three, which tested how each 
organisation’s performance management systems and accountability mechanisms 
incentivise or disincentivise a system-wide approach to solving complex, cross-sector 
challenges. Research question four was aimed at understanding if it is necessary for 
legislative and structural change to take place before a collaborative approach is 
embedded. 
 
As figure 9 demonstrates, there was a strong belief across all three organisations that 
their organisational priorities reflected a commitment to collaborative working. 
Respondents were asked to think about collaborative working outside their sector and 
whether they believed collaborative working with other public services would 
improve the delivery of services, and reduce costs.  There was strong agreement that 
it would improve services, across all three organisations, as figure 9 and 10 
demonstrate, with 91 per cent agreement and a mean score of 4.39 and a standard 
deviation of 0.7. This was also the case for reduced costs that produced 78 per cent 













Figure 9: A comparison of responses on their organisations commitment to 




Figure 10: A comparison of responses on whether working collaboratively with 
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Figure 11: A comparison of responses on whether working collaboratively with 




While this overwhelmingly positive response to greater collaboration would tend to 
support Choi and Robertson's (2019) findings that people are willing and able to act in 
ways that help achieve shared objectives rather than pursue self-interest, the 
complexities, practicalities and most notably the path dependence of such an approach 
were evident in the free-text comments in the survey.  
 
As one police respondent commented: 
 
"I used to believe that working collaboratively was the future and a solution to 
many of the problems that society faces. Having been at the head of a team 
established for this purpose for over 2 years, I no longer believe it is the way 
forward. Collaboration undermines the core values of organisations that seek 
to collaborate, and the compromise required dilutes the service that should be 
provided. Without significant legislative change and funding being provided to 
social care, way more than current levels, collaborating with them will never 
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Likewise, one respondent from local government commented on the rigour and 
perseverance required to make cross-sector working a success by commenting that: 
 
"Yes cross-sector working saves budget and ensures better coordination, but 
that is often further down the line - in the early days of setting up it can be 
slow, time-consuming and the benefits not seen well." 
 
Finally, one respondent from health commented on the disconnect between the 
rhetoric and the reality of cross-sector working saying: 
 
"Whilst all managers and indeed regulatory bodies will extoll the virtue of 
cross-sector working and joined-up experiences of service users, in reality 
almost all of our performance measures that are critical to our perceived 
success (by the regulators) and how our boards are measured are about 
individual performance, not joint work. We won't sacrifice the performance of 
our organisation for the benefit of others, because we would be held to 
account if we did. So more autonomy and recognition that 'missing targets' in 
one area could be supporting performance in other areas [that may be more 
meaningful for service users] is needed." 
 
Encouraging Closer Working with other Public Services. 
 
Respondents were provided with a list of possible options on what they thought the 
essential ingredients were in encouraging closer collaborative working. This list was 
compiled based on previous research findings identified in the literature review in 









Table 10: Combined responses on the incentives for collaboration (by 












A clearer sense of joint purpose  51 
 
43 4 2  4.43 0.65 0.43 
More joint problem solving  46 
 
46 7 1  4.38 0.65 0.43 
Greater alignment of priorities  45 
 
47 6 2  4.35 0.67 0.45 
A greater understanding by others of my 
organisations roles, responsibilities and 
culture  
29 58 10 3  4.14 0.69 0.48 
A greater understanding by you of other 
organisations roles, responsibilities and 
culture  
26 60 11 3  4.10 0.69 0.47 
Being prepared to give up some control  37 
 
48 13 2  4.22 0.76 0.52 
More trust between organisations  40 
 
44 14 2  4.23 0.76 0.57 
Less unnecessary bureaucracy from other 
organisations  
25 45 26 4  3.91 0.81 0.65 
More time available  24 
 
50 19 7  3.9 0.84 0.70 
Less unnecessary bureaucracy from my 
organisation  
24 44 24 8  3.84 0.87 0.76 
Less of a blame culture  23 
 
43 22 11 1 3.78 0.94 0.88 
Changes to existing structures  18 
 
48 29 5  3.79 0.79 0.63 
Changes to national regulatory requirements  20 43 28 9  3.74 0.88 0.77 
 
More shared budgets  22 
 
39 30 8 1 3.73 0.93 0.87 
Changes to legislation  14 
 
40 37 9  3.59 0.84 0.71 
 
The responses appeared to support Offe and Wiesenthal's (1986) findings that the 
formation of coalitions involves a process in which multiple actors reinterpret their 
interests in ways that allow them to join together behind a joint project and then 
assemble the power resources necessary to respond to the views of the coalition. As 
table 10 demonstrates this was consistent with the perception of the majority of 
respondents who felt that effective collaboration relied less on restructuring, 
regulatory and legislative changes, and more on building relationships by establishing 
a clear sense of joint purpose, understanding each other's challenges, working more 









The survey produced a wealth of information across a significant breadth of the most 
senior leaders in the three organisations under review. These are discussed under the 
four key themes of models of public administration, performance management, 
accountability and collaborative working. By applying Mangione's (1995) guide, 
overall the response rate can be considered very good, which increased the validity of 
the findings.  However, broken down across the three participating organisations, 
there was an excellent response rate from Avon and Somerset Constabulary, a very 
good response rate from University Hospitals Bristol, but a barely acceptable 
response rate from Bristol City Council.  
 
• Models of Public Administration – there was a variance of opinions about 
which models of public administration had the most influence across the three 
organisations. Local government responses were evenly spread but suggested 
that there was more significant emphasis on outcomes, more commonly 
associated with public value approaches. However, they also felt a strong 
accountability to national departments and less responsiveness to public 
demand, which contradicted this.  The police responses suggested that the 
greatest influence was on outputs, commonly associated with new public 
management, but they felt considerably less accountability to performance 
targets, competition and league tables than the other organisations. However, 
health responses were more defined and suggested the greatest emphasis was 
on outputs, performance targets, competition and league tables commonly 
associated with new public management followed closely by inputs and 
national regulation commonly associated with traditional public 
administration. The influence of responsiveness to changing public demand 
and service users’ comments was significantly less than the other 
organisations. While conclusive interpretations cannot be drawn from this at 
this stage, it did suggest that the influence of traditional public administration 
and new public management remains prevalent across all three organisations, 
but more so in health.  
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• Performance Management - there was a lack of clarity from police 
respondents about whether targets were set or not, and there was a lack of 
clarity from all three organisations about how they were set and by whom. 
The majority of respondents indicated that the use of targets helped improve 
performance, but this was more pronounced in the responses from those 
who had only been in public service since their introduction. This opened up 
a line of inquiry for the interviews in understanding the reasons for this and 
whether it was due to continuing national requirements, organisational 
traditions, or a belief that this was a positive way in improving performance. 
Despite a belief from the majority of respondents that their organisational 
priorities reflected a commitment to working with other public services, it 
was again unclear how this was measured, and whether this involved a joint 
performance management process. 
 
• Accountability - while respondents all felt the strongest pull organisationally 
was to national departments, overall there was consistency across the police 
and local government that accountability was greater towards service users 
than performance league tables, which was the opposite to health 
respondents. However, there was a consistent response across all three 
organisations that individually they felt most accountable to their values and 
then to those that were in closest proximity to them at a managerial or 
political level. 
 
• Collaborative Working - Despite some cynicism and disillusionment, it was 
apparent that the majority of respondents felt that working across public 
service providers provided an opportunity to improve services and reduce 
costs. They also believed that this was within their control, but that it 
required a more definite sense of purpose, increased trust, and a better 
understanding of each other's challenges and constraints. However, this did 
not appear to be perceived to be reliant on having to wait for structural, 
regulatory or legislative changes.  
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While the findings from the survey were not definitive, they did demonstrate notable 
elements of the impact the historical evolution of the organisations and their 
subsequent path dependence appeared to have in suppressing alternative theoretical 
models such as complexity theory and its practical application in systems thinking 
approaches. This reinforces the challenges collaborative working faces from an 
ingrained adherence to a top-down direction and control.  
 
However, it also demonstrated the importance senior leaders placed on collaborative 
working and began to expose the value of several of the key stages contained in the 
collective service model presented in figure 1. Such as understanding the historical 
context of the organisations studied and the challenges this presented to collaborative 
working (Stage 5 in figure 1), how priorities are agreed (stage 2 in figure 1) and the 
value of reciprocal accountability and joint performance management (stage 3 in 
figure 1). 
 
This all provided critical lines of inquiry for more in-depth scrutiny in the interview 

























CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the findings of the interviews conducted with 16 of the most 
senior leaders from Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Bristol City Council and 
University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust, as well as critical national 
stakeholders in the field.  The interviews tested and built on the findings of the survey 
covered in Chapter Five and initially centred on the four key themes that had emerged 
from the review of the literature. These were models of public administration, 
performance management, accountability and collaborative working.  
 
The interviews were conducted between June and September 2019. There were 16 
elite interviews, which led to 83,000 words of transcripts. All the participants were 
white, 13 participants were male, and three were female. Except for one participant, 
they were all aged between 45 and 60 and collectively had over 500 years of public 
service experience. Participants included the chief executive and executive team 
members from each of the participating organisations, regional contributions from 
NHS Improvement (the health regulator), and the South West Combined Authority 
and national contributions from current and former policy leads in the police and local 
government.  
 
Models of Public Administration 
 
The survey demonstrated there was a variance of opinions about which models of 
public administration had the most influence across the three organisations.  And 
while it generally suggested that traditional public administration and new public 
management often had a more significant presence than alternative models that have 
emerged, this was inconclusive and required further exploration in the interviews. 
 
Of the 16 participants in the interviews, 12 had joined public services before the 
introduction of new public management. In line with public choice arguments they all 
described how traditional public administration in public services in the 1990s was 
old fashioned, inefficient, and too process-driven and collectively recognised there 
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had been a need to shift the emphasis towards tighter performance management and 
results, enabled by the growing availability of management information.  
 
One participant expressed how the departure from traditional public administration 
had removed the freedom to run things flexibly, but also recognised that performance 
management had been largely absent and that a shift had been necessary to justify the 
spending of public money. However, several participants indicated that this had 
moved too far the other way. As one local government participant commented: 
 
"That injection of discipline and performance management was needed. The 
problem was it then went too far. As often happens with these things, the 
pendulum went too far the other way." 
 
There were numerous examples provided about how this negatively manifested itself, 
with several participants describing how success criteria had become wholly 
numerically based, with one police participant describing how he was called to 
London to account for figures without any recognition of the context or underlying 
factors. 
 
However, all the participants described how the performance management approach 
stimulated by new public management had shifted again in recent years, albeit the 
extent to which it had shifted varied significantly across the three organisations. 
While the police and local government participants described the shift towards a more 
qualitative approach to performance management, it was evident from participants 
from health that the emphasis remained firmly rooted in centrally directed targets and 
that they were still more focused on outputs than outcomes, thus supporting the 
findings of the survey. One health participant, who expressed the view that other 
organisations had greater flexibility in giving up control, allowing them to respond to 
changing demand, reinforced this notion reinforcing the ingrained path dependence in 
the context of health. However, greater autonomy in becoming a foundation trust had 




A common narrative emerged about the need for more place-based partnership 
working, but there was a belief from several participants that central government 
departments were still working within their silos, which hampered their progression. 
This was particularly prevalent in the responses from participants from health who 
described the continuance of central control through national performance targets.  
 
As one health participant commented: 
 
"We measure inputs and outputs. We haven't focused on outcomes in the NHS. 
We probably think we know what's good for people, rather than understanding 
what's good for people." 
 
However, another health participant felt that stepping away from the hallmarks of new 
public management would lead to people losing focus and another commented that 




A Shift in Focus 
 
As the literature suggests the shift of emphasis from traditional public administration 
to new public management and the increasing availability of management information 
brought with it an intensity of performance measurement and management through 
targets, league tables and organisational benchmarking. However, since the removal 
of national police and local government targets, there was a belief from several of the 
respondents from these organisations that this had been detrimental to the way in 
which performance was managed in their organisation. One police participant 
commented that performance management had become a 'dirty phrase' and that the 
pendulum had now swung back too far the other way, and another commented on the 
lack of focus on performance management stating that: 
 
"At one point, everyone would have known every performance detail, but no 
one knows the performance detail now."  
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One local government participant expressed a view that the focus on performance 
management had diminished, describing the change as having gone full circle. 
However, there was little evidence that the target focus had shifted in health. It might 
be concluded from this that the hallmarks of new public management in the form of 
national targets had continued to reinforce path dependence in health, and locally set 
targets had continued to drive path dependence in local government. However, in the 
police, while the national and local targets have been removed, their presence and 
path dependence in the organisational history has been so significant, that some senior 
leaders still retain them in their operating practices. 
 
The Use of Targets 
 
The use of targets was a key hallmark of new public management and despite 
research that identifies the risks and shortcomings of a target-driven culture (Loveday, 
1999; Sanderson, 2001; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Behn, 2003; McLean et al., 2007), 
there was a consistent view from participants in all three sectors, in both the survey, 
and the interviews, that targets are important in ensuring a focus on performance 
improvement. While participants recognised the risks in an overzealous target culture, 
the majority in both the survey and interviews valued their contribution in focusing 
attention on priorities. That said, a quarter of the participants in the interviews had 
only been working in public services since the mid-1990s so this cohort had little or 
no experience of the working practices and operating culture before new public 
management was introduced. 
 
It is hard to deduce conclusively that the support for targets is anchored in 
institutionalised behaviour, albeit several participants in the interviews highlighted 
this as a contributory factor. One participant from health suggested that it had become 
so 'hardwired' that people did not know how to argue against it. However, what was 
clear was that the three organisations took a very different approach to the 




From the early days of new public management, the police were quick to adopt a 
challenging and confrontational style of performance management. This was done in 
front of peers, senior officers, and sometimes politicians, using the rise or fall of 
police recorded crime figures to judge performance (Eterno and Silverman, 2012), 
However, after high profile and damming complaints of categorisation errors, gaming 
(McLean et al., 2007) and the removal of national targets, this approach changed.  
 
One police participant described the current approach as one that is; 
 
"Focusing on all those different elements that come together to give us the 
understanding of what the issues are, the understanding of our environment, 
who we need to work with, how we need to monitor and measure and how we 
need to get staff in the right place to be doing the right things." 
 
However, the survey and subsequent interviews identified that many senior police 
staff in Avon and Somerset Constabulary, and beyond, are now uncertain about how 
they should effectively measure performance. This uncertainty has left some 
mourning the demise of a target-driven approach, which was reinforced by one police 
participant who commented: 
 
"I think we could be said to have completely taken our eye off some aspects of 
performance." 
 
Similarly, in Bristol City Council after the removal of nationally set targets in 2010, 
the gap was filled with a set of locally agreed targets, which all participants valued in 
focusing attention, but recognised that this could become detrimental if there were an 
over-focus on the targets themselves.  These locally set targets do not carry the same 
level of scrutiny and national benchmarking as central government targets but are 






One local government participant described how he felt that it was sensible removing 
unhelpful and superfluous targets contained in the comprehensive performance 
assessment. However, as another local government participant commented: 
 
"Councillors won't let us be in a world where we didn't have something they 
can look at, see a number, a red or green arrow, be able to kick the tyres and 
hold us to account." 
 
This suggested that despite the removal of national targets, there remains an 
institutionalised reliance by local politicians on this form of performance 
measurement in local government, which consequently continues to produce path 
dependence for senior leaders in local government as they are still used to judge their 
success.  
 
However, in health, little appears to have changed. The health service is still subject 
to a set of national constitutional targets that are benchmarked against other similar 
health providers. These remain under constant scrutiny from regulators and are still 
heavily used to judge the performance of the organisation, supporting Boswell's 
findings (2015) that targets continue to retain political significance in signalling a 
commitment to and underscoring the achievement of, a range of political goals. 
Health targets have continued to be incentivised with rewards and fines, and evidence 
in this research supports Gubb's (2009) contention that this has distorted clinical 
priorities, undermined professional autonomy and that local leadership encourages 
silo-based rather than integrated approaches to providing care.  There is also evidence 
in this research that supports Andersen and Hjorortshov (2016) and Olsen's (2017) 
findings that numbers still appear to be more convincing than anecdotal reports about 
performance. One health participant described how the NHS had been 'groomed' into 
accepting central targets, and another commented that they believed they would 
always have them. 
 
Police participants and local government participants both described a less binary 
approach to the use of targets, but recognised the tension in adopting a whole system 
placed-based approach, as the health service did not have the flexibility to adjust its 
priorities due to the pressures of centrally set targets.  
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Therefore, while the three organisations have considerable similarities, as public 
service providers, there are distinct differences in culture, practice, performance 
measurement and accountability mechanisms, making direct comparisons and aligned 
goals somewhat problematic. 
 
Setting Targets with Other Sectors 
 
Despite 37 per cent (57) of respondents to the survey believing they set their targets 
with other public services, none of the participants in the interviews were able to 
clearly describe where, when or how these were set or how they were measured. 
Several local government participants in the interviews described how they believed 
targets were agreed with health on social care, but these appear to be nationally 
mandated targets for health that are then shared with local government. One health 
participant described this as more of a contract agreement than target setting, and 
another suggested that their quality and safety targets took priority above 
collaborative activity. There was some agreement that targets between health and 
local government were set within the framework of the Better Care Fund, however, 
there was a lack of clarity on the monitoring and performance management of these.  
 
One local government respondent indicated that targets were set with the Community 
Safety Partnership (Safer Bristol), made up of Avon & Somerset Constabulary, Avon 
& Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner, Avon Fire & Rescue Service, Bristol 
City Council, Bristol Clinical Commissioning Group, National Probation Service, 
Stand Against Racism and Inequality (SARI) and Bristol Drugs Project (BDP) for 
substance misuse. However, while the 2019/20 crime plan provides goals and 
aspirations, there are no apparent targets. None of the police participants were aware 






Joint Performance Management 
 
There was a belief from the majority of respondents in the survey that their 
organisational priorities reflected a commitment to working with other public services 
and despite 26 per cent (49) of respondents in the survey either agreeing (18.5%) or 
strongly agreeing (8.2%) that their organisation jointly monitored performance with 
other public services, how this was done, if at all, was not clear from participants in 
the interviews. While all the participants were supportive in principle of a process of 
joint performance management, there were several reasons provided for why this had 
yet to take hold. These included a lack of trust, integrity and confidence in partners, 
and as one health participant commented: 
 
"I think it would be highly uncomfortable for me to be accounting for my 
performance to a peer." 
 
The absence of financial support to make joint performance management happen, fear 
of increasing bureaucracy and the complexity and breadth of services were all given 
as potential barriers.  This reinforced Denhardt and Aristigueta's (2008) findings that 
existing organisational performance measurement systems enhance the accountability 
of individual organisations holding them to account for specific results rather than a 
broader collaborative effort.  As Van Dooren et al., (2011) identify, this willingness to 
collaborate can erode when one-to-one accountability schemes are maintained, and 
this also supports Verbeeten and Speklé's (2015) findings that effective management 
control still rests on a results-oriented culture based on incentives. This rigidity of 
individual accountability and performance management has meant that a whole 
system approach to performance management is unlikely to gain sufficient traction in 
the short term despite its value in increasingly complex settings. However, there 
remains potential to develop this on specific cross-cutting challenges, particularly 
those that Pilsbury (2016) in her 'Four Quadrants of Aligned Actions for Results' 
describes as high in both organisational and partner accountability. Therefore, any 
joint performance management process would need to be collectively formulated and 
designed to gain acceptance and internalisation from participants. These findings 
again reinforced the importance of joint performance management at stage 5 in the 




The literature suggests that while clear lines of accountability are the accepted norm 
of any modern democracy, too much accountability can be as problematic as too little 
(Flinders and Moon, 2011) and that this potentially limits the incentive for chief 
executives and chief constables to work collaboratively on the delivery of services. 
However, in this research, there was a considerable variation of opinion from 
participants about which accountability mechanisms impacted on the way they led 
their respective organisations. The survey identified that respondents felt the greatest 
level of accountability to their values and beliefs, followed by their closest layers of 
management and the further away the layer of accountability was from them, the 
lesser the degree of accountability they perceived they felt. This appeared to conflict 
with Gallo and Thompson's (2000) findings in which they concluded that the 
hierarchy of accountability firmly places legal requirements as the first step. 
 
Whilst Andersen, Boesen and Pedersen’s (2016) explanation of the emergence of 
'public value' identified a significant increase in the span of stakeholders involved in 
applying performance objectives and layers of accountability, as tables 2, 3 and 4 
demonstrate, none of the participants in the interviews indicated that the layers of 
accountability they experienced were a disabling factor in effectively carrying out 
their roles.  
 
What Koppell (2005) referred to as multiple accountabilities disorder, in which too 
much accountability undermines the capacity of an organisation to focus on its core 
tasks due to contradictory demands and requirements, was not evident in the 
interviews.  However, there was apparent support for Ferlie et al.'s (1996) finding that 
public service organisations are still essentially public, and as such should rightfully 
expect to face stringent accountability tests. This also supported Gallie's (1956) 
contention that the growth in accountability has primarily been seen as a good thing 
and reflected Barberis’s (1956) descriptions of the accepted broader system of checks 
and balances. Despite a view from many commentators that public servants are 
subjected to too many constraints (Kaufman, 1977), there was a general acceptance 
from participants in the interviews that this was part and parcel of public services and 
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that it was inevitable when things went wrong that politicians felt obligated to react 
and increase the layers of accountability. 
 
There was strong support for significant accountability mechanisms from some 
participants with one local government participant indicating that without a 
compliance culture people would do whatever they wanted. One health participant 
expressed the view that they felt the regulatory and accountability frameworks had 
become weakened in recent years, which had a detrimental effect on performance.  
 
However, the majority of participants indicated that it was their responsibility to 
manage the growing accountability requirements and as one health participant 
indicated, it was also their job to manage those that held them to account and create 
realistic expectations. This independence and personal leadership was reflected in the 
views of one local government participant who felt that regardless of the layers of 
accountability it was the most senior leaders’ behaviour and values that guided the 
operating culture of the organisation, and they needed to try to develop a sense of 
cooperation, collaboration and joint working, despite a tendency for separate 
inspectorates and regulators to reinforce the narrow targets of individual 
organisations.  
 
Interestingly, one regulatory contributor, cited national political control as a critical 
inhibitor, stating that: 
 
"It's a real challenge for us at this regional level to try and convince political 
masters or national regulatory masters that there is a better way of doing this" 
 
However, despite the overall support, some participants expressed a view that it 
produced additional challenges. As one local government participant commented: 
 
"It creates such a compliance-led approach. There's such an industry around 




Another local government participant indicated that the introduction by politicians of 
single-issue projects, with separate funding streams and separate reporting 
mechanisms made a more joined-up strategic approach even harder to achieve. In 
practical terms, local government participants unanimously felt most accountable to 
locally elected members, and this predominantly drove their behaviour, bringing with 
it a greater place-based emphasis towards their roles. Conversely, while health 
participants felt a strong sense of accountability to their boards, there was also a 
significantly higher emphasis on the accountability they felt towards national 
regulators, creating more of a national focus than a place-based one.  
 
As one health participant put it: 
 
"I think the NHS and local authority divide is still not to be underestimated, 
particularly the whole thing about the accountability to the public through 
elected officials." 
 
The participants from the police formed their identity from a sense of national service, 
recognising national pressures and constraints. However, much of their descriptions 
of accountability centred on a more localised and place-based response, which left 
them occupying a position somewhere between health and local government. This 
reinforced Balogun, Gleadle, Hailey, and Willmottz’s (2005) findings that actors are 
network dependent for their sense of identity and purpose as well as for 
accomplishing the objectives derived from their participation in networks. However, 
where the network’s predominant emphasis is on organisational boundaries, it can 
narrow their focus. As one health participant commented, hospitals have felt no 
responsibility for population health and traditionally, they have just diagnosed and 
treated people who have come through the door. 
 
Finally, as Cairncross and Ashburner (1992) had previously identified there was also 
a lack of clarity on what constituted accountability at the most senior level and whilst 
the majority of participants talked about their accountability to the public, none 
articulated a view that they were held to account, either formally, or informally, by 
other public service providers in delivering their services. This is explored further 




Support in Principle 
 
There was strong support in principle for greater collaborative working, with all the 
participants in the interviews and 91 per cent of respondents in the survey, 
recognising the benefits this might achieve in improving services. All the participants 
in the interviews and 78 per cent of respondents in the survey also recognised the 
opportunities in reducing costs and making public service fit for the future, with many 
participants reflecting the observations of Ingraham (2005) that leadership approaches 
in the future need to be persuasive, but not coerce and move across organisational 
boundaries in the collective best interest.  
 
However, they also identified that there were a significant number of practicalities 
that were disabling factors to this becoming commonplace. Several participants 
operationalised these thoughts in their description of the way the Sustainability and 
Transformation Partnership (STP) worked. The Bristol, North Somerset and 
Gloucestershire STP is made up of 13 organisations (acute and community health 
providers, primary care, mental health trusts, ambulance services, commissioners and 
local government) whose ambition is to demonstrate shared system leadership that 
works towards an integrated care system by 2021. This was optimised by one health 
participant who suggested that in the STP a common purpose was as yet ill-defined, 
and one local government participant expressed the view that the STP was not 
delivering and that it felt more like a health plan in which the local government was 
an afterthought.  
 
There was a consistent recognition from participants that they felt they should be 
doing more partnership work to intervene earlier to solve problems, but as one police 
participant indicated, there are so many barriers to making this a reality. All of the 
elements described by Huxham and Vangen (2000a) as barriers to negotiating joint 
purposes such as diversity of the organisations, varying internal procedures, 
operational constraints, professional language, differences in cultures, structures, and 
procedures, imbalances inequity and power (real or perceived) were evident in 
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varying degrees in this study, which was best summed up by one health participant 
who commented that: 
 
"We don't all see it through the same lens ….. this is complex" 
 
One health participant suggested that phenomenal collective leadership commitment 
and trust, and alignment of vision and goals would have to take place for a truly 
collaborative effort to become more common place and this reflected comments from 
several participants across health and local government who questioned whether the 




A plethora of strategic plans were described as a barrier to the alignment of services, 
which one police participant identified resulted in more of a win/lose situation for 
organisations rather than a win/win one. Additionally, one local government 
participant criticised the lack of consultation in the production of plans and that 
current financial incentives did not incentivise collaborative working. This adds 
weight to the recommendation at stage 1 of the collective service model set out at 
figure 1, that there is a need to collectively understand demand across the system, not 
just the individual part organisations play in it.  
 
There was confusion about the prioritisation of emerging issues. An example of this 
was when participants were presented with a 'wicked’ issue (Ritter and Webber, 1973; 
Grint, 2005) that required a cross-sector collaborative effort to resolve. The scenario 
concerned a rough sleeper in the city who was high on drugs, semi-conscious and 
street begging. There was a lack of clarity from participants about whose 
responsibility this was: several said it was everyone's responsibility, some as another 
organisation's responsibility, and others as their own organisation's responsibility. 
Additionally, one local government participant questioned whose job it was to say 
what the priority was, whether it was the mayor’s or more of a collective consensus 
view across the system. This reinforced Agranoff and Maguire's (2001) findings that 
with no single authority, everyone is somewhat in charge, and everyone is somewhat 
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responsible, and where all participants appear to be accountable, no one is 
accountable. However, another local government participant questioned the value in 
allowing every chief executive regardless of the size and complexity of their 
organisation to have an equal say in how services might be delivered, as they believed 
this prevented innovation or change from taking place by commenting that: 
 
"If you've got 38 people who've got the title chief executive and 38 people 
who've got the title chair, [they] become a lobby group for the status quo." 
 
Waterman and Meier (1998) and Willems and Van Dooren’s (2011) description of 
multiple and conflicting overseers, mandates and reporting requirements being 
barriers to collaborative approaches were evident in this study.  One local government 
participant helpfully outlined the historical context that had led to this by saying: 
 
"From the early 1980s we have been encouraged to establish and run 
specialist agencies……… you have smaller agencies all with their own 
targets, some of those targets from the clients’ point of view don't work well 
together, but as a chief executive or chief constable, you're driving to achieve 
the targets you're going to be measured on and for some time, the targets that 
you're going to be paid on."  
 
Lee Baker (2004) observed that successful collaboration requires new infrastructure 
and management behaviours, but participants in this study did not wholly support this 
notion. While there was a recognition that a more collaborative approach would 
require more significant system leadership, there was considerable resistance to 
introducing new layers of bureaucracy and reporting to achieve this. As one local 
government participant put it: 
 
"There is no world in which suddenly you are all joined up and working in 
partnership to a shared set of performance targets and strategic aims without 




While there was a recognition that legislative and structural changes might speed this 
up, there was little appetite for this with several participants indicating how this 
would potentially create a distraction from the delivery of services, which again 
reinforced the value in a bottom-up service-led response to collaboration, as opposed 
to a top-down redesign of services. 
 
The Political Imperative 
 
Despite a wealth of evidence in the literature that highlights both legislative changes 
and political rhetoric in support of increased localism and more joined-up public 
services, several participants described a mixed political message towards 
collaborative working and questioned the current political appetite for this. Examples 
were noted such as the delay in the Health and Social Care Green Paper, and one 
police participant suggested that anyone talking about partnership is often branded as 
a 'common purpose buffoon'.  
 
The Impact of Austerity 
 
As the literature identifies, the coalition government published its comprehensive 
spending review in October 2010, which set out its deficit reduction plan. The 
consequences of this prolonged period of austerity resulted in significant cuts to 
public services, particularly to the police and local government. The majority of 
participants reflected on the impact of these financial cuts and how this should have 
created fertile ground for greater collaborative working, but that it had been a missed 
opportunity.  
 
Instead, austerity measures and financial cuts were attributed to the derogation of 
preventative strategies and the removal of multi-agency teams and partnership 
analysts. As one local government participant commented, austerity had been good 
for efficiency and productivity. However, it appeared to have been approached from a 
single organisational perspective rather than from a broader collaborative one. So, 
while financial cuts might have brought services together, the evidence from this 
research is that the opposite has occurred, with participants indicating that there has 
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been a higher propensity to focus on the things they could more easily control rather 
than approaching this from a system perspective. Additionally, while this might have 
commonly been regarded as a critical juncture for local government and the police 
with the scale of cuts to their service, this was not replicated in health who have been 
subjected to year on year cost savings but have not experienced the same dramatic 
cuts.  
 
The Use of Continuous Improvement 
 
Each organisation had embarked on continuous improvement processes, but there was 
no evidence that these had taken place across organisational boundaries. None of the 
participants was able to describe if, or how, such an approach had been adopted, 
reinforcing the assumption that the tension between the competing ideologies of 
complexity theory and historical institutionalism that challenge the necessary 
conditions for collaborative approaches to become commonplace were present. Top-
down control a key hallmark of historical approaches to public administration and 
their subsequent path dependence appeared to be a significant factor in this.  
 
Additional Emerging Themes from the Interviews 
 
In addition to the four themes from the literature review and survey three additional 
themes emerged from the interviews of joint leadership development, the use of data 
and organisational values. 
 
Joint Leadership Development  
 
There was a consensus from respondents in the survey, and from participants in the 
interviews in support of Angranoff and Maguire's (2001) findings that the capacities 
required to operate successfully in a collaborative setting are different from those 
needed to succeed in managing a single organisation. However, time constraints, the 
impact of austerity measures and leadership behaviours were all cited as factors for 
why this rarely became a reality.  
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There was also a consensus from participants in the interviews in support of  
Williams's (2002) findings, that inter-organisational capacity was unlikely to flourish 
in organisational structures based on hierarchical control and power and that decision-
making models must reflect consensus formation and trust-building. The majority of 
participants articulated a view that trusting relationships and consensus building was 
pivotal to successful collaborative working, but several cited time constraints and 
other priorities as disabling factors. As one local government participant explained 
when referring to collaborative working: 
 
"It's not more than five or ten per cent of my time. If we are really going to 
make a breakthrough as a city, I guess leaders like me would have to be 
spending a lot more time on that stuff." 
 
Several examples were provided in which leadership behaviour, or perceived 
behaviour, had done little to champion this, but as one health participant commented: 
 
"It's not that that people don't think it's worth doing …… It's just a bit of a 
reality check about other pressures on people's time." 
  
There was tension in the relationships articulated such as a perception that one 
organisation believed they could run certain services better than another, people being 
present but not being engaged in meetings, and a lack of understanding of each other's 
roles. One local government participant commented that behaviour was not consistent 
across senior leaders when it came to supporting collaborative efforts, and this was 
accentuated further amongst operational managers. Another local government 
participant pointed towards the significant cultural shift that would be needed from 
their organisational conditioning to embrace a collaborative effort, and one health 
participant highlighted the pressure and accountability to national regulators carrying 
more weight than place-based discussions. As one local government participant 
commented: 
 
"We don't have many people at the top of public services who got there 
because they are brilliant at cooperation." 
 
 138 
These findings reinforced Denhardt and Aristigueta's (2008) contention that if 
investing in collaboration comes at the expense of meeting performance targets for 
which the agency is accountable, then withdrawing (literally or figuratively) from the 
collaboration might be a reasonable managerial choice.  
 
As a solution, one local government participant highlighted the need for more joint 
training and conditioning of leaders across sectors to create a greater understanding of 
each other's working practices. The findings of the survey strongly emphasised the 
need for a clear sense of common purpose, more joint problem solving, greater 
alignment of priorities, greater trust between organisations, being prepared to give up 
some control and a greater understanding of each other's roles, responsibilities, and 
culture, giving weight to the need to incorporate this at stage 5 of the collective 
service model set out at figure 1.  Indeed, some work has begun to bring together 
senior leaders from health and local government in the Healthy Together 
Sustainability and Transformation Partnership as part of the 'Peloton' programme, 
intending to develop system leaders, but its success has yet to be evaluated. However, 
there is more scope for this to be developed further, and for more generic leadership 
training and development to take place across a more comprehensive public sector 
cohort. 
 
The Use of Data 
 
While data were not identified initially as a topic for consideration in this research, 
the availability, scale and sharing thereof became a critical emerging theme in many 
of the interviews. Claims have been made that there were more data produced and 
stored between 2012 and 2014 than ever before (Accenture, 2014) and it was 
estimated that there would be one point eight (1.8) zettabytes (one zettabyte 
=1000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) of data created in 2017, and this would 
continue to double every two years. However, as Armstrong (2019) points out these 
claims have been significantly underestimated, as by 2018 the amount of data 
produced reached 33 zettabytes. Added to this, the organisational control of data has 
diminished with access to vast amounts of data online (Mayer-Schöenberger and 
Cukier, 2013) meaning the public is potentially more informed than service providers. 
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Access to data is a critical resource for any twenty-first-century organisation, just as 
physical assets such as money, labour, machines and material have been for previous 
generations (Parise, 2016), however, despite this several participants in this study 
described how the disincentives (whether real or perceived) still outweighed the 
incentives to collectively share and use these data to understand demand in the 
system.  
 
There were lots of examples of the availability of data. These included the local 
government city open data dashboards, the population health data, and the police data 
science innovation centre. Participants welcomed the opportunities, benefits, and 
connectivity that the digital world had brought with it. Participants recognised the 
need to rethink, not only how services are delivered in the digital age, but how they 
are governed, led and regulated. However, many reasons were provided for why these 
data are not captured, analysed and shared collectively across public services in the 
Bristol city region. These included a fear that the data would be used to scrutinise 
organisational performance by other organisations, an inherent risk aversion from 
staff in sharing data and their accountability and how challenging and time consuming 
it would be. One health participant expressed the views that some organisations were 
wedded to their ways of working with 'their' data, and that this impeded the ability to 
capture a regional or national picture. This led to one local government participant 
concluding that it would be a more straightforward process if the data commissioner 
spent as much time on data sharing as they do on data protection. The data protection 
culture was blamed for a reluctance to share data effectively, as one health participant 
commented: 
 
"I think there are cultures, even in this organisation, where the people 
producing the data see themselves as custodians of that data quality and see 
their responsibilities as the recipient of the data, sitting in an office 
somewhere in London, more than they feel a responsibility to share it with me 
or indeed any other partners." 
 
Where data was shared in areas such as high-intensity users, it is unclear what 
analysis of the data and subsequent tasking and coordinating of resources were in 
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place to support this. Several participants felt that demand analysis was only ever 
partially achieved, if at all, and organisations were slow to respond, leading to a 
comment that they were often data-rich but not intelligence-led, resulting in 
organisations having to ask for data rather than having access to it. This all leads to an 
apparent need to share and analyse data to be able to collectively understand demand 
across public services, which features at stage 1 of the collective service model set out 
at figure 1.  
Organisational Values 
 
Values define what is important to an organisation and how things will be done. 
While this not an area of key inquiry for this research it is worthy of note that despite 
the three organisations in this study all providing public services in the same locality, 
as table 11 identifies, while their stated values have some commonality, they differ 
considerably.  
 
Table 11: A Comparison of Organisational Values 
 
ORGANISATIONAL VALUES 
Avon & Somerset 
Constabulary 
University Hospitals 
Bristol Foundation Trust 
Bristol City 
Council 
Inclusive Respecting Everyone Respecting our staff 
Courageous Embracing Change Using available resources to 
deliver best value for local 
people 
Caring Working Together Leading with our partners 
 
Learning Recognising Success 
 
Championing equality of 
opportunity for all 
  Helping individuals and our 
communities determine their 
own future 
 
In addition, all three organisations stated values that differ from those of national 
bodies, such as the stated values of the NHS, the police code of ethics, the Nolan 
principles of public life or the public service values set out in section seven of the 
Public Administration Act 2004. Whilst this requires more in depth inquiry it may 
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The interviews produced a broad spectrum of views that built on the four themes of 
models of public administration, performance management, accountability and 
collaborative working examined in the survey. The interviews reinforced a strong 
commitment to cross-sector collaboration but also highlighted the significant 
influence of the history, incremental change and critical junctures in each of the 
organisation’s path dependence. Three additional themes emerged during the 
interviews of joint leadership development, the use of data, and organisational values. 
 
Models of Public Administration - while there was evidence from all the participants 
of a growing trend towards outcome-based performance management, there was 
consistent recognition that this was more complex, challenging to measure and not 
centrally supported in the case of health. However, despite the apparent change in 
direction from the police and local government, two police participants still saw 
isolated institutionalised practices of binary output measurement operating in pockets 
throughout the organisation. They felt this was due to ingrained ways of working that 
focus on targets and league tables. In conclusion, the approach to public 
administration was inconsistent and mixed across the three organisations in the study, 
but it was clear that the transition from new public management had been less evident 
in health than in the police or local government. 
 
Performance Management - Every performance movement leaves some sediment, 
which is acquired in future movements (Van Doreen, 2011) and the use of targets in 
Bristol city region is an excellent example of this.  While they have faced criticism as 
a principle technique in new public management, their presence and where 
appropriately applied, their effectiveness is still supported. However, where targets 
are agreed, they appear to be within individual organisations. Anecdotally, there was a 
belief they were set in partnership, but there was no evidence to indicate the form 
these took, how these were performance managed, or the value each organisation 
placed on these. The findings of this research also reinforce that while there is support 
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across all organisations for more significant joint performance management, 
performance judgements are is still primarily set and managed within individual 
organisations boundaries.  
 
Accountability - Despite the growth in the breadth and depth of accountability 
mechanisms, the majority of participants accepted that this was just part and parcel of 
leading sizeable public service organisations and despite the irritation and constraints 
this sometimes caused it was accepted that this was legitimate, necessary and 
expected. 
 
Collaborative Working - There was a considerable level of support for more 
collaborative cross-sector working from all the participants in the interviews. They 
recognised that such an approach had the potential to improve services, reduce costs 
and was the only realistic way in which complex cross-cutting issues, growing 
demand and increased expectation could be dealt with both now, and in the future. 
However, participants were pragmatic about how easy this would be to achieve, 
which was also evident from the survey. The conflicting ways in which their 
organisations are held to account, performance managed and rewarded as well as 
different cultures, the financial challenges, the lack of trust, the reluctance to give up 
some control, a lack of understanding of each other roles and the constraints on their 
time were all compelling factors. This reinforced the findings of Martin and Webb 
(2009), in their evaluation of collaborative working in Wales, who concluded that 
such an approach had not taken hold not because of a lack of vision or goodwill, but 
as a natural outcome of the existence of sector-specific funding and performance 
regimes causing leaders to focus on their own organisational goals first and foremost 
and that the broader picture came a distant second.  
 
Joint Leadership Development – The findings of the survey highlighted the need for a 
clear sense of joint purpose, more joint problem solving, greater alignment of 
priorities, greater trust between organisations, being prepared to give up some control 
and having a greater understanding of each other's roles, responsibilities and culture, 
all of which were supported by participants in the interviews. Some work has taken 
place to bring together senior leaders from health and local government, but several 
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articulated the need for more leadership development to take place across a broader 
public sector cohort. 
 
The Use of Data - While data were not initially identified as an area for consideration, 
the availability, scale, and sharing thereof became an emerging theme in many of the 
interviews. There was uncontested recognition that more effective capturing of data 
and analysis across services would be beneficial, but time, money, conflicting 
priorities and risk were all raised as disabling factors. 
 
Organisational Values – The values of the organisation were a recurring theme in the 
way individuals described how their organisation worked. However, the values of 
each of the organisations in this research while not conflicting, were not wholly 
aligned, which is arguably another inhibitor to more collaborative working.  
 
The next chapter compares the findings of this research with the original research 




























This chapter returns to the aims, questions and hypotheses set out in Chapter Two and 
tests them against the findings of the empirical research and theoretical concepts set 
out in the literature review. In doing so, it discusses how the findings contribute to the 
knowledge in the field on the topic and identifies in practical terms how incremental 
changes and critical junctures have influenced the path dependence of the 
organisations in this study. Finally, it outlines why a bottom-up service-led approach 
to collaboration is more likely to gain traction than a top-down directional approach.  
Aims, Questions and Hypotheses  
 
The overall aim of this research was to establish what the incentives and disincentives 
were in adopting a system wide approach to cross public sector challenges. In order to 
achieve this, three of the largest public service organisations in the Bristol city region 
were identified and three specific aims were established. These were: 
 
1. To examine the operation of different models and practices of public sector 
performance management and accountability in three vital public services – 
health, local government and the police - in a defined locality of England (the 
Bristol city region); 
 
2. To determine which are the dominant models and practices of management 
and accountability in these services; how they have developed in recent 
decades, and how they operate today;   
 
3. To establish whether collaborative, place-based and systems approaches to 
local public services constitute an emerging paradigm of public sector 
management and accountability in England, and, if so, how far such a 
paradigm is constrained or frustrated by the persistence of New Public 
Management (NPM) governance frameworks. 
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The research began by critically reviewing the theoretical concepts set out in the 
literature, establishing how the most dominant approaches had emerged, and 
examining the impact these have had on each of the organisations. 
 
Then, through empirical research, the presence of these approaches and their 
influence was tested by way of a survey and interviews with key contributors in the 
field. The empirical research was targeted at a random sample of the top one per cent 
of leaders in each of the organisations participating in the research, together with 
several senior leaders from outside the organisations. All the participants hold a 
position between policy makers and front line delivery, in which they are responsible 
for interpreting national policy and embedding this into operational delivery. This 
provided a unique perspective from contributors who were able to articulate the most 
significant understanding in their organisations of both external and internal 
accountability and performance management mechanisms, the history of institutional 
change, and the associated path dependence.  
 
In doing so, the research provided an opportunity to establish whether a collaborative 
place-based approach to the delivery of public services is realistic, given the 
constraints and challenges each organisation faces. The use of a mixed-methods 
approach helped unearth the different and sometimes conflicting accounts from 
respondents in the survey and participants in the interviews. This also enhanced the 
robustness of the study and led to different conclusions than if using one method 
alone.  
 
While this research provides rare access to the most senior strata, both within the 
three organisations and from other senior leaders occupying national roles, it produces 
a partial view as it only presents the changes necessary to successfully implement 
collaborative working from a senior leaders perspective, and does not claim to have 







Reviewing the Research Questions  
 
Question 1: Which models of public sector management have the most significant 
prominence in the discourses and institutional practices of each of the organisations? 
 
The research identified that there was no clearly defined and unified response to this 
question and respondents in the survey, and participants in the interviews described to 
a greater or lesser degree the influence traditional public administration, new public 
management and public value approaches, had on the governance and leadership of 
their respective organisations. However, the survey indicated that overall respondents 
felt that there was a greater level of organisational accountability to inputs (activity) 
and outputs (quantity of work) than outcomes (things that make a difference), a clear 
legacy of the influence of traditional public administration and new public 
management. As figure 3 demonstrates, the emphasis on inputs and outputs was more 
accentuated in health. Health participants in the interviews described the enduring 
presence and influence of the characteristics of traditional public administration and 
new public management. As one senior health participant stated: 
 
“Last year we measured inputs and outputs and we haven't really focused on 
outcomes and what they really mean ……. I also think that this is part of the 
professional culture in the NHS” 
 
The majority of respondents to the survey felt national departments and politicians 
produced the most significant levels of organisational accountability, reflecting the 
hallmarks of traditional public administration (Wilson, 1887; Weber, 1948; Fayol, 
1930; Taylor, 1939; Salamon, 2002). There was a distinct difference across the three 
organisations about whom they felt their organisation was most accountable to after 
that, but as figure 12 suggests, health’s accountability to national targets and 






Figure 12: Organisational accountability to targets, competition, and league 




Local government respondents to the surveys indicated that responsiveness to 
multiple objectives and service outcomes, the hallmarks of public value (Moore, 
1997), took greater prominence than targets or league tables, more commonly 
associated with new public management, but that both still existed. The police 
response reflected that of local government respondents, but the emphasis on targets 
was less evident than in local government, and significantly less than in health. In 
health, despite a shift towards more local autonomy through foundation trust status 
and integrated care systems, respondents to the survey, and participants in the 
interviews indicated that the characteristics of traditional public administration, in the 
form of centralised political control, and the path dependence of the new public 
management principles in the form of targets, competition and league tables, still had 
a significant influence (Hood, 1991; 1995.). However, the predominant characteristics 















Approaches to Organisational Change 
 
None of the contributors to the research described a dramatic shift in moving from 
one approach to another. They chose to explain the variation in the context of 
continuous incremental change (Palier, 2005), accompanied by punctuated 
equilibrium (Krasner, 1984; Baumgarter and Jones, 1993) from bursts of change over 
time, driven by political ideology. An example of this for the police and local 
government was the incremental shift away from the hallmarks of new public 
management that led to a different approach to performance management. However, 
the description by police and local government participants of the financial cuts in the 
mid-2000s was more of a ‘critical juncture’ for both organisations. One senior local 
government participant evidenced this in his description of conversations with local 
government chief executives across the country, describing the difficult, but positive 
impact austerity had on organisational change: 
 
“I've gone over the years since 2010....... they spontaneously tell me we would 
never have done this if we had if we had not had austerity” 
 
One senior police officer described how the financial cuts had made a huge impact on 
the way he worked, producing a positive catalyst for change: 
 
“I've taken over a hundred fifty million pounds of revenue out …….our world 
has just been spun on its head overnight, which is very welcome. I've argued 
for this for a long time.” 
 
The greater drive towards localism and the subsequent removal of nationally set 
targets for the police and local government was seen as a significant moment in their 
ability to manage performance more locally. However, the apparent absence of any 
‘critical juncture’ of austerity for health, and their continuing path dependence on 
national direction, meant change had been less significant. This reinforces the 
contention of historical institutionalists (Lieberman 2001; Pierson 2004; Capoccia and 
Keleman, 2007; Hall, 2016) that the distinct difference in approach reflects the 
organisation’s history and path dependence. They suggests that the interaction of 
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variables form a distinctive pattern across space and time, making collaborative 
activity more challenging. As one senior local government participant put it: 
 
“I think it's also the area where the effectiveness of [social care] is probably 
most compromised by the very top-down approach within health.  Health 
colleagues ultimately find themselves saying to us I'm sorry, but we have these 
mandated targets. These are the ones we have to report on, I know they don't 
quite make sense in our local setting, but these are the targets that we've got.” 
 
While health participants acknowledged the extent of the financial challenges faced 
by local government and the police, there appeared to be some resentment from 
several health participants about assumptions from other sectors that the health 
service was cash-rich. As one senior health respondent in the survey wrote: 
 
“Within healthcare, we have been better protected than other public bodies 
from austerity measures, so there is a natural inclination from partners to 
assume we are better placed to invest, but the financial requirements are still 
challenging for us too – made more so by the knock-on impact [that the] cuts 
in other areas have had on our services and demand.” 
 
The Effect of Path Dependence 
 
It was evident from this research that the path dependence of each organisation has 
had a substantial influence in deciding the approach they take, or persist with, even if 
they are no longer efficient. This reinforced Lipset and Rokkan (1967) description of 
how organisational approaches built on decisions and developments located in the 
distant past still have a long-lasting effect on institutional arrangements, and as 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002) identify, once actors have ventured down a particular 





As one senior health participant described it, when alluding to the path dependence of 
the NHS: 
 
“I think to be honest I’m cynical, I think that now we're in the stage where 
there's massive workforce shortages. There's a rhetoric now around 
appreciating our staff and attending to well-being and compassionate 
leadership. But frankly, the behaviour of the centre hasn't particularly 
changed. The resource incentives are still as crude as they ever were. 
 
Organisational Approaches and a Comparison with Complexity Theory 
 
The research findings demonstrated the complexity of the participating organisations, 
the inconsistency in how they are held to account, and the variation in how services 
are delivered. As Room (2011) identifies such inconsistency across complex systems 
should not be considered surprising, but this research has identified that some 
theoretical concepts are more accentuated and underpin the operational response more 
obviously in some of the organisations than in others. There was no significant 
paradigm shift towards the hallmarks of complexity theory in any of the organisations 
in this study. However, while several commentators (Geyer, 2012; Geyer and Rihani, 
2010) contend that complexity as a theory has been ignored by policymakers in the 
United Kingdom, who are too driven by the idea of order, rigid hierarchies and top-
down approaches. This research found that in practice the hallmarks of complexity 
theory were emerging, albeit this was less apparent in health.  
 
To examine the extent to which complexity theory underpins the practices of the 
organisations in this study, Cairney’s (2012) six themes are re-visited and applied to 
the research findings. His first contention is that complex system cannot be explained 
merely by breaking them down into their component parts, because the parts are 
interdependent and that elements interact with each other, share information, and 
combine to produce systemic behaviour. In the context of this research this has 
particular relevance, as it highlights that to work successfully as a system, governance 
and accountability processes, and the people leading them need to have a collective 
appreciation and shared view. This is something that is currently impeded by the 
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influence of their historically embedded practices, and competing path dependence. 
This was evident in the response from one senior external contributor when referring 
to the collaborative efforts of the West of England Combined Authority: 
 
“I'm always conscious that we're trying to balance a sort of tricky set of scales 
between making sure [senior leaders] they get enough out that's delivering 
against their agendas with trying to nudge it forward on a strategic agenda.” 
 
Secondly, that behaviour of a complex system is difficult (or impossible) to predict 
and that small actions can have large effects, and large actions can have small effects. 
This supports the claim that a focus on smaller cross-cutting ‘wicked issues’, has as 
much, if not more, opportunity to succeed in delivering successful collaboration as 
larger and more challenging cross-sector organisational change and reinforces the 
value in adopting the five key stages set out in the conceptual model at figure 1. 
 
Thirdly, complex systems are particularly sensitive to initial conditions that produce 
long-term momentum or path dependence. This is a key element of historical 
institutionalism and has become more apparent as alternative approaches have 
emerged. Therefore, the necessity to understand each other’s constraints through the 
collective agreement of demand (stage 1 in figure 1) and creating a greater joint 
understanding of this further through combined review, training and development 
(stage 5 in figure 1), appear to be valuable criteria in bringing about effective 
collaborative activity.  
 
Fourthly, that complex systems exhibit behaviour that evolves from the interaction 
between elements at a local level rather than central direction. The evidence of this 
research demonstrates that this is inconsistent across the public sector organisations in 
this study, but supports the claim that for a greater collaborative effort to succeed a 
more system centred and localised bottom-up approach, as set out in the five stages of 





Fifthly, that systems may demonstrate extended regularities of behaviour, which are 
liable to change radically exhibiting periods of punctuated equilibrium. These 
elements were all present in the evolution of public administration in the 
organisations in this study. 
 
Finally, that the various problems that complexity theory seeks to address can only be 
solved by interdisciplinary scientific groups. This point is reinforced in the 
recommendations in this research and supports the value of embarking on, and 
collectively learning from, the evaluation of collaborative efforts to understand the 
development of theory and practice.  
 
While, to a varying degree, all the necessary elements to support a systems-based 
collaborative effort were evident in the research findings, it was also clear that, while 
the political drive towards greater localism had created an incremental shift away 
from the established principles of new public management and national targets for the 
police and local government, little had changed in health. Despite an appetite and 
willingness from senior leaders in health to progress greater cross-sector collaborative 
efforts, the antecedent conditioning towards top-down centralised control by national 
politicians, professional bodies and national policymakers preserved the ingrained 
path dependence of centrally driven performance regimes and national targets. The 
critical juncture for the police and local government, created by the financial cuts in 
the mid-2000s, had presented an opportunity to introduce creative and collaborative 
solutions, but this has yet to be ingrained in the path dependence of either of these 
organisations.  It remains to be seen whether the wide-ranging impact of the 
Coronavirus will produce an even wider and more significant critical juncture for 
public services in both financial and operational terms. 
 
However, these findings should be treated with some caution as drawing conclusions 
from experimental methods such as these, and arguing that key causal factors can be 
generalised to all times and places is problematic (Hall, 2016). Added to this path 
dependence is subjective because it involves the judgment of the researcher in 
determining the historical conjunctures that affect the outcome and why others do not 
(Fioretos et al., 2016). Finally, this study only examines the perceptions of the most 
senior leaders in the three organisations not the organisations as a whole.  
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Question 2: How do senior officials perceive and interpret the models of 
accountability for performance in their respective organisations, and how do these 
models affect the way they manage and lead their respective organisations? 
 
Despite this research identifying a strong presence of the characteristics of traditional 
public administration, neither respondents to the survey, nor participants in the 
interviews perceived themselves as agents of the government, more often seeing 
themselves as public servants, reflecting the language of public value principles. 
However, within each of the organisations, there was evidence of individual 
formalised rules and normalised behaviours. This reinforced March and Olsen’s 
(1983) description of how institutions are ordered through a variety of mechanisms 
that systemise the way people work and constrain the way they behave. Those 
participants in the interviews who had been employed in public services prior to the 
emergence of new public management welcomed the greater emphasis of 
performance management and accountability, with several indicating that this had 
been necessary for the effectiveness and efficiency of public services. However, there 
was recognition from several participants that an over emphasis on measurement by 
numbers had become detrimental to overall performance management (Hood, 1995). 
In contrast to the findings of many commentators, none of the participants expressed a 
view that that the sediment of new public management in their organisation lacked 
social conscience (Hilgers, 2013), economic, political or cultural inequalities (Davies, 
2016), gaming or categorisation errors (McClean, 2007), perverse incentives 
(Loveday, 1999; Behn, 2003; Bevan and Hood, 2006;) or deterred learning or 
improvement (Sanderson, 2001).  
 
Respondents to the survey felt the highest degree of accountability to those that were 
closest to them, with unanimous agreement that their values had the highest priority. 
This reflected Grube’s (2012) contention that since the emergence of new public 
management public servants have increasingly seen themselves as independent moral 
actors. In the interviews, participants accepted the widening of accountability 
mechanisms as part and parcel of leading public services, but also reinforced the 
greatest accountability they felt was to those closest to them. However, this differed in 
each organisation and the position they occupied therein. While participants 
commonly described how accountability mechanisms placed barriers, constraints and 
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challenges on the flexibility they had to lead their respective organisations, in contrast 
to Kaufman's findings (1977) none of the participants in the interviews indicated that 
there were too many constraints, or that the breadth of accountability mechanisms was 
a debilitating factor. 
 
Question 3: How do the organisations performance management systems and 
accountability mechanisms incentivise or disincentive a system-wide collaborative 
approach to solving complex cross-sector challenges? 
 
This research established that the range and scale of accountability mechanisms and 
performance management requirements meant that the incentives and disincentives 
were not always consistent across the three organisations. There was an 
overwhelming belief from respondents to the survey that collaborative working would 
improve services and reduce costs and participants in the interviews supported this, 
albeit they were pragmatic in describing the practicalities required to make this a 
reality. 
 
The chief executives and chief constable in the three organisations in this research are 
subject to vast and growing layers of accountability and performance management on 
a national, regional, organisational and individual level. The incentives and 
disincentives these create are discussed in the research, but their variation and impact 
were dependent on several factors, none more so than the perception of the individual 
chief executive or chief constable at any given time.  While the human element of 
effective collaborations is a critical factor (Hall and Lamont, 2013), it was also 
apparent that this was only one key ingredient and the totality of the necessary 
elements described by many commentators was evident in responses from participants 
in this research. 
 
However, what was evident was that any one of these elements in isolation was not a 
disabler, but together they built up compelling disincentives to collaborative working.  
This research has identified that embedding collaborative working, as a routine 
occurrence in the Bristol city region will require considerable institutional changes 
and a better understanding of each organisations history and constraints. In addition to 
the political will and leadership support to build coalitions in which everyone 
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understands each other’s constraints, accountabilities and restrictions, there would 
also need to be considerably more time and effort applied to make this a reality. As 
Jervis (1998) identifies most people just presume others see the world in the same 
way as they do, but as this research identifies this is not always the case, making it 
harder to break out of established patterns. In addition the support and assurance for 
‘entrepreneurial bureaucrats’ (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007; 2009) to embrace 
collaborative working are counteracted, not by the plethora of accountability 
mechanisms, but more so by the other performance and institutional requirements. As 
Drucker (1995) identifies despite organisations having been built on a combination of 
rank and power for over a hundred years, emerging organisations need to be built on 
mutual understanding and responsibility. Many contributors to this research 
commented on how greater cross-sector leadership development would support the 
building of relationships, and understanding of each other’s roles, requirements and 
constraints, and that this would develop a boarder range of leadership skills in 
delivering services, a key feature at stage 5 of the collective service model presented 
at figure 1. However, as Day (2000) explains there is a core difference between 
'leaders' development, orientated towards developing human capital, and 'leadership' 
development, orientated towards social capital emphasising the development of 
reciprocal obligations and commitments and built on a foundation of mutual trust and 
respect. This has particular relevance in the context of the findings of this research 
and supports a recommendation of a programme of cross-sector public service 
'leadership' development in the Bristol city region that features at stage 5 in the model 












Question 4: Is it necessary for legislative and structural change to take place before a 
collaborative approach is embedded? 
 
There is nothing in this research that suggests that legislative or structural changes 
were a significant factor in bringing public services together. As table 10 indicates, 
respondents placed legislative and structural change at the bottom of their list on the 
things that are needed to encourage closer working with other public services. Indeed, 
Timmins (2015) found that recent structural changes in the NHS, such as foundation 
trusts, have been counter-productive, driving an internal focus. While structural 
changes are undoubtedly a contributory factor, they did not attract any greater 
significance from survey respondents, or participants in the interview than many other 
contributory factors.  Indeed, the majority of respondents in the survey described how 
other essential ingredients such as a common purpose, greater alignment of priorities, 
better understanding of what each other does, stronger relationships and giving up 
some control were more critical. However, the influence of path dependence was 
evident in the response to this question with some participants describing the 
difficulty in challenging established paths within their organisations.  As one senior 
health participant commented: 
 
“The conflict of interest [and] power of the doctors and the nurses, in 
executive leadership positions, has really gone unchallenged. They are 
members of the Board [who] if they say something it is very very difficult for 












Reviewing the Hypotheses 
 
Finally, based on the review of the literature, four hypotheses were established at the 
commencement of the research and these are revisited here: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A place-based, collaborative and system-wide approach to public sector 
management is an emerging paradigm in local services in England and commands 
support from senior managers. 
 
This hypothesis is partly proven, but the operational realities of delivery on the 
ground appear to be some distance from this statement. It is apparent from both the 
literature and this research that there has been significant attention afforded to a place-
based and system-wide approach to public services in England. This approach has 
frequently been espoused at both national and local levels as the desired model for 
public service delivery and has been seen by many as the solution to improving 
service, reducing costs and focusing services on citizens’ needs. Such an approach has 
attracted the support in principle of most if not all of the most senior public service 
leaders who participated in this research. However, the reality of embedding this into 
the fabric of how services are delivered is limited for a variety of reasons. As Offe 
and Wiesenthal (1986) identify, the formation of coalitions must involve a process in 
which multiple actors reinterpret their interests in ways that allow them to join 
together behind a common purpose and then assemble the resources to ensure the 
views of the coalition are addressed. In addition, as Hall (2016) highlights for major 
institutional change to take place in most cases discontent with existing institutions 
has to reach levels in which actors are convinced they should abandon procedures, 
which they are familiar with, and to enter uncertain territory. Moreover, as Kahneman 
and Tverseky (1979) indicate, people are typically more concerned about losing 
something they already have than about gaining something they do not have yet, even 
if the latter is of greater value.  
 
However, the survey responses and interviews suggest that there remains a positive 
appetite for change provided it does not conflict with organisational historical norms 
or existing path dependence. This research has identified that for these reasons a more 
practical, localised, systems-based solution is likely to enhance a more collaborative 
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response at this time. The absence of established processes for data sharing was a 
recurring theme from participants about the ineffectiveness of collaborative working.  
Despite an abundance of data, there is no apparent process to establish a collective 
understanding of demand beyond times of crisis (stage 1 in figure 1). There remains a 
reluctance to share data for reasons that have included the organisational and personal 
risk of sharing data, patient/public confidentiality, incompatible systems, and a lack of 
time and resources. Participants recognised the importance of effective data sharing to 
understand the demand for their services, as one senior local government participant 
said: 
“Public services are going to continue to find it very difficult. It's not easy but 
there are ways in which you can share data [but] you do need local 
protocols.” 
 
One senior health participants reinforced this and described how the partial sight of 
the data doesn’t allow them to provide effective services:  
 
“I see a different kind of data from the cut you will see and I see it in a 
different time frame from the time frame you see it. Well that’s nonsense and 
ridiculous and if you then add in local authorities, police and fire. Well, I 
simply don’t get any of that data. 
 
Another senior local government participant highlighted the variance of approach to 
this in different parts of the country: 
 
“There’s some local authorities who really understand data and predictive 
analytics. These can really help you intervene earlier, better target your 









One senior police participant highlighted the challenges and opportunities in data 
sharing: 
 
“I think it's just a pain, it’s difficult. It's difficult to pull it out and provide it 
somewhere. One of the things we're working on which is a going to be an 
amazing project, [is] our Data Science Innovation Centre. The whole 
principle of that is multi-agency data sharing to drive performance or to 
increase visibility on what's going on, to understand demand better.” 
 
This lack of data sharing presents a challenge for the organisations in this research in 
agreeing on appropriate strategic priorities due to the constraints from their historical 
evolvement, their path dependence and their overall accountability and performance 
management regimes. Stage 2 in figure 1 describes why agreeing on strategic 
priorities is a key component in the effective delivery of collaborative services and is 
necessary for the coordinated allocation of resources and timely intervention (stage 3 
in figure1). 
 
Therefore, while a place-based, collaborative and system-wide approach to public 
sector management is an emerging paradigm, both institutional barriers and other 
practicalities in systemising and embedding it means that this is yet to be firmly in 
place. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Despite an apparent consensus amongst politicians and system leaders, 
the existing performance frameworks and layers of accountability create more 
disincentives, than incentives to change. 
 
It would appear that this hypothesis is proven in that, despite an apparent consensus 
amongst politicians and system leaders that such an approach is supported, the 
existing performance frameworks, layers of accountability, historical norms and path 
dependence all continue to create more significant disincentives than incentives to 
change. While there is a compelling argument that such an approach commands 
support from senior leaders, the realities of the current incentives and disincentives in 
the system mean that such approaches are isolated and not effectively systemised. The 
current accountability mechanisms encourage more organisational, than system-
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based, approaches to service delivery, and while leaders understand, support and 
recognise the need to work differently, there are too many compelling reasons why 
this is yet to be common place. In addition, Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) ‘wedge 
of uncertainty’ of how different approaches would be treated within existing 
performance frameworks was evident in this research. 
 
Hypothesis 3: In the long term a change to legislation, organisational structures and 
accountability frameworks may be necessary to enable a more collaborative approach 
to public service delivery. 
 
It is apparent from this study that it is legitimate to claim that, in the long term, 
legislation, organisational structures and accountability frameworks may need to 
change, but this in itself is insufficient. This research has identified that legislation 
and reorganising structures do little to build the trust and relationships necessary for 
successful collaborative working on their own, as they are inadequate in unravelling 
the ingrained cultures and established ways of working established over generations. 
In addition, competing ways in which policy is formed and the historical approaches 
employed means that alignment is more complex than just legislation, structural 
change and accountability frameworks. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: In the short term, a more collective form of performance management 
may ease the passage towards a more collaborative delivery of services. 
 
This research supports this hypothesis, particularly when the focus is on those 'wicked 
issues’ (Ritter and Webber, 1973; Grint, 2005) that fit with each organisation's 
priorities and require cross-sector working to be resolved. However, there is limited 
evidence of a collective understanding of demand (stage 1 of figure 1), a robust 
process of resource allocation (stage 2 and 3 in figure 1) and an agreed localised 
performance management process (stage 4 in figure 1), which would all be necessary 
for this to succeed. Critically, the success of such an approach would also need to be 
cognisant of the complexity, competing priorities, accountabilities and the path 
dependence of each organisation and the enablers outlined in this study would need 
careful consideration to make this happen.  
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This was optimised in the comment from one senior health participant commented: 
 
“It [joint performance management] would be something I’d be interested in, 
but to be honest it’s a struggle in this organisation with the breadth of services 
we have……I think it would be a huge industry, I don’t think it would be 
completely beyond us, but I think it would require everybody being willing to 




This research identifies that leaders across each of the organisations in the study 
understand and value collaborative working, but it also identifies that the historical 
influence of top-down approaches, engendered by traditional public administration, 
and more recently by new public management, has created a conflicting path 
dependence. This was evident in the form of motivations, accountabilities, 
governance, capacity and other determinants that have led to collaboration not being 
effectively systemised and anchored in public services in the Bristol city region. The 
implications for policymakers is that more is required to harmonise the 
accountabilities and performance requirements of public service organisations if 
cross-sector working is to become ingrained, but the implications for local leaders are 
far more significant and compelling. Despite the challenges and constraints of 
existing accountability mechanisms and performance management processes, there is 
a pressing need for local leaders to identify and respond to those cross-sector issues 
that can only be resolved through a more collaborative approach across public 
services. However, this would require a shift from the underpinning theoretical 
paradigm to one in which the hallmarks of complexity theory and greater cross sector 
systems thinking are more apparent. This would also require an agreed sense of 
common purpose, greater trust and relinquishing some control. This research suggests 
that a contributory factor in shifting this paradigm towards more effective 
collaborative working might involve taking a bottom-up approach where 
organisational leaders come together to focus on a cross-cutting ‘wicked issues’.  This 
would also need to involve a greater understanding of each other’s organisational 
history and path dependence. Chapter Eight sets out in greater detail how this might 
be achieved. 
 162 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This research makes several contributions to the knowledge in the field on this topic 
through empirical research and testing existing theory.  
 
Firstly, it provides a unique perspective from a significant cohort of the most senior 
leaders in the three largest public service providers in the Bristol city region. The 
contributors occupy a position between policy makers and frontline delivery in which 
they are responsible for interpreting national policy and embedding this into 
operational delivery. The views of this cohort are relatively untested in empirical 
research in comparison to policy makers and front line actors. Extending the research 
across three separate organisations enabled greater comparisons and wider 
conclusions to be drawn. 
 
Secondly, it provides a thorough critique of the theoretical concepts of public 
administration and analyses their impact on the political and operational landscape in 
three of the largest public service providers in the Bristol city region. It also identifies 
how the approach differs across the individual organisations, despite them delivering 
public services in the same locality.  
 
Thirdly, it demonstrates how the historical context and path dependency of the 
organisations in this study have evolved in different ways and how specific critical 
junctures have impacted on this. This also demonstrates how this has contributed to 
the adoption of varying approaches to policy formation and public administration that 
have subsequently impacted on the operating practices in the organisations 
participating in this research. 
 
Fourthly, it provides a first-hand description of the conditions senior leaders believe 
are required for successful cross-sector collaborative working, challenging existing 
theories and assumptions.  
 
Finally, in Chapter Eight, it adds an original conceptual framework for collective 
service delivery that acts as a guide for practitioners in managing successful 
collaborative services. 
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Limitation and Transferability of the Research Findings 
 
The research was confined to three public services providers in the Bristol city region 
and only included those in the most senior leadership positions. It did not extend to all 
statutory or third sector public services or private business. It was therefore not 
representative of all services in the locality, or indeed the same services provided in 
other cities, or localities across the country. Therefore, it cannot claim to be a 
definitive position on the research topic. 
 
Identification of participants in the survey was reliant on each of the organisations 
identifying a random sample of one per cent of their most senior leaders, who were 
asked to complete a self-administered online survey. However, the environment in 
which they did this and the time they had available may all have had an impact on 
their responses. However, based on the confidence levels and intervals applied, the 
findings from the survey can claim to be representative of the top leaders across these 
three organisations, who are amongst the largest and arguably most influential public 
service providers in the Bristol city region. This would support a generalisation of the 
findings, but the transferability of these findings is less definitive as organisational 
size and context across England differ significantly.  
 
The participants in the interviews were selected based on their position in their 
respective organisations and not singled out to support or conflict with the 
researcher’s opinions. Conducting the interviews in a semi-structured manner and 
subsequent coding by the researcher all introduce potential bias due to the 
researcher’s interpretation, and therefore a definitive position cannot be drawn.  
However, the depth and consistency of the interviews mean that they do expand the 
findings of the survey. Therefore it is legitimate to claim that while not definitive, this 
research makes an empirical contribution to the knowledge and tests the theory on the 
research topic. 
 
The final chapter draws together the findings and conclusions in this research and sets 
out recommendations to apply a model for public service delivery intended to impact 
in a professional setting by bringing about a more effective and efficient collaborative 
response. 
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This chapter uses the findings from the exiting literature and the empirical research to 
identify several recommendations for the improvement of public services in the 
Bristol city region. Presented in a model for collective public service delivery (Figure 
12) these are not approached from the perspective of immediate wholesale system 
change, but are suggested as a way of more effectively tackling cross-cutting, 
complex and enduring issues.  Finally, the chapter sets out some recommendations for 
further research. 
 
This research has identified that despite considerable acceptance and support at the 
most senior levels for a more collaborative approach to the delivery of public 
services, existing accountability mechanisms, ingrained institutionalised cultures and 
path dependence, varying critical junctures, separate performance management 
processes, available time, individual funding streams, variable levels of trust in 
relationships, and the disillusionment when collaborative approaches have been tried 
and failed to gain traction, have all contributed to creating more disincentives than 
incentives to adopt a system-wide approach to the delivery of services in the Bristol 
city region.  
 
While whole system change maybe an unrealistic, short-term ambition, there remains 
considerable opportunity to improve the optimal value of collaborative approaches by 
focusing on those cross-cutting, complex and enduring issues that affect all the public 
service providers in this study. However, to achieve this, it would require a more 
significant understanding of the culture, operating practices and layers of 
accountability of the various stakeholders involved, and would need consensus and 







A Collective Service Model (Revisited) 
 
Figure 13 sets out a continuous model of collective service provision that identifies 
five key steps that have emerged during this research. Based on the existing literature 
and the research findings, if applied effectively, this should have a significant and 
positive impact on public service delivery in the Bristol city region. While yet to be 
tested, in conversations with senior leaders in each of the organisations, they 
generally supportive of the stages it contains. This approach is aimed at incremental 
realignment as opposed to a transformational ‘big bang’ and centres on reducing 
demand and costs, improving services, and building trust, confidence and consensus 
in facilitating further system change. 
 





Recommendation One: Establishing a Process of Collectively Understanding Demand 
and Service Failure 
 
It was apparent from this research that, despite an abundance of both ‘open source’ 
and ‘organisationally owned’ data, attempts to capture, analyse and understand the 
true extent of demand have struggled to gain traction for several reasons as outlined in 
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Chapter Seven. However, while the collection, control and dissemination of data has 
historically been the sole preserve of public bodies, this is no longer the case.  
 
The growth and availability of vast amounts of' 'open source' data in both structured 
text and unstructured non-text, such as videos, photos, social media content and 
Internet of things (IoT), means that organisations no longer have a monopoly on data 
gathering, and now anyone with a computer or mobile device can access limitless 
amounts of data online (Mayer-Schöenberger and Cukier, 2013). 
 
A systemised approach to collecting, analysing and understanding the evidence base 
of cross-sector demand and failure demand and to producing a single version of the 
truth is an important first step in tackling cross-cutting and enduring issues for public 
services in the Bristol city region 
 
Recommendation Two: Agreeing on a Small Number of Strategic Priorities 
 
The research established that, for several reasons, the ability to set out agreed 
priorities in a complex and competitive system is a challenge, particularly when the 
organisations involved have differing path dependence. This is accentuated when 
there is no collective understanding or agreement on what the demand for services 
looks like. 
 
Lord Michael Bichard, one of the principal architects of Total Place, was interviewed 
as part of this research and offered the following comment: 
 
"Choose two or three things where you can make progress in the next 12 
months, because if you make progress and can see the difference on the 
ground that's going to give you the strength to carry on. If you have spent the 
first 12 months just talking around processes and sub-committees and 





Therefore, it is recommended that, after the initial capture and analysis of the data, a 
small number of agreed priorities are established to tackle the cross-cutting, complex 
and enduring issues in the system. In choosing the priorities, cognisance and 
sensitivity of the history and path dependence of the organisations involved 
areessential. Examples of this might include services provided to the most vulnerable 
system users such as missing children, victims of domestic abuse, victims of street 
violence, rough sleepers or those with poor mental health. 
 
Recommendation Three: Intervention and Resource Allocation 
 
There has been considerable amounts of research on the ingredients of successful 
partnerships (Huxman and Vangen, 2000a), but even if demand was understood and 
priorities agreed, this research suggests that there is still insufficient cross-sector 
understanding of each other’s capability, capacity and constraints in delivering 
effective services, leading to a duplication of services, a lack of coordination and gaps 
in service provision. 
 
Therefore, a collective understanding of existing gateways to services and, where 
necessary, support in making the case for new ones needs to be considered. However, 
this would need to be underpinned by an agreed, cross-sector tasking and coordinating 
process if such an approach is to succeed.  
 
Tasking and coordinating is more readily associated with a command-and-control 
style of service delivery often associated with emergency services such as the police, 
and the police national intelligence model has not been without its problems (John & 
Maguire, 2004). Therefore it is recommended that consideration is given to a bespoke 
process of tasking and coordinating of resources aligned to the key strategic priorities 










Recommendation Four: Joint Performance Management 
 
This research has identified that, without an agreed process of joint performance 
management, a collaborative approach is unlikely to gain sustained traction. There 
was an acknowledgement from participants in this research that a process of joint 
performance management would be beneficial - indeed some believed it was already 
in place - but there were several barriers to this working effectively, which included a 
lack of trust, the finances to make it happen, a fear of increasing bureaucracy and the 
complexity and breadth of services. There was also recognition that for a successful 
process to be embedded, the area under scrutiny would need to be high on the list of 
both organisational and partner priorities and not conflict with existing organisational 
accountabilities or performance requirements. Therefore, a recommendation of this 




Recommendation Five: Combined Training and Leadership Development  
 
This is a critical element of the model as mutual understanding and organisational and 
individual responsibilities was a view commonly espoused by participants in this 
research when describing the necessary ingredients for effective cross-sector working. 
The collective de-brief of working practices and the joint training and development of 
leaders at all levels is essential, not only in developing relationships but in creating a 
shared understanding of the history and path dependence of each other’s organisations 















Suggestions for Further Research 
 
While this research provides a significant contribution to the knowledge it also has its 
limitations. Therefore, several additional areas for further research have been 
identified which would help to develop and test these research findings.  
 
Firstly, repeating the research methodology with a similar cohort outside the Bristol 
City region would provide comparative data that would either support or challenge 
the legitimacy of the findings in this research. While an identical environment is 
unlikely to be replicated, the additional variables in an alternative setting might be 
valuable in understanding the legitimacy of the conclusions in this research, or 
whether these research findings are transferable beyond the Bristol City region.  
 
Secondly, repeating the study with a cohort of less senior leaders within the three 
organisations that participated in this research to try to establish whether the findings 
were unique to the most senior leaders, or whether they were consistent with the 
views of those leaders closer to the front end of service delivery would be of value. 
 
Thirdly, testing the collective service model presented in figure 13 in an operational 
environment. This would be valuable in testing the claims made in this research that a 
more bottom-up service-led approach to collaboration would be more effective in the 
short term than a more top-down organisational response. This might involve a closer 
focus on each of the components of the model to assess their relevance, 
appropriateness and necessity. 
 
Fourthly, this research has outlined considerable support for a whole systems 
approach to the delivery of public services. However, a study to test the extent to 
which collaborative working improves efficiency or effectiveness and whether there 
are sufficient governance and performance frameworks in place to test this would be 
worthy of further exploration. 
 
Finally, the importance of shared organisational values was a consistent theme from 
participants in this research. Therefore firstly examining the current stated values of 
public service providers in the Bristol city region, and examining whether these are 
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shaped by the historical institutionalism and path dependence of the individual 
organisation and the identifying whether any disparity in stated values is a barrier to 
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